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As is made clear from the fact that those issues all link to the mailing list, these are not novel issues. They were raised during discussion, taken into accoun
by mjg59 1y ago
As is made clear from the fact that those issues all link to the mailing list, these are not novel issues. They were raised during discussion, taken into account, and the draft authors concluded they were answered adequately. Complaining about them at this point is fundamentally a complaint that the process failed to take these issues into account appropriately, and the issues should be revisited. Given that this was raised to the IESG, who are not the point of contact for engineering issues, the response is focused on that. There's a mechanism Dan can use to push for engineering decisions to be reviewed - he didn't do that.
- timschmidt 1y ago> There's a mechanism Dan can use to push for engineering decisions to be reviewed - he didn't do that. This is the retort of every bureaucracy which fails to do the right thing, and signals to observers that procedure is being used to overrule engineering best practices. FYI. I'm thankful for the work djb has put in to these complaints, as well as his attempts to work through process, successful or not, as otherwise I wouldn't be aware of these dangerous developments. Excuses of any kind ring hollow in the presence of historical context around NSA and encryption standardization, and the engineering realities.
- mjg59 1y agoHey, look, you're free to read the mailing list archives and observe that every issue Dan raised was discussed at the time, he just disagreed with the conclusions reached. He made a complaint to the ADs, who observed that he was using an email address with an autoresponder that asserted people may have to pay him $250 for him to read their email, and they (entirely justifiably) decided not to do that. Dan raised the issue to the next level up, who concluded that the ADs had behaved entirely reasonably in this respect and didn't comment on the engineering issues because it's not their job to in this context. It's not a board's job to handle every engineering complaint themselves, simply because they are rarely the best suited people to handle engineering complaints. When something is raised to them it's a matter of determining whether the people whose job it is to make those decisions did so appropriately, and to facilitate review if necessary. In this case the entire procedural issue is clear - Dan didn't raise a complaint in the appropriate manner, there's still time for him to do so, there's no problem, and all the other complaints he made about the behaviour of the ADs were invalid.
- timschmidt 1y ago> you're free to read the mailing list archives and observe that every issue Dan raised was discussed at the time As was https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG which was ratified over similar objections. That made it no less of a backdoor. > it's not their job As I said about excuses.
- mjg59 1y agoThey're adhering to their charter. If you show up to my manager demanding to know why I made a specific engineering decision, he's not going to tell you - that's not the process, that's not his job, he's going to trust me to make good decisions unless presented with evidence I've misbehaved. But as has been pointed out elsewhere, the distinction between the Dual EC DRBG objections and here are massive. The former had an obvious technical weakness that provided a clear mechanism for a back door, and no technical justification for this was ever meaningfully presented, and also it wasn't an IETF discussion. The counterpoints to Dan's engineering complaints (such as they are) are easily accessible to everyone, Dan just chose not to mention them.
- timschmidt 1y ago> unless presented with evidence The complaint seems well referenced with evidence of poor engineering decisions to me. > Dual EC DRBG ... had an obvious technical weakness that provided a clear mechanism for a back door Removing an entire layer of well tested encryption qualifies as an obvious technical weakness to me. And as I've mentioned elsewhere in these comments, opens users up to a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Downgrade_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Downgrade_attack should flaws in the new cipher be found. There is a long history of such flaws being discovered, even after deployment. Several examples of which DJB references. I see no cogent reason for such recklessness, and many reasons to avoid it. Continued pointing toward "procedure" seems to cede the case.
- mjg59 1y agoWhy don't we hybridise all crypto? We'd get more security if we required RSA+ECDSA+ED25519 at all times, right? Or is the answer that the benefits are small compared to the drawbacks? I am unqualified to provide an answer, but I suspect you are also, and the answer we have from a whole bunch of people who are qualified is that they think the benefits aren't worth it. So why is it fundamentally and obviously true for PQC? This isn't actually an engineering hill I'd die on, if more people I trust made clear arguments for why this is dangerous I'd take it very seriously, but right now we basically have djb against the entire world writing a blogpost that makes ludicrous insinuations and fails to actually engage with any of the counterarguments, and look just no.