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I wouldn't call the idea of physical access not being the highest level (to hardware state) particularly innocuous. From the article - "You can't even sell it [
by mindslight 18y ago
I wouldn't call the idea of physical access not being the highest level (to hardware state) particularly innocuous. From the article - "You can't even sell it [a stolen drive] on eBay". Theft deterrence is nice, but the piles of bricked drives left over from xbox upgrades are disgusting.
The same eviction of malware can be achieved through a documented hardware interface to the lowest levels of microcode (say, JTAG). The current problem is not due to openness, but closed CPU microcode.
- eru 18y ago> The same eviction of malware can be achieved through a documented hardware interface to the lowest levels of microcode (say, JTAG). The current problem is not due to openness, but closed CPU microcode. Would you please elaborate?
- mindslight 18y agokragen's comment hits the nail right on the head. Any software update system suffers from the ability to install a "rootkit" that can emulate the update mechanism itself to ensure its own survival. I was mistaken in thinking that CPU microcode was stored in non-volatile memory on the CPU itself, but the same idea goes for any area in which such rootkits can be installed. The simple solution is to allow easy updating of that base firmware through a dedicated hardware interface. A socketed DIP isn't hip anymore (eww through-hole), but a USB device header on the motherboard would certainly work. I'd feel better about trusted computing technology if one of their design goals wasn't preventing physical "tampering" but instead they provided unfettered access through a debug port. However, it seems like they're aiming for the exact opposite in order to facilitate naive software, theft deterrence, and business model preservation.
- tptacek 18y agoCan you explain more about how the TPM facilitates naive software and business model preservation? That's not my experience with it, but maybe you've had a different experience.
- mindslight 18y agoCertain restrictions are impossible to encode in protocols where one's computer acts as their agent. For example, it's impossible to restrict the duplication or longevity of a document. Remote attestation restricts what code can be used to run a protocol, and thus enables implementation of such naive rules. I don't currently use remote attestation for anything, but it's a matter of time until some bozo decides that remote attestation is the way to solve online banking security ("if only we could be sure they weren't running malware!"), and brings the technology stack mainstream. When that happens, the non-techies (seeing no distinction) will enforce their business rules on end user's computers (they occasionally try to do this now, but run up against reality). Client-side-only verification of form fields may be laughable now, but won't be so funny with no incentive to fix it because common people cannot exploit it.