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Not sure why why we are talking about everyone's device now or even a backdoor as such if it might even need access to the device to interfere with it? (My init

Not sure why why we are talking about everyone's device now or even a backdoor as such if it might even need access to the device to interfere with it? (My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance.) If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though.

JoshTriplett 1y ago
> My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance. When you said "If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?", that sounded like it was talking about how a device that can have new software installed onto it can have a backdoor for later use installed onto it, and that led into a discussion about how to protect against that. Were you instead saying "on a device you have control over, how can you protect yourself against that?". Or something else? > If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though. They can at a minimal level (e.g. steganography, duress passwords), but yes, ultimately there is little you can do against someone threatening you personally with harm.
- RandomLensman 1y ago
  Sorry, I meant it as in someone else installing surveillance on a device/bugging it, not as in installing something with a backdoor for some possible later use, i.e., targeted surveillance of a specific device under a warrant etc. So something which can have a lot more effort per device involved, potentially access to it, and not some broad-based thing. And, yes, there can be a debate if such warrants are desirable etc., but I think it's quite different from broad-based backdoors for potential mass surveillance etc. and liberal democracies can decide to have such tools available.
  - JoshTriplett 1y ago
    Ah, got it! Sorry for us talking past each other there, then. I think part of what I was suggesting still applies there: if you can't install things remotely, and you have oversight to ensure that any backdoor applied to you has to have been sent to everyone (which provides a measure of security), then what's left is physical control of the device. For instance, keeping the device in your possession, locking it down against peripherals... That can't prevent you from being physically coerced, but it provides a lot of security in every other case. And if things have devolved to the point of you being physically coerced then you have much worse problems.

JoshTriplett 1y ago

> My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance. When you said "If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?", that sounded like it was talking about how a device that can have new software installed onto it can have a backdoor for later use installed onto it, and that led into a discussion about how to protect against that. Were you instead saying "on a device you have control over, how can you protect yourself against that?". Or something else? > If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though. They can at a minimal level (e.g. steganography, duress passwords), but yes, ultimately there is little you can do against someone threatening you personally with harm.

RandomLensman 1y ago
Sorry, I meant it as in someone else installing surveillance on a device/bugging it, not as in installing something with a backdoor for some possible later use, i.e., targeted surveillance of a specific device under a warrant etc. So something which can have a lot more effort per device involved, potentially access to it, and not some broad-based thing. And, yes, there can be a debate if such warrants are desirable etc., but I think it's quite different from broad-based backdoors for potential mass surveillance etc. and liberal democracies can decide to have such tools available.
- JoshTriplett 1y ago
  Ah, got it! Sorry for us talking past each other there, then. I think part of what I was suggesting still applies there: if you can't install things remotely, and you have oversight to ensure that any backdoor applied to you has to have been sent to everyone (which provides a measure of security), then what's left is physical control of the device. For instance, keeping the device in your possession, locking it down against peripherals... That can't prevent you from being physically coerced, but it provides a lot of security in every other case. And if things have devolved to the point of you being physically coerced then you have much worse problems.