4 ms·

There exist a number of possibilities, all of which are equally likely 1. they are lying. The most obvious one. It's legal and is expected that law enforcement

There exist a number of possibilities, all of which are equally likely 1. they are lying. The most obvious one. It's legal and is expected that law enforcement lie in the United States. 2. defendant was so dumb he had the funds in a crypto exchange account 3. Law enforcement has no idea what keys or crypto is. Also likely, law enforcement in the US is not required to be competent. 4. defendant was so dumb he landed on a flight in the US. This would be exceptionally stupid 5. The US military or the intelligence community either coerced the keys out of him or just beat the keys out of him. There are no jurisdictional issues with this approach. From what I understand this guy isn't very popular in any country, so few countries would care. Even fewer would want to publicly discuss how their sovereignty was violated 6. A random member of the criminal organization had access to most but not all of the keys. He showed up at a US embassy and said "well I did lots of bad stuff. I'd like to disappear now & not at a location named Guantanmo! How about we cut a deal" My personal bet is on #3. It's effectively impossible for anyone to prove they don't have the keys. The only person who could do that would the defendant, who has no interest in doing so.

mrandish 1y ago
Good reply. While #2 and #4 are certainly possible, I find it hard to believe this guy gets this far for this long without being sufficiently paranoid and street smart. I think the most likely is a combo variant of #5 and #6. Maybe the USG (or a cooperating government) got leverage on one of his lieutenants - like lieutenant's adult kid goes to NYC to party for a weekend with friends without telling daddy and despite it being against dad's rules. USG quietly holds the kid under some immigration pretext (much easier these days) and forces the lieutenant to put a USB thumb drive in his boss's 'special' PC. Alternatively, a probable weak point with most overtly criminal kingpins who accumulate literal billions is they really can't trust anyone around them to not steal it. So the guy probably has to keep the crypto keys to his 'big wad' physically with him on a mobile device or memory stick, maybe protected only by a password short enough he can remember it. In that scenario, the USG just does a 'sneak and peek' and images the device, maybe while the guy is transiting a third country. Then it's just a matter of either using one of the NSA's tier 1 vulns on the mobile device image or deploying the NSA's super-computer farm to crack the 'human-memorable' password. If so, it would have been much smarter for the guy to control access to the 'big wad' with split keys separated on multiple devices - and only keep one required part around his neck. Then neither the 'sneak and peak' nor the 'crowbar to the balls' methods would work. In any of those scenarios, the very interesting part is it shows the Trump admin and Trump's new FBI head Kash Patel are willing to cross some new lines which haven't been publicly crossed before - like using secret intelligence assets for purely criminal enforcement. Note: I think the USG has done this before but it's been pretty rare and always been in ways that were unseen or otherwise deniable, because the CIA/NSA have been extremely resistant to using their best toys for fear of losing their best toys. I suspect the Trump admin has crushed this resistance. A potentially relevant fact is Kash Patel was previously on the National Security Council during Trump's first term, so he'd be familiar with intel assets. Obviously, in the near-term that's bad news for a handful of major international criminals and in the long-term it may be bad for US intelligence capabilities (as the reasons for CIA/NSA resistance weren't baseless).

mrandish 1y ago

Good reply. While #2 and #4 are certainly possible, I find it hard to believe this guy gets this far for this long without being sufficiently paranoid and street smart. I think the most likely is a combo variant of #5 and #6. Maybe the USG (or a cooperating government) got leverage on one of his lieutenants - like lieutenant's adult kid goes to NYC to party for a weekend with friends without telling daddy and despite it being against dad's rules. USG quietly holds the kid under some immigration pretext (much easier these days) and forces the lieutenant to put a USB thumb drive in his boss's 'special' PC. Alternatively, a probable weak point with most overtly criminal kingpins who accumulate literal billions is they really can't trust anyone around them to not steal it. So the guy probably has to keep the crypto keys to his 'big wad' physically with him on a mobile device or memory stick, maybe protected only by a password short enough he can remember it. In that scenario, the USG just does a 'sneak and peek' and images the device, maybe while the guy is transiting a third country. Then it's just a matter of either using one of the NSA's tier 1 vulns on the mobile device image or deploying the NSA's super-computer farm to crack the 'human-memorable' password. If so, it would have been much smarter for the guy to control access to the 'big wad' with split keys separated on multiple devices - and only keep one required part around his neck. Then neither the 'sneak and peak' nor the 'crowbar to the balls' methods would work. In any of those scenarios, the very interesting part is it shows the Trump admin and Trump's new FBI head Kash Patel are willing to cross some new lines which haven't been publicly crossed before - like using secret intelligence assets for purely criminal enforcement. Note: I think the USG has done this before but it's been pretty rare and always been in ways that were unseen or otherwise deniable, because the CIA/NSA have been extremely resistant to using their best toys for fear of losing their best toys. I suspect the Trump admin has crushed this resistance. A potentially relevant fact is Kash Patel was previously on the National Security Council during Trump's first term, so he'd be familiar with intel assets. Obviously, in the near-term that's bad news for a handful of major international criminals and in the long-term it may be bad for US intelligence capabilities (as the reasons for CIA/NSA resistance weren't baseless).