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You can find the abuse of animals morally objectionably (I do), but comparing it to human slavery rests on a grossly false moral equivalence between human being

You can find the abuse of animals morally objectionably (I do), but comparing it to human slavery rests on a grossly false moral equivalence between human beings and other animals. Indeed, it usually rests on sentiment or convention rather than a sound and rationally grounded objective ethics. Chattel slavery was first and foremost morally objectionable, because human beings have rights that conflict with its practice. Rights are rooted in two properties human beings have, namely, the ability to comprehend one's actions and one's situation, and the ability to freely choose between alternatives. If I can understand my actions and I can freely choose to act one way or another, then I am, in principle [1], a moral agent and thus morally responsible for my actions. But for me to be able to fulfill those responsibilities as a moral agent, certain conditions must be met and this claim on others to supply me with those conditions we call rights. Without those conditions, I cannot do what I have a responsibility to do. Non-human animals [2] lack these properties, which is why we do not hold them morally accountable, and because they don't have responsibilities, they do not have rights. (I realize that it has become customary to pull rights out of thin air without the slightest moral scruple or justification about doing so.) Of course, it would be morally objectionable for us to torment animals, but we are free to make use of animals in ways that do not contract the human good, rightly understood. [0] The only sound, objective basis for morality is human nature, which determines what actions accord with it and which contradict it. So, it is morally objectionable to torment animals, even though they have no rights, because - in short - it contradicts human nature and thus my good as a human being. Sadism is a serious defect. [1] I say "in principle", because in practice, as you'll recall, mens rea has legal significance for a reason. If I kill someone by accident, then I did not choose freely to kill him, and so I have not committed murder, only involuntary manslaughter or whatever. If I kill someone, because I believed he was a monster from the 7th dimension trying to kill me, then I did not comprehend my situation and thus the nature of my action. So, in practice, I may fail to exercise what in principle I have the power to do by virtue of my nature as a human being. But other animals do not have this power by nature. [2] To preempt the inevitable petty drive-by pedant, I define "human" as any animal with these two properties, so according to this view, an intelligent alien from another planet would also be human, despite occupying a place in a separate phylogenetic tree or whatever.

FridayoLeary 1y ago
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jmdeon 1y ago
It sounds like you're conflating legal arguments with moral ones. You're saying animals lack rights so it's morally okay to enslave/make use of them? I'd argue it's much baser than that. Animals have feelings and often feel very bad when kept in enslaved conditions. Since humans can understand the pain they inflict on enslaved animals, then it's wrong of us to continue enslaving them when we have alternatives that are just as healthy for us, if not more healthy. I would also say your assumption that pigs do not comprehend their actions and cannot choose between alternatives is false.
- lo_zamoyski 1y ago
  > It sounds like you're conflating legal arguments with moral ones. You're saying animals lack rights so it's morally okay to enslave/make use of them? I am not conflating moral and legal arguments, though the legal is a determination of the moral (contra something stupid and tyrannical like legal positivism). Genuine law is not arbitrary or established by fiat. There are general moral principles, and the law plays a role in determining their particular, contingent application in a circumscribed and prudential manner within the given circumstances. That is why an unjust law is not a real law and why within one jurisdiction something may be legitimately legal while it is legitimately illegal in another. So I'm not sure how you arrived at that conclusion. As for enslaving animals, I would reject that it is possible to enslave non-human animals as a matter of metaphysical fact. Non-human animals can be held in captivity or employed for labor, but this is not slavery. To be enslaved presupposes the properties I explained. However, the absence of rights does not mean a right to do whatever you please with animals. It is immoral to torment or to abuse an animal, even if the animal doesn't have rights in this regard. > I'd argue it's much baser than that. Animals have feelings and often feel very bad when kept in enslaved conditions. Since humans can understand the pain they inflict on enslaved animals, then it's wrong of us to continue enslaving them when we have alternatives that are just as healthy for us, if not more healthy. We have to make distinctions here. First, one I already used above, is the distinction between rights and morality. That is, the absence of a right does not entail a total absence of moral constraints or considerations in the relevant respect. I have no problem with criticisms of the contingent and particular conditions of, say, factory farming. I would agree that conditions in which animal welfare is better is preferable, but on moral grounds and by prioritizing human good. But these are matters of prudence, not principle. Whereas it is intrinsically evil to employ people in chattel slavery[0], it is not intrinsically evil to hold animals in captivity or to use them for labor. > I would also say your assumption that pigs do not comprehend their actions and cannot choose between alternatives is false. Okay, and I would disagree with you - it is an inference, not an assumption on my part - because pigs lack the kind of language that entails the kind of intentionality that would make rationality possible (which is what understanding presupposes), something free choice presupposes. That is, they "choose" based on sense impressions and appetite (in the broad sense of the term). [0] Emphasis on chattel. Some forms of servitude are not immoral.

FridayoLeary 1y ago

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jmdeon 1y ago

It sounds like you're conflating legal arguments with moral ones. You're saying animals lack rights so it's morally okay to enslave/make use of them? I'd argue it's much baser than that. Animals have feelings and often feel very bad when kept in enslaved conditions. Since humans can understand the pain they inflict on enslaved animals, then it's wrong of us to continue enslaving them when we have alternatives that are just as healthy for us, if not more healthy. I would also say your assumption that pigs do not comprehend their actions and cannot choose between alternatives is false.

lo_zamoyski 1y ago
> It sounds like you're conflating legal arguments with moral ones. You're saying animals lack rights so it's morally okay to enslave/make use of them? I am not conflating moral and legal arguments, though the legal is a determination of the moral (contra something stupid and tyrannical like legal positivism). Genuine law is not arbitrary or established by fiat. There are general moral principles, and the law plays a role in determining their particular, contingent application in a circumscribed and prudential manner within the given circumstances. That is why an unjust law is not a real law and why within one jurisdiction something may be legitimately legal while it is legitimately illegal in another. So I'm not sure how you arrived at that conclusion. As for enslaving animals, I would reject that it is possible to enslave non-human animals as a matter of metaphysical fact. Non-human animals can be held in captivity or employed for labor, but this is not slavery. To be enslaved presupposes the properties I explained. However, the absence of rights does not mean a right to do whatever you please with animals. It is immoral to torment or to abuse an animal, even if the animal doesn't have rights in this regard. > I'd argue it's much baser than that. Animals have feelings and often feel very bad when kept in enslaved conditions. Since humans can understand the pain they inflict on enslaved animals, then it's wrong of us to continue enslaving them when we have alternatives that are just as healthy for us, if not more healthy. We have to make distinctions here. First, one I already used above, is the distinction between rights and morality. That is, the absence of a right does not entail a total absence of moral constraints or considerations in the relevant respect. I have no problem with criticisms of the contingent and particular conditions of, say, factory farming. I would agree that conditions in which animal welfare is better is preferable, but on moral grounds and by prioritizing human good. But these are matters of prudence, not principle. Whereas it is intrinsically evil to employ people in chattel slavery[0], it is not intrinsically evil to hold animals in captivity or to use them for labor. > I would also say your assumption that pigs do not comprehend their actions and cannot choose between alternatives is false. Okay, and I would disagree with you - it is an inference, not an assumption on my part - because pigs lack the kind of language that entails the kind of intentionality that would make rationality possible (which is what understanding presupposes), something free choice presupposes. That is, they "choose" based on sense impressions and appetite (in the broad sense of the term). [0] Emphasis on chattel. Some forms of servitude are not immoral.