5 ms·

Your comment is disingenuous -- the article isn't arguing against TLS. It is arguing against WebPKI. You can stop ISP ad injection with solutions much less co

Your comment is disingenuous -- the article isn't arguing against TLS. It is arguing against WebPKI. You can stop ISP ad injection with solutions much less complex than WebPKI. Simply using TOFU-certificates (Trust On First Use) would achieve this. It also gives you the "people who controlled this website the first time I visited it still control it" guarantee you mention in your last paragraph. TOFU isn't ideal, but it's an easy counterexample to your claims.

blenderob 1y ago
> Simply using TOFU-certificates (Trust On First Use) would achieve this. As a user how would I know if I should trust the website's public key on first use?
- octoberfranklin 1y ago
  The same way you know if you should trust the WebPKI Rube-Goldberg-contraption: you don't. It's a counterexample, not a recommendation. If you need this guarantee, use self-certifying hostnames like Tor *.onion sites do, where the URL carries the public key. More examples of this: https://codeberg.org/amjoseph/not-your-keys-not-your-name https://codeberg.org/amjoseph/not-your-keys-not-your-name
  - akerl_ 1y ago
    I trust the WebPKI infra quite a bit. Cert validation is publicly logged, CAs that do nefarious things get booted from browser trust stores. I can set which CAs can sign certs for my domains, and monitor if any are issued that I didn't expect.
- akerl_ 1y ago
  I guess we could organize regional parties where site operators and users meet up and exchange key material. I'm sure that will scale and won't have any problems of its own.
- 1718627440 1y ago
  The same way I know which real person is serving me the website. I don't I merely know that the owner doesn't change randomly.
  - majewsky 1y ago
    TOFU does not help if the ISP is consistently malicious, and serves me the MITM certificate on first use.
    - 1718627440 1y ago
      In that case the ISP becomes the real website. If this is always consistent, then you are always talking with the same entity. This only matters, when your view of the entity isn't solely determined by the domain name. For example you care when someone impersonates google.com, because you expect it to belong to Alphabet Inc., you perceive impersonating when the entity you are talking to changes. When some domain is always constantly resolved to your ISP, then that domain is owned by the ISP in your network.
      - blenderob 1y ago
        > In that case the ISP becomes the real website. But that's exactly what we're trying to avoid. When I want to visit my bank website, I don't want the ISP to become the real website. I don't understand your comments. Your solution to how I trust the website on first use (TOFU) is to trust whatever public key the middle man (the ISP) serves? If you're okay with that, I guess you don't have a problem. But I'm not okay with that, so TOFU doesn't solve my problem.
        1718627440 1y ago
        No, in this case this is not the real website, but it's not because of the ISP, it is because you consider that website "my bank website". That's the real issue here. It's not different than someone registering a (similar) domain name and you thinking that this is owned by the bank. If you were to redesign name and address resolution, to enforce connecting to the real physical world entity, this should happen out-of-band. Well, know that I think of it, I think that's what the GNU Name System is trying to address: https://www.gnunet.org/en/gns.html https://www.gnunet.org/en/gns.html . ----- The question seams to be, what do you consider to be the real website? The one that answers to your request? Then the ISP is the real website. In your example you seem to have preconceptions of who might own the website, but these are outside of the network. TLS from Let's Encrypt only enforces that the entity never changes. There are validation schemes where the physical/legal entity is validated, but this is not the case here.
iamnothere 1y ago
TOFU would allow the ISP to MITM every connection and then serve you ads. The ISP could simply provide their own cert to you.

blenderob 1y ago

> Simply using TOFU-certificates (Trust On First Use) would achieve this. As a user how would I know if I should trust the website's public key on first use?

octoberfranklin 1y ago
The same way you know if you should trust the WebPKI Rube-Goldberg-contraption: you don't. It's a counterexample, not a recommendation. If you need this guarantee, use self-certifying hostnames like Tor *.onion sites do, where the URL carries the public key. More examples of this: https://codeberg.org/amjoseph/not-your-keys-not-your-name https://codeberg.org/amjoseph/not-your-keys-not-your-name
- akerl_ 1y ago
  I trust the WebPKI infra quite a bit. Cert validation is publicly logged, CAs that do nefarious things get booted from browser trust stores. I can set which CAs can sign certs for my domains, and monitor if any are issued that I didn't expect.
akerl_ 1y ago
I guess we could organize regional parties where site operators and users meet up and exchange key material. I'm sure that will scale and won't have any problems of its own.
1718627440 1y ago
The same way I know which real person is serving me the website. I don't I merely know that the owner doesn't change randomly.
- majewsky 1y ago
  TOFU does not help if the ISP is consistently malicious, and serves me the MITM certificate on first use.
  - 1718627440 1y ago
    In that case the ISP becomes the real website. If this is always consistent, then you are always talking with the same entity. This only matters, when your view of the entity isn't solely determined by the domain name. For example you care when someone impersonates google.com, because you expect it to belong to Alphabet Inc., you perceive impersonating when the entity you are talking to changes. When some domain is always constantly resolved to your ISP, then that domain is owned by the ISP in your network.
    - blenderob 1y ago
      > In that case the ISP becomes the real website. But that's exactly what we're trying to avoid. When I want to visit my bank website, I don't want the ISP to become the real website. I don't understand your comments. Your solution to how I trust the website on first use (TOFU) is to trust whatever public key the middle man (the ISP) serves? If you're okay with that, I guess you don't have a problem. But I'm not okay with that, so TOFU doesn't solve my problem.
      - 1718627440 1y ago
        No, in this case this is not the real website, but it's not because of the ISP, it is because you consider that website "my bank website". That's the real issue here. It's not different than someone registering a (similar) domain name and you thinking that this is owned by the bank. If you were to redesign name and address resolution, to enforce connecting to the real physical world entity, this should happen out-of-band. Well, know that I think of it, I think that's what the GNU Name System is trying to address: https://www.gnunet.org/en/gns.html https://www.gnunet.org/en/gns.html . ----- The question seams to be, what do you consider to be the real website? The one that answers to your request? Then the ISP is the real website. In your example you seem to have preconceptions of who might own the website, but these are outside of the network. TLS from Let's Encrypt only enforces that the entity never changes. There are validation schemes where the physical/legal entity is validated, but this is not the case here.

iamnothere 1y ago

TOFU would allow the ISP to MITM every connection and then serve you ads. The ISP could simply provide their own cert to you.