6 ms·

A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves.

falcor84 1y ago
Well, yes, a "checklist" (his word) might be too much of a strawman, but what would be useful would be a strategy in the game theoretical sense - a decision mechanism of actions conditional on different situations (e.g. "If the enemy is hiding in a network of tunnel under civilian population, you should wait until ... and then randomly ..., but if they ... then reverse course and instead ..."). Quoting again from the author's closing remarks: > Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive. But that's so vague that I can't help but again yell "But what is decisive?!", "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?". It's almost astrology in how it doesn't say anything objectionable.
- lukan 1y ago
  "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?" It simply depends. No situation is unique. Israels strategy towards tunnels for example is to blow up and level everything. Ukraine does not deem that acceptable to the russian tunnels inside Ukraine.
  - falcor84 1y ago
    What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on? I was hoping that being "the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute" [0], the author could offer some actual advice on strategy. Or what is the institute for? Hopefully not just for writing essays. As for Israel's strategy towards tunnels, I actually have no understanding of what's going on there, but I can just say that whatever they're doing has not been effective in achieving a decisive victory, and is thus ipso facto not a good strategy. So I'm wondering what might a good strategy have been. The author now has two years of hindsight - could he not use that time and information to offer some alternative approach? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Spencer_(military_officer) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Spencer_(military_officer...
    - lukan 1y ago
      "What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on?" The terrain, your avaiable forces and equipment, the morale of your soldiers, the main goal of the operation, the short, mid and long term plans. Outside reactions. Strength of enemy. Outside reactions, will the enemy get more support if X happens or less, will it matter if key target is achieved before time Y, ... There is no magic bullet for something as complex as urban warfare. If you want to level all, just use a nuke. But there seems to be reasons, why that is not a valid option. If you go with lots of ground troops, you will have casualties. Here the question how much is acceptable to your own population. If you go fast, you achieve a different effect then going slow. Etc. Etc etc.
    - breppp 1y ago
      The issue is mainly the hostages, as any tunnel or building may contain one that really slows the pace of advance considerably and ironically increases palestinian suffering
  - pjc50 1y ago
    What Russian tunnels in Ukraine? The battlefields are of very, very different sizes, and the Ukraine war is mostly not taking place in occupied cities at the moment.
    - lukan 1y ago
      They ain't in use like in Gaza, but just google for "russia tunnels ukraine" if you are curious. They are used to get past strong lines of defense for example.
      - cyberax 1y ago
        They were used during the urban fighting, but they don't play any serious role.
- bell-cot 1y ago
  In one sense, your checklist is whatever you wrote down before starting: > Clausewitz also famously wrote, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” You could also make a checklist of stuff like "reduce effectiveness of enemy's forces" and "minimize damage to your own ability to wage war" - but that's basics which any upperclassman at a military academy could recite, in regard to pretty much any war ever. It's been 2 centuries since Clausewitz was writing about military theory. He's still widely read because his ideas are big-picture abstractions. Bridging the gap between his abstractions and what to do, with whatever current-day/recent-tech forces you happen to have - that's the job of your flag officers and their staffs. Though their "checklists" will keep changing, as the war progresses.
  - falcor84 1y ago
    Well said. But I'm still left with the question - have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory? If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time. If we treat kinetic warfare as a game, I suppose you could argue that as in any other game, the more knowledgeable and more experienced the players are, the higher the likelihood of a draw. But then, seeing the harm that this is doing to the world, should we not see about changing the rules of war to reduce this likelihood and make things more decisive again, with the aim of reducing overall harm to civilians?
    - bell-cot 1y ago
      > have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory? "How to win" theories - when correct - favor those with the motivation to take them seriously, and the smarts to apply them correctly. I hope that overlaps nicely (in Venn diagram terms) with your "we". Plausibly, some wars have been prevented by military theory - because a nation analyzed their situation, and decided that starting a war would be a bad move. > If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time. That's somewhat an effect of our larger nations and populations, the industrialized basis of modern warfare, and how heavily modern "get firearms, dig in" military technology favors the defense. BUT - pre-Clausewitz wars could also run a very long time - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Year%27s_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Year%27s_War or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Years'_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Years'_War or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_Year%27s_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_Year%27s_War or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punic_Wars https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punic_Wars or ... > If we treat kinetic warfare as a game... Human "games" are generally balanced, or darn close. Vs. very few modern wars were started by anyone who thought things were nicely balanced. > ...should we not see about changing the rules... If you mean military tech or practices aimed at cutting such harm - 'most every modern military is forever working on that.* If you mean treaties banning land mines, or napalm, or nerve gas, or whatever - when well done, those can be quite useful. But in game terms, they are (at most) just changing the costs (in economic, human, and political terms) of making a "break the treaty" move. *Edit: Unfortunately, they're also working on some conflicting goals - like "require even more firepower for our enemies to defeat" and "apply even more firepower, to defeat our enemies".
JumpCrisscross 1y ago
> A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves Checklists aren't immutable. Having clear pre-war plans and procedures doesn't preclude changing them. But going in without them almost assures defeat.

Well, yes, a "checklist" (his word) might be too much of a strawman, but what would be useful would be a strategy in the game theoretical sense - a decision mechanism of actions conditional on different situations (e.g. "If the enemy is hiding in a network of tunnel under civilian population, you should wait until ... and then randomly ..., but if they ... then reverse course and instead ..."). Quoting again from the author's closing remarks: > Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive. But that's so vague that I can't help but again yell "But what is decisive?!", "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?". It's almost astrology in how it doesn't say anything objectionable.

lukan 1y ago
"What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?" It simply depends. No situation is unique. Israels strategy towards tunnels for example is to blow up and level everything. Ukraine does not deem that acceptable to the russian tunnels inside Ukraine.
- falcor84 1y ago
  What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on? I was hoping that being "the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute" [0], the author could offer some actual advice on strategy. Or what is the institute for? Hopefully not just for writing essays. As for Israel's strategy towards tunnels, I actually have no understanding of what's going on there, but I can just say that whatever they're doing has not been effective in achieving a decisive victory, and is thus ipso facto not a good strategy. So I'm wondering what might a good strategy have been. The author now has two years of hindsight - could he not use that time and information to offer some alternative approach? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Spencer_(military_officer) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Spencer_(military_officer...
  - lukan 1y ago
    "What do you mean it depends? What does it depend on?" The terrain, your avaiable forces and equipment, the morale of your soldiers, the main goal of the operation, the short, mid and long term plans. Outside reactions. Strength of enemy. Outside reactions, will the enemy get more support if X happens or less, will it matter if key target is achieved before time Y, ... There is no magic bullet for something as complex as urban warfare. If you want to level all, just use a nuke. But there seems to be reasons, why that is not a valid option. If you go with lots of ground troops, you will have casualties. Here the question how much is acceptable to your own population. If you go fast, you achieve a different effect then going slow. Etc. Etc etc.
  - breppp 1y ago
    The issue is mainly the hostages, as any tunnel or building may contain one that really slows the pace of advance considerably and ironically increases palestinian suffering
- pjc50 1y ago
  What Russian tunnels in Ukraine? The battlefields are of very, very different sizes, and the Ukraine war is mostly not taking place in occupied cities at the moment.
  - lukan 1y ago
    They ain't in use like in Gaza, but just google for "russia tunnels ukraine" if you are curious. They are used to get past strong lines of defense for example.
    - cyberax 1y ago
      They were used during the urban fighting, but they don't play any serious role.
bell-cot 1y ago
In one sense, your checklist is whatever you wrote down before starting: > Clausewitz also famously wrote, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” You could also make a checklist of stuff like "reduce effectiveness of enemy's forces" and "minimize damage to your own ability to wage war" - but that's basics which any upperclassman at a military academy could recite, in regard to pretty much any war ever. It's been 2 centuries since Clausewitz was writing about military theory. He's still widely read because his ideas are big-picture abstractions. Bridging the gap between his abstractions and what to do, with whatever current-day/recent-tech forces you happen to have - that's the job of your flag officers and their staffs. Though their "checklists" will keep changing, as the war progresses.
- falcor84 1y ago
  Well said. But I'm still left with the question - have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory? If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time. If we treat kinetic warfare as a game, I suppose you could argue that as in any other game, the more knowledgeable and more experienced the players are, the higher the likelihood of a draw. But then, seeing the harm that this is doing to the world, should we not see about changing the rules of war to reduce this likelihood and make things more decisive again, with the aim of reducing overall harm to civilians?
  - bell-cot 1y ago
    > have we actually benefitted in any way from these two centuries of military theory? "How to win" theories - when correct - favor those with the motivation to take them seriously, and the smarts to apply them correctly. I hope that overlaps nicely (in Venn diagram terms) with your "we". Plausibly, some wars have been prevented by military theory - because a nation analyzed their situation, and decided that starting a war would be a bad move. > If anything, it seems to me that wars are less decisive, more prolonged and often more deadly than they've been in Clausewitz's time. That's somewhat an effect of our larger nations and populations, the industrialized basis of modern warfare, and how heavily modern "get firearms, dig in" military technology favors the defense. BUT - pre-Clausewitz wars could also run a very long time - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Year%27s_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Year%27s_War or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Years'_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Years'_War or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_Year%27s_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_Year%27s_War or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punic_Wars https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punic_Wars or ... > If we treat kinetic warfare as a game... Human "games" are generally balanced, or darn close. Vs. very few modern wars were started by anyone who thought things were nicely balanced. > ...should we not see about changing the rules... If you mean military tech or practices aimed at cutting such harm - 'most every modern military is forever working on that.* If you mean treaties banning land mines, or napalm, or nerve gas, or whatever - when well done, those can be quite useful. But in game terms, they are (at most) just changing the costs (in economic, human, and political terms) of making a "break the treaty" move. *Edit: Unfortunately, they're also working on some conflicting goals - like "require even more firepower for our enemies to defeat" and "apply even more firepower, to defeat our enemies".

JumpCrisscross 1y ago

> A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves Checklists aren't immutable. Having clear pre-war plans and procedures doesn't preclude changing them. But going in without them almost assures defeat.