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> conflict was settling into a "war of the cities" scenario with both Israel and the US exhausting interceptors rapidly Iran was rapidly running out of launche
by JumpCrisscross 1y ago
> conflict was settling into a "war of the cities" scenario with both Israel and the US exhausting interceptors rapidly
Iran was rapidly running out of launchers. Once Israel gained air supremacy, it severely reduced its launcher deployment to avoid losing them for nothing.
> What happens when it turns into a contest of rocket production and absorption against a country with 10x the population and 20x the land area? Completely unwinnable for Israel
Iranian rocket production rates aren't particularly amazing. Tehran's deterrence came from the size of their stockpile, and the fact that they could fire on Israel from four directions (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis and Iran proper).
> Iran doesn't need air superiority to fire rockets
Where did you get this?
Iran's MRBMs are mostly liquid fuelled [1] and stored in fortified bunkers (like V2s were). This leaves them highly vulnerable during fuelling (same as V2s). With air supremacy one can take out the missiles on the pad. (Which, due to the aforementioned fortification requirements, are predictably placed.) This is one reason Iran's missile firing rate collapsed during the war [2]--Israeli intelligence combined with targeted (land-origin, it seems) strikes took out their launchers.
Iran also has a fleet of solid-fuelled missiles which can be launched on short notice, but these are also less accurate, have to carry smaller payloads and more cheaply intercepted.
Moreover, in a war of attrition (which we did not reach, both sides were burning stockpiles) production reigns supreme. You need at least air parity to fire missiles. You need a favourable air situation to run fixed factories.
[1] https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/table-irans-missile-arsenal https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-ba...
[2] https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Iranian-Ballistic-Missile-Estimates-6-26-2025-6.pdf https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Iranian-Ballist...
- woooooo 1y agoThat's all well argued, but I can't get over the asymmetries of country size and the asymmetry of missile defense vs shooting the missile. Russia wasn't supposed to be economically capable of a war this long and yet here we are. And that's a war of choice. If Iran is being attacked, they have no choices. People will find a way to make missiles underground if they have to. And that's all before we get into political and psychological factors. How long does Netanyahu stay in power if Tel Aviv is hit every day? (I have to note, USA vs Iran and Israel vs Iran are very different economic comparisons. It would be impossible for Israel to sustain 24/7 suppression over a country Iran's size but maybe with enough American funding its more feasible.)
- sir0010010 1y agoIran has a choice - it could choose not to support Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis or any other group firing rockets on Israel. It could also choose not to enrich uranium.
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- 8note 1y agoisrael also has a choice, to attack or not attack. iran doesnt make israel's choices, so chances are israel is gonna attack either way for israel's own internal politics
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> I can't get over the asymmetries of country size and the asymmetry of missile defense vs shooting the missile You're referring to strategic depth. Iran has lots of it. Israel does not. Countering that, however, is power projection capability. Israel has a lot of this, through its air force and allies. Iran was thought to have a lot of it, through its proxies, but that failed. Without its proxies, Iran's fire on Israel has to originate from its own territory. That means trading missile range against the protection offered by its strategic depth from Israeli counter-battery fire. Hence why Iran's launchers were somewhat distributed across its territory. But! If Israel has air supremacy, that strategic depth changes from a risk to a logistical cost. If Israeli jets can freely access Iranian air space, that extra distance Iran's central and eastern launchers have to fly don't trade against any defensive upside--they're still going to be blown up shortly after a pad is revealed. They just have to burn more fuel to get the same payload to the same place. > Russia wasn't supposed to be economically capable of a war this long There were a variety of estimates. Most of them assumed Russia's economy would crumble under sanctions and so Moscow would lose the will to fight. I don't believe any showed Russia would lose the ability. > If Iran is being attacked, they have no choices. People will find a way to make missiles underground if they have to Rockets, sure. Missiles? No. The Shahab-3 reaches altitudes of 400 km [1]. That's where the ISS orbits [2]. > How long does Netanyahu stay in power if Tel Aviv is hit every day? How long does Putin stay in power if Ukraine keeps dismantling Russia's energy infrastructure? The sad truth is war-time leaders tend to be deposed after unpopular wars, not during them. > It would be impossible for Israel to sustain 24/7 suppression over a country Iran's size Again, they don't need to. They just need to destroy the launchers. It's estimated Iran went from 350 to 100 launchers in the war. Once you've levelled the launchers, you're defending against unguided rockets (which everyone in between will try to pot) and drones (which are cheaper and easier to destroy and cause less damage). > would be impossible for Israel to sustain 24/7 suppression over a country Iran's size but maybe with enough American funding its more feasible Israel's economy is twice the size of Irans's [3][4]. Its smaller territory means it can concentrate air defences. And with 10x fewer mouths to feed, it can devote more of that economy to its war machine in a spurt. Iran-Israel is super interesting because they don't share a border, and they sort of min-maxed their militaries and economies in very different ways. If Iran had maintained its proxies, I think your original analysis stands. Without them, when it can only fire from one direction and from far away, all while Israel can scoot up close and right on top of it, many of its advantages turn into liabilities. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahab-3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahab-3 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Space_Station https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Space_Station [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Israel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Israel [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Iran https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Iran
- sudosysgen 1y agoIranian solid-fueled MRBM production rates were estimated by Israel to be at 200 a month, and rapidly increasing. That is actually a pretty remarkable production rate - basically the yearly production rate of interceptors. And that's only the solid fueled (by now the most produced), and only in ranges that can reach Israel. There is no reason why they would be any easier to intercept - plenty of aeroballistic missiles and even HGVs are propelled by solid fueled boosters. Iranian missiles launchers are pretty cheap, and reportedly quite plentiful - they are relatively simple modifications of domestically produced truck platforms. The Iranian account for why the strikes slowed down, FWIW, is that it took a significant amount of time to dig out the exits of the missiles bases, not that they ran out of launchers. Given the recycling of footage from launcher destruction and the simplicity of the launchers I personally find that account significantly more plausible.
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> not that they ran out of launchers They didn't run out of launchers. The launchers just emerged from a predictable place with unfuelled rockets. That made them easy to pot from the air.
- sudosysgen 1y agoThe Iranian missile arsenal and production is now focused on solid fueled missiles, so they were emerging from a predictable place, but with a fuelled rocket they could fire in minutes. Since it took at least an hour for a cruise missile to make it's way and around 15 minutes for an ALBM to make it's way, that means that once Israeli drones started being shot down, they were able to dig out the entrances, exit and launch faster than it took for a munition to be delivered. Of course if Israel had been able to fly manned aircraft deep into Iran and for prolonged periods of time, that would have been impossible, and they would actually have been unable to fire. But that wasn't the case and so they were able to fire, probably limited by the ability to dig out the entrances and synchronize launches between different sites.
- tguvot 1y ago