3 ms·

Why? How?

JoshTriplett 1y ago
By way of example, if there's a backdoor key, it can be stolen or misused. Witness the many examples of companies that collect too much data and have that data stolen, and many examples of police departments abusing police databases for personal stalking and similar misuses. Any other backdoor mechanism can similarly be breached or misused. There is no such thing as a backdoor that can only be used for what it is "supposed" to be used for.
- RandomLensman 1y ago
  If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?
  - JoshTriplett 1y ago
    Depending on the level of security you need, there are any number of steps people could take or the industry as a whole could take: - Don't allow remotely installing things on a device, only doing so with physical presence on the device. - Have "binary transparency" mechanisms to make sure that you're seeing the same binary everyone else is, and you're not getting served a special backdoored version nobody else sees. (This doesn't prevent global backdoors, of course, but those are more likely to get caught.) - Relatedly, have multiple independent app stores in different jurisdictions, and make sure they are serving identical binaries. That ensures no one jurisdiction can surreptitiously demand and enforce a backdoor. - Have signatures from the original app author that can be verified, and ensure that intermediaries (e.g. "app stores") can add signatures but can't add anything to the package that's not covered by the original signature. That reduces the number of parties you have to trust. - In an ideal world, only install Open Source software that's reviewed and subject to multiple independent reproducible builds.
    - RandomLensman 1y ago
      In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies.
      - JoshTriplett 1y ago
        > In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. That's appropriate for a SCIF, not for someone's day-to-day life. > Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies. They still don't get to have backdoors into everyone's device. Also, many many events throughout history should demonstrate that "democratically authorized" is in fact laughably bad at curtailing abuses of power, and not a substitute for a sacrosanct right to privacy that's systematically enforced through both legal and technical means. Make devices secure. When people tell you to make them insecure, refuse.
        RandomLensman 1y ago
        Not sure why why we are talking about everyone's device now or even a backdoor as such if it might even need access to the device to interfere with it? (My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance.) If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though.
        JoshTriplett 1y ago
        > My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance. When you said "If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?", that sounded like it was talking about how a device that can have new software installed onto it can have a backdoor for later use installed onto it, and that led into a discussion about how to protect against that. Were you instead saying "on a device you have control over, how can you protect yourself against that?". Or something else? > If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though. They can at a minimal level (e.g. steganography, duress passwords), but yes, ultimately there is little you can do against someone threatening you personally with harm.

Why? How?

By way of example, if there's a backdoor key, it can be stolen or misused. Witness the many examples of companies that collect too much data and have that data stolen, and many examples of police departments abusing police databases for personal stalking and similar misuses. Any other backdoor mechanism can similarly be breached or misused. There is no such thing as a backdoor that can only be used for what it is "supposed" to be used for.

RandomLensman 1y ago
If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?
- JoshTriplett 1y ago
  Depending on the level of security you need, there are any number of steps people could take or the industry as a whole could take: - Don't allow remotely installing things on a device, only doing so with physical presence on the device. - Have "binary transparency" mechanisms to make sure that you're seeing the same binary everyone else is, and you're not getting served a special backdoored version nobody else sees. (This doesn't prevent global backdoors, of course, but those are more likely to get caught.) - Relatedly, have multiple independent app stores in different jurisdictions, and make sure they are serving identical binaries. That ensures no one jurisdiction can surreptitiously demand and enforce a backdoor. - Have signatures from the original app author that can be verified, and ensure that intermediaries (e.g. "app stores") can add signatures but can't add anything to the package that's not covered by the original signature. That reduces the number of parties you have to trust. - In an ideal world, only install Open Source software that's reviewed and subject to multiple independent reproducible builds.
  - RandomLensman 1y ago
    In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies.
    - JoshTriplett 1y ago
      > In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. That's appropriate for a SCIF, not for someone's day-to-day life. > Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies. They still don't get to have backdoors into everyone's device. Also, many many events throughout history should demonstrate that "democratically authorized" is in fact laughably bad at curtailing abuses of power, and not a substitute for a sacrosanct right to privacy that's systematically enforced through both legal and technical means. Make devices secure. When people tell you to make them insecure, refuse.
      - RandomLensman 1y ago
        Not sure why why we are talking about everyone's device now or even a backdoor as such if it might even need access to the device to interfere with it? (My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance.) If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though.
        JoshTriplett 1y ago
        > My initial post wasn't about mass surveillance. When you said "If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?", that sounded like it was talking about how a device that can have new software installed onto it can have a backdoor for later use installed onto it, and that led into a discussion about how to protect against that. Were you instead saying "on a device you have control over, how can you protect yourself against that?". Or something else? > If you look at history, not sure why technical measures would offer much protection against violence based approaches against privacy, though. They can at a minimal level (e.g. steganography, duress passwords), but yes, ultimately there is little you can do against someone threatening you personally with harm.