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Over recent user privacy (and security) crackdowns from Google, these OS upgrades seem to be becoming more appealing. Can anyone comment on what differs Lineage

Over recent user privacy (and security) crackdowns from Google, these OS upgrades seem to be becoming more appealing. Can anyone comment on what differs Lineage from something like GrapheneOS?

saidinesh5 1y ago
A few years ago, Lineage was just a customizable tinkerer friendly AOSP. It served as a base for a lot more Android distros. It was just a smoother Android variant with features like double tap on the notification bar to sleep, better integrated root support, more built in theming options. Graphene OS was only available for a few Pixel Devices whose source was fully available and mainly focused on security features like improved permissions and more anti tracking features. To give an example, a company I worked for shipped it's phones with a Lineage OS base with a few patches from Graphene OS to replace default ntp and connectivity check servers.
drnick1 1y ago
Graphene is probably better on the devices that support both (Pixels), but since hardware support is so (intentionally) limited, it kind of a moot point. Also the Graphene community is kind of obsessed with "security" and does not seem to place much emphasis on freedom/hackability.
- kahnclusions 1y ago
  Why the scare quotes? Graphene’s focus on security is legitimate and well founded. They are the only phone OS that is consistently safe from hacking by the likes of Cellebrite long after all other androids have fallen.
  - udev4096 1y ago
    And having security focused settings by default. For instance, the https://localmess.github.io https://localmess.github.io tracking attempt was prevented on Vanadium (a browser maintained by GOS). Another serious vulnerability from top of my mind was TapTrap (https://taptrap.click/ https://taptrap.click/), which was fixed by GOS [1] few months ago. Android is still vulnerable to it! [1] - https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025070700:~:text=only%20permit%20third%20party%20apps%20to%20use%20custom%20activity%20animations%20for%20transitions%20between%20their%20own%20activities%20to%20prevent%20a%20recently%20disclosed%20Android%20tapjacking%20vulnerability%20branded%20as%20TapTrap https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025070700:~:text=only%20per...
  - Borealid 1y ago
    Let's define "more secure" as "preventing a particular behavior that is against the device owner's conscious or unconscious wishes". It would be "more secure" to have a per-application firewall that blocks particular apps from outbound traffic over certain networks or to certain destinations. This prevents a malicious app from consuming roaming data. LineageOS can have that, at the owner's preference. Graphene explicitly forbids it. It would be "more secure" to allow backing up apps and all their data. This would mitigate the damage of ransomware. Graphene, again, forbids it (following google guidelines prioritizing the wishes of an app's developer over the device owner). There are many such examples. Lineage is philosophically owned by the person who installed it onto the phone. Graphene is owned by the Graphene devs, NOT the phone owner. Sometimes the Graphene devs purposefully choose to let software on the device restrict the valid owner of that device.
    - ysnp 1y ago
      >It would be "more secure" to have a per-application firewall that blocks particular apps from outbound traffic over certain networks or to certain destinations. This prevents a malicious app from consuming roaming data. LineageOS can have that, at the owner's preference. Graphene explicitly forbids it. Not sure what is meant by forbidding it? GrapheneOS provides per-app network access control via a user-controllable Network permission which is not implemented in AOSP or LineageOS afaik. They do not forbid using local firewall/filtering apps like RethinkDNS (to enforce mobile data only or Wi-Fi only iirc) and InviZible. They only warn that 'blocks particular apps from outbound traffic ..to certain destinations' cannot be enforced once an app has network access which makes sense to me. >It would be "more secure" to allow backing up apps and all their data. This would mitigate the damage of ransomware. Graphene, again, forbids it (following google guidelines prioritizing the wishes of an app's developer over the device owner). Contact scopes, storage scopes, the sensors permission and the network permission are examples that show precisely the opposite (GrapheneOS prioritises the device owner over the application developers). To my understanding, the backup app built-in to GrapheneOS even 'simulates' a device-to-device transfer mode to get around apps not being comfortable with data being exfiltrated to Google Drive. That being said, I understand they have plans to completely revamp the backup experience once they have the resources to do so.
  - sotix 1y ago
    I just read that they changed their stance, but for a long time, they were against implementing RCS and said users should be using another tool like Signal. That ignores real world scenarios where users ended up using SMS rather than RCS, which was encrypted with Google messages. Of course, there's more nuance to the discussion, but I found myself a few years ago having gone from encrypted messaging on an iPhone by default to encrypted messaging on stock Android with RCS to unencrypted messaging on GrapheneOS. I thought that was certainly less secure for myself and likely the average user. But they did share valid concerns about their reasoning and most other aspects of the OS certainly have a great focus on security.
    - strcat 1y ago
      GrapheneOS never had a stance against implementing RCS and has supported RCS at an OS level for years. The issue was that the only available RCS app in practice is Google Messages and it requires privileged access for Google Play services, which goes against the sandboxed Google Play approach. We worked around it by making it so that the access granted to Google Messages when it's set as the SMS/MMS/RCS app also applies to Google Play services where part of the implementation is done. iOS does not currently implement end-to-end encryption for RCS. End-to-end encryption for RCS is exclusive to conversations between Google Messages users. Apple has said they'll implement the new MLS end-to-end encryption for RCS but has not done it and has provided no timeline for doing it. It took them a very long time to implement basic RCS support and this will likely take a long time too. Google Messages has not yet moved to the new MLS encryption, but it will need to do that too in order for iOS implementing it to provide end-to-end encryption across them.
      - sotix 1y ago
        I appreciate the response and how you're proactive about following things! That's great to know RCS is now possible on GrapheneOS. That's very pragmatic. For now, I have switched back to iOS due to a significant majority of my contacts using iMessage, so I'm back to encrypted chats again. Hopefully the future of RCS changes things while America struggles with using a unified messenger. I dream of using a dumb phone with RCS.
Semaphor 1y ago
Security & Privacy: GrapheneOS Freedom & Features: LineageOS That is not to say you have no freedom or extra features with Graphene, or no security with Lineage, it’s just what either project has very clearly as main target. I do miss some features since switching to GrapheneOS (customizable on screen nav, volume rocker for cursor control), but I’m very happy with stuff like sandboxed google play services.
- strcat 1y ago
  GrapheneOS provides a lot of features not available in LineageOS. Our focus for is privacy, security and replacing Google apps/services. The features we add aren't only privacy and security features. We provide our own network location and geocoding support. Local text-to-speech and speech-to-text are being developed. It also provides a bunch of assorted features such as forcing the availability of VoLTE, VoNR, VoWiFi and 5G. https://grapheneos.org/features https://grapheneos.org/features is an overview of what's provided compared to AOSP but doesn't cover everything yet, especially recent additions.
tcfhgj 1y ago
GOS only works on Google phones
- strcat 1y ago
  That's only because Pixels are the only devices meeting the hardware security and update requirements. GrapheneOS has an OEM partner working on meeting our requirements for some of their future devices. That's how GrapheneOS is able to provide our security preview releases with security patches from 3 months of upcoming Android Security Bulletins.
palata 1y ago
I have used both, and I can personally use my smartphone properly with both. GrapheneOS is more strict about security, making it more secure but less accessible (at the moment you can only run GrapheneOS on Pixel phones). I am happy with GrapheneOS' policy: that's exactly why I use GrapheneOS, to the point where I bought a Pixel just for GrapheneOS. Many people complain about GrapheneOS not supporting other phones. IMO it's the other way round: the other Android manufacturers do not support GrapheneOS. If you really want GrapheneOS to lower their security in order to run on another phone, what you want is actually LineageOS.
- nunobrito 1y ago
  There is little point in fortifying the front-door when the backdoor is wide open. The hardware itself should never be trusted when being produced by a vendor like Google and cannot be verified on the component level. Their business model completely revolves in reducing your private sphere and sell it to others. Never use google hardware if you are serious about security.
  - ysnp 1y ago
    All mobile computing and connectivity hardware is unverifiable in reality and by design. It's not some property exclusive to Google Pixels. Their business model also does not involve selling data afaik, it's selling access to their adspaces [1] all over the internet including the ability to target people (based on information Google jealously hoard). They stand to lose just as much as most other OEMs if they did suspicious things in hardware just like Apple, Samsung etc. If you're serious about security you will avoid using OEMs that have unfortunate patch gaps which leave device owners at the mercy to *known vulnerabilities* [1][2][3][4] as well as unknown threats which is fortunately one of GrapheneOS's many reasonable device support requirements. [1] https://blog.google/products/ads-commerce/more-effective-media-buying-on-apps/ https://blog.google/products/ads-commerce/more-effective-med... [2] https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap [3] https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap-2020 https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap-2020 [4] https://www.android-device-security.org/talks/ https://www.android-device-security.org/talks/ [5] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/vulnerability-management/research-analysis-and-guidance-ensuring-android-security-update-adoption/4216714 https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/vulnerability-manag...
strcat 1y ago
GrapheneOS is a privacy and security hardened OS. The third party comparison table at https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm focused on privacy and security provides a good overview. The GrapheneOS features page at https://grapheneos.org/features https://grapheneos.org/features provides an overview of many of the changes it makes compared to standard Android.

Over recent user privacy (and security) crackdowns from Google, these OS upgrades seem to be becoming more appealing. Can anyone comment on what differs Lineage from something like GrapheneOS?

saidinesh5 1y ago

A few years ago, Lineage was just a customizable tinkerer friendly AOSP. It served as a base for a lot more Android distros. It was just a smoother Android variant with features like double tap on the notification bar to sleep, better integrated root support, more built in theming options. Graphene OS was only available for a few Pixel Devices whose source was fully available and mainly focused on security features like improved permissions and more anti tracking features. To give an example, a company I worked for shipped it's phones with a Lineage OS base with a few patches from Graphene OS to replace default ntp and connectivity check servers.

drnick1 1y ago

Graphene is probably better on the devices that support both (Pixels), but since hardware support is so (intentionally) limited, it kind of a moot point. Also the Graphene community is kind of obsessed with "security" and does not seem to place much emphasis on freedom/hackability.

kahnclusions 1y ago
Why the scare quotes? Graphene’s focus on security is legitimate and well founded. They are the only phone OS that is consistently safe from hacking by the likes of Cellebrite long after all other androids have fallen.
- udev4096 1y ago
  And having security focused settings by default. For instance, the https://localmess.github.io https://localmess.github.io tracking attempt was prevented on Vanadium (a browser maintained by GOS). Another serious vulnerability from top of my mind was TapTrap (https://taptrap.click/ https://taptrap.click/), which was fixed by GOS [1] few months ago. Android is still vulnerable to it! [1] - https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025070700:~:text=only%20permit%20third%20party%20apps%20to%20use%20custom%20activity%20animations%20for%20transitions%20between%20their%20own%20activities%20to%20prevent%20a%20recently%20disclosed%20Android%20tapjacking%20vulnerability%20branded%20as%20TapTrap https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025070700:~:text=only%20per...
- Borealid 1y ago
  Let's define "more secure" as "preventing a particular behavior that is against the device owner's conscious or unconscious wishes". It would be "more secure" to have a per-application firewall that blocks particular apps from outbound traffic over certain networks or to certain destinations. This prevents a malicious app from consuming roaming data. LineageOS can have that, at the owner's preference. Graphene explicitly forbids it. It would be "more secure" to allow backing up apps and all their data. This would mitigate the damage of ransomware. Graphene, again, forbids it (following google guidelines prioritizing the wishes of an app's developer over the device owner). There are many such examples. Lineage is philosophically owned by the person who installed it onto the phone. Graphene is owned by the Graphene devs, NOT the phone owner. Sometimes the Graphene devs purposefully choose to let software on the device restrict the valid owner of that device.
  - ysnp 1y ago
    >It would be "more secure" to have a per-application firewall that blocks particular apps from outbound traffic over certain networks or to certain destinations. This prevents a malicious app from consuming roaming data. LineageOS can have that, at the owner's preference. Graphene explicitly forbids it. Not sure what is meant by forbidding it? GrapheneOS provides per-app network access control via a user-controllable Network permission which is not implemented in AOSP or LineageOS afaik. They do not forbid using local firewall/filtering apps like RethinkDNS (to enforce mobile data only or Wi-Fi only iirc) and InviZible. They only warn that 'blocks particular apps from outbound traffic ..to certain destinations' cannot be enforced once an app has network access which makes sense to me. >It would be "more secure" to allow backing up apps and all their data. This would mitigate the damage of ransomware. Graphene, again, forbids it (following google guidelines prioritizing the wishes of an app's developer over the device owner). Contact scopes, storage scopes, the sensors permission and the network permission are examples that show precisely the opposite (GrapheneOS prioritises the device owner over the application developers). To my understanding, the backup app built-in to GrapheneOS even 'simulates' a device-to-device transfer mode to get around apps not being comfortable with data being exfiltrated to Google Drive. That being said, I understand they have plans to completely revamp the backup experience once they have the resources to do so.
- sotix 1y ago
  I just read that they changed their stance, but for a long time, they were against implementing RCS and said users should be using another tool like Signal. That ignores real world scenarios where users ended up using SMS rather than RCS, which was encrypted with Google messages. Of course, there's more nuance to the discussion, but I found myself a few years ago having gone from encrypted messaging on an iPhone by default to encrypted messaging on stock Android with RCS to unencrypted messaging on GrapheneOS. I thought that was certainly less secure for myself and likely the average user. But they did share valid concerns about their reasoning and most other aspects of the OS certainly have a great focus on security.
  - strcat 1y ago
    GrapheneOS never had a stance against implementing RCS and has supported RCS at an OS level for years. The issue was that the only available RCS app in practice is Google Messages and it requires privileged access for Google Play services, which goes against the sandboxed Google Play approach. We worked around it by making it so that the access granted to Google Messages when it's set as the SMS/MMS/RCS app also applies to Google Play services where part of the implementation is done. iOS does not currently implement end-to-end encryption for RCS. End-to-end encryption for RCS is exclusive to conversations between Google Messages users. Apple has said they'll implement the new MLS end-to-end encryption for RCS but has not done it and has provided no timeline for doing it. It took them a very long time to implement basic RCS support and this will likely take a long time too. Google Messages has not yet moved to the new MLS encryption, but it will need to do that too in order for iOS implementing it to provide end-to-end encryption across them.
    - sotix 1y ago
      I appreciate the response and how you're proactive about following things! That's great to know RCS is now possible on GrapheneOS. That's very pragmatic. For now, I have switched back to iOS due to a significant majority of my contacts using iMessage, so I'm back to encrypted chats again. Hopefully the future of RCS changes things while America struggles with using a unified messenger. I dream of using a dumb phone with RCS.

Semaphor 1y ago

Security & Privacy: GrapheneOS Freedom & Features: LineageOS That is not to say you have no freedom or extra features with Graphene, or no security with Lineage, it’s just what either project has very clearly as main target. I do miss some features since switching to GrapheneOS (customizable on screen nav, volume rocker for cursor control), but I’m very happy with stuff like sandboxed google play services.

strcat 1y ago
GrapheneOS provides a lot of features not available in LineageOS. Our focus for is privacy, security and replacing Google apps/services. The features we add aren't only privacy and security features. We provide our own network location and geocoding support. Local text-to-speech and speech-to-text are being developed. It also provides a bunch of assorted features such as forcing the availability of VoLTE, VoNR, VoWiFi and 5G. https://grapheneos.org/features https://grapheneos.org/features is an overview of what's provided compared to AOSP but doesn't cover everything yet, especially recent additions.

tcfhgj 1y ago

GOS only works on Google phones

strcat 1y ago
That's only because Pixels are the only devices meeting the hardware security and update requirements. GrapheneOS has an OEM partner working on meeting our requirements for some of their future devices. That's how GrapheneOS is able to provide our security preview releases with security patches from 3 months of upcoming Android Security Bulletins.

palata 1y ago

I have used both, and I can personally use my smartphone properly with both. GrapheneOS is more strict about security, making it more secure but less accessible (at the moment you can only run GrapheneOS on Pixel phones). I am happy with GrapheneOS' policy: that's exactly why I use GrapheneOS, to the point where I bought a Pixel just for GrapheneOS. Many people complain about GrapheneOS not supporting other phones. IMO it's the other way round: the other Android manufacturers do not support GrapheneOS. If you really want GrapheneOS to lower their security in order to run on another phone, what you want is actually LineageOS.

nunobrito 1y ago
There is little point in fortifying the front-door when the backdoor is wide open. The hardware itself should never be trusted when being produced by a vendor like Google and cannot be verified on the component level. Their business model completely revolves in reducing your private sphere and sell it to others. Never use google hardware if you are serious about security.
- ysnp 1y ago
  All mobile computing and connectivity hardware is unverifiable in reality and by design. It's not some property exclusive to Google Pixels. Their business model also does not involve selling data afaik, it's selling access to their adspaces [1] all over the internet including the ability to target people (based on information Google jealously hoard). They stand to lose just as much as most other OEMs if they did suspicious things in hardware just like Apple, Samsung etc. If you're serious about security you will avoid using OEMs that have unfortunate patch gaps which leave device owners at the mercy to *known vulnerabilities* [1][2][3][4] as well as unknown threats which is fortunately one of GrapheneOS's many reasonable device support requirements. [1] https://blog.google/products/ads-commerce/more-effective-media-buying-on-apps/ https://blog.google/products/ads-commerce/more-effective-med... [2] https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap [3] https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap-2020 https://srlabs.de/blog/android-patch-gap-2020 [4] https://www.android-device-security.org/talks/ https://www.android-device-security.org/talks/ [5] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/vulnerability-management/research-analysis-and-guidance-ensuring-android-security-update-adoption/4216714 https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/vulnerability-manag...

strcat 1y ago

GrapheneOS is a privacy and security hardened OS. The third party comparison table at https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm focused on privacy and security provides a good overview. The GrapheneOS features page at https://grapheneos.org/features https://grapheneos.org/features provides an overview of many of the changes it makes compared to standard Android.