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I'm going off your post here. 1. I hijack the DNS entry so "_atproto.ruuuuu.de" TXT record now returns "did=did:web:iam.evilhacker.de" to the the actor doing
by magicalhippo 1y ago
I'm going off your post here.
1. I hijack the DNS entry so "_atproto.ruuuuu.de" TXT record now returns "did=did:web:iam.evilhacker.de" to the the actor doing the at protocol resolution.
2. To get the DID, the actor doing the at protocol resolution downloads the DID from "https://iam.evilhacker.de/.well-known/did.json https://iam.evilhacker.de/.well-known/did.json", which I have full control over.
3. In the DID document, I put "alsoKnownAs": ["at://ruuuuu.de"], along with my own public key.
Wouldn't this make the actor doing the resolution associate me with your handle?
Again, maybe I'm missing something here. It just seemed to me this would allow me to hijack your posts when they are federated.
- bnewbold 1y ago(I added a reply up-thread here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45469667 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45469667)
- thisismissem 1y agoThat is a risk for did:web, just as loosing control of your domain is a risk; The did method that is most widely used on AT Protocol is did:plc, which is https://web.plc.directory/ https://web.plc.directory/ There's also did:webvh which isn't yet supported by AT Protocol, but may provide some better security, but is likely still susceptible to DNS poisoning. However, the resolution of handle to DID happens at many different layers in the stack, so you'd have to manage to attack all of them at once. Handle resolution isn't something that typically happens on the end-users' machine, but rather on a server running a PDS, Relay or AppView. Those environments tend to be much harder to carry out DNS poisoning attacks.