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We are not obligated to choose a "lesser of two evils" here. We should reject both. I really appreciate Signal's public responses to warrants ("sure, here's al

We are not obligated to choose a "lesser of two evils" here. We should reject both. I really appreciate Signal's public responses to warrants ("sure, here's all the information we have, by design we don't have anything important"). https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/

RandomLensman 1y ago
I think, there are warrants to put surveillance software on a device under certain circumstances (in Germany, Quellen TKÜ).
- SV_BubbleTime 1y ago
  Anywhere that a warrant could be used to do something, you can be certain that someone is doing that same thing without the warrant. The method that works is to make it technically or practically impossible.
  - RandomLensman 1y ago
    Why? How?
    - JoshTriplett 1y ago
      By way of example, if there's a backdoor key, it can be stolen or misused. Witness the many examples of companies that collect too much data and have that data stolen, and many examples of police departments abusing police databases for personal stalking and similar misuses. Any other backdoor mechanism can similarly be breached or misused. There is no such thing as a backdoor that can only be used for what it is "supposed" to be used for.
      - RandomLensman 1y ago
        If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?
        JoshTriplett 1y ago
        Depending on the level of security you need, there are any number of steps people could take or the industry as a whole could take: - Don't allow remotely installing things on a device, only doing so with physical presence on the device. - Have "binary transparency" mechanisms to make sure that you're seeing the same binary everyone else is, and you're not getting served a special backdoored version nobody else sees. (This doesn't prevent global backdoors, of course, but those are more likely to get caught.) - Relatedly, have multiple independent app stores in different jurisdictions, and make sure they are serving identical binaries. That ensures no one jurisdiction can surreptitiously demand and enforce a backdoor. - Have signatures from the original app author that can be verified, and ensure that intermediaries (e.g. "app stores") can add signatures but can't add anything to the package that's not covered by the original signature. That reduces the number of parties you have to trust. - In an ideal world, only install Open Source software that's reviewed and subject to multiple independent reproducible builds.
        RandomLensman 1y ago
        In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies.
        JoshTriplett 1y ago
        > In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. That's appropriate for a SCIF, not for someone's day-to-day life. > Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies. They still don't get to have backdoors into everyone's device. Also, many many events throughout history should demonstrate that "democratically authorized" is in fact laughably bad at curtailing abuses of power, and not a substitute for a sacrosanct right to privacy that's systematically enforced through both legal and technical means. Make devices secure. When people tell you to make them insecure, refuse.
  - littlestymaar 1y ago
    > The method that works is to make it technically or practically impossible. The only way is to avoid the jurisdiction altogether then, because any app can be remotely updated to disable encryption…
    - tliltocatl 1y ago
      Disable automatic remote updates. These should never have been a thing.
      - SV_BubbleTime 1y ago
        How much do you trust the button that says to disallow automatic updates then?
      - littlestymaar 1y ago
        And what do you do when you app stops working because the server rejects it for being out of date? For the record, Signal pushes an update every few days.
      - JoshTriplett 1y ago
        Not disagreeing with the underlying issue, but the tradeoff is: security bugs are a thing.
- Aachen 1y ago
  What does Quellen TKU mean?
  - RandomLensman 1y ago
    Something like source telecommunication surveillance
    - LargoLasskhyfv 1y ago
      Too vague. More like surveillance of telecommunications at the source (by means of trojaning the source/device, or using existing backdoors at whichever layer of the stack).
  - LargoLasskhyfv 1y ago
    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telekommunikations%C3%BCberwachung https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telekommunikations%C3%BCberwac... https://bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/bvg25-069.html https://bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteil... https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Ermittlungsunterstuetzung/Technologien/QuellentkueOnlinedurchsuchung/quellentkueOnlinedurchsuchung_node.html https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Ermittlungsunterstuetzu...

RandomLensman 1y ago

I think, there are warrants to put surveillance software on a device under certain circumstances (in Germany, Quellen TKÜ).

SV_BubbleTime 1y ago
Anywhere that a warrant could be used to do something, you can be certain that someone is doing that same thing without the warrant. The method that works is to make it technically or practically impossible.
- RandomLensman 1y ago
  Why? How?
  - JoshTriplett 1y ago
    By way of example, if there's a backdoor key, it can be stolen or misused. Witness the many examples of companies that collect too much data and have that data stolen, and many examples of police departments abusing police databases for personal stalking and similar misuses. Any other backdoor mechanism can similarly be breached or misused. There is no such thing as a backdoor that can only be used for what it is "supposed" to be used for.
    - RandomLensman 1y ago
      If you can install stuff on the device, how could you protect against it?
      - JoshTriplett 1y ago
        Depending on the level of security you need, there are any number of steps people could take or the industry as a whole could take: - Don't allow remotely installing things on a device, only doing so with physical presence on the device. - Have "binary transparency" mechanisms to make sure that you're seeing the same binary everyone else is, and you're not getting served a special backdoored version nobody else sees. (This doesn't prevent global backdoors, of course, but those are more likely to get caught.) - Relatedly, have multiple independent app stores in different jurisdictions, and make sure they are serving identical binaries. That ensures no one jurisdiction can surreptitiously demand and enforce a backdoor. - Have signatures from the original app author that can be verified, and ensure that intermediaries (e.g. "app stores") can add signatures but can't add anything to the package that's not covered by the original signature. That reduces the number of parties you have to trust. - In an ideal world, only install Open Source software that's reviewed and subject to multiple independent reproducible builds.
        RandomLensman 1y ago
        In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies.
        JoshTriplett 1y ago
        > In high security settings, just don't allow devices in. That's appropriate for a SCIF, not for someone's day-to-day life. > Also, democratically authorized state actors have a valid role to play in liberal democracies. They still don't get to have backdoors into everyone's device. Also, many many events throughout history should demonstrate that "democratically authorized" is in fact laughably bad at curtailing abuses of power, and not a substitute for a sacrosanct right to privacy that's systematically enforced through both legal and technical means. Make devices secure. When people tell you to make them insecure, refuse.
- littlestymaar 1y ago
  > The method that works is to make it technically or practically impossible. The only way is to avoid the jurisdiction altogether then, because any app can be remotely updated to disable encryption…
  - tliltocatl 1y ago
    Disable automatic remote updates. These should never have been a thing.
    - SV_BubbleTime 1y ago
      How much do you trust the button that says to disallow automatic updates then?
    - littlestymaar 1y ago
      And what do you do when you app stops working because the server rejects it for being out of date? For the record, Signal pushes an update every few days.
    - JoshTriplett 1y ago
      Not disagreeing with the underlying issue, but the tradeoff is: security bugs are a thing.
Aachen 1y ago
What does Quellen TKU mean?
- RandomLensman 1y ago
  Something like source telecommunication surveillance
  - LargoLasskhyfv 1y ago
    Too vague. More like surveillance of telecommunications at the source (by means of trojaning the source/device, or using existing backdoors at whichever layer of the stack).
- LargoLasskhyfv 1y ago
  https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telekommunikations%C3%BCberwachung https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telekommunikations%C3%BCberwac... https://bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/bvg25-069.html https://bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteil... https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Ermittlungsunterstuetzung/Technologien/QuellentkueOnlinedurchsuchung/quellentkueOnlinedurchsuchung_node.html https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Ermittlungsunterstuetzu...