5 ms·

I don't think the rank on a list that includes stuff like SQL injection and path traversal tells you much about what language features are worthwhile in the C/C

I don't think the rank on a list that includes stuff like SQL injection and path traversal tells you much about what language features are worthwhile in the C/C++ replacement space. No developer that works on something like Linux or Chromium would introduce a SQL injection vulnerability unless they experienced severe head trauma. They do still introduce use after free vulnerabilities with some regularity.

pron 1y ago
First, UAF can be made largely non-dangerous without eliminating it (as in the link above and others). It's harder to exploit to begin with, and can be made much harder still virtually for free. So the number of UAFs and the number of exploitable vulnerabilities due to UAF are not the same, and have to be treated as separate things (because they can be handled separately). Second, I don't care if my bank card details leak because of CSRF or because of a bug in Chromium. Now, to be fair, the list of dangerous vulnerabilities weighs things by number of incidents and not by number of users affected, and it is certainly true that more people use Chrome than those who use a particular website vulnerable to CSRF. But things aren't so simple, there, too. For example, I work on the JVM, which is largely written in C++, and I can guarantee that many more people are affected by non-memory-safety vulnerabilities in Java programs than by memory-safety vulnerabilities in the JVM. Anyway, the point is that the overall danger and incidence of vulnerabilities - and therefore the justified cost in addressing all the different factors involved - is much more complicated than "memory unsafety bad". Yes, it's bad, but different kinds of memory unsafety are bad to different degrees, and the harm can be controlled separately from the cause. Now, I think it's obvious that even Rust fans understand there's a complex cost/benefit game here, because most software today is already written in memory-safe languages, and the very reason someone would want to use a language like Rust in the first place is because they recognise that sometimes the cost of other memory-safe languages isn't worth it, despite the importance of memory safety. If both spatial and temporal safety were always justified at any reasonable cost (that is happily paid by most software already), then there would be no reason for Rust to exist. Once you recognise that, you have to also recognise that what Rust offers must be subject to the same cost/benefit analysis that is used to justify it in the first place. And it shouldn't be surprising that the outcome would be similar: sometimes the cost may be justified, sometimes it may not be.
- johncolanduoni 1y ago
  > I don't care if my bank card details leak because of CSRF or because of a bug in Chromium Sure, but just by virtue of what these languages are used for, almost all CSRF vulnerabilities are not in code written in C, C++, Rust, or Zig. So if I’m targeting that space, why would I care that some Django app or whatever has a CSRF when analyzing what vulnerabilities are important to prevent for my potential Zig project? You’re right that overall danger and incidence of vulnerabilities matter - but they matter for the actual use-case you want to use the language for. The Linux kernel for example has exploitable TOCTOU vulnerabilities at a much higher rate than most software - why would they care that TOCTOU vulnerabilities are rare in software overall when deciding what complexity to accept to reduce them?
  - pron 1y ago
    To your first point, you're sort-of right, but it's still not so simple. The value of vulnerabilities in V8 or in CPython is affected by their likelihood compared to other vulnerabilities to users using that same product (i.e. in JS or Python code). If I want to know how much I should pay for a screw in some machine, the answer isn't "whatever it costs to minimise the chance of the screw failing regardless of other components". Once the chance of a fault in the screw is significantly lower than the chance of the machine failing for other reasons, there's no much point in getting a more resilient screw, as it would have little to no effect on the resilience of the machine. The rate of vulnerabilities obviously can't be zero, but it also doesn't need to be. It needs to be low enough for the existing coping processes to work well, and those processes need to be applied anyway. So really the question is always about cost: what's the cheapest way for me to get to a desired vulnerability rate? Which brings me to why I may prefer a low-level language that doesn't prevent UAF: because the language that does present UAF has a cost that is not worth it for me, either because UAF vulnerabilities are not a major risk for my application or because I have cheaper ways to prevent them (without necessarily eliminating the possibility of UAF itself), such as with one of the modern pointer-tagging techniques.
    - johncolanduoni 1y ago

pron 1y ago

First, UAF can be made largely non-dangerous without eliminating it (as in the link above and others). It's harder to exploit to begin with, and can be made much harder still virtually for free. So the number of UAFs and the number of exploitable vulnerabilities due to UAF are not the same, and have to be treated as separate things (because they can be handled separately). Second, I don't care if my bank card details leak because of CSRF or because of a bug in Chromium. Now, to be fair, the list of dangerous vulnerabilities weighs things by number of incidents and not by number of users affected, and it is certainly true that more people use Chrome than those who use a particular website vulnerable to CSRF. But things aren't so simple, there, too. For example, I work on the JVM, which is largely written in C++, and I can guarantee that many more people are affected by non-memory-safety vulnerabilities in Java programs than by memory-safety vulnerabilities in the JVM. Anyway, the point is that the overall danger and incidence of vulnerabilities - and therefore the justified cost in addressing all the different factors involved - is much more complicated than "memory unsafety bad". Yes, it's bad, but different kinds of memory unsafety are bad to different degrees, and the harm can be controlled separately from the cause. Now, I think it's obvious that even Rust fans understand there's a complex cost/benefit game here, because most software today is already written in memory-safe languages, and the very reason someone would want to use a language like Rust in the first place is because they recognise that sometimes the cost of other memory-safe languages isn't worth it, despite the importance of memory safety. If both spatial and temporal safety were always justified at any reasonable cost (that is happily paid by most software already), then there would be no reason for Rust to exist. Once you recognise that, you have to also recognise that what Rust offers must be subject to the same cost/benefit analysis that is used to justify it in the first place. And it shouldn't be surprising that the outcome would be similar: sometimes the cost may be justified, sometimes it may not be.

johncolanduoni 1y ago
> I don't care if my bank card details leak because of CSRF or because of a bug in Chromium Sure, but just by virtue of what these languages are used for, almost all CSRF vulnerabilities are not in code written in C, C++, Rust, or Zig. So if I’m targeting that space, why would I care that some Django app or whatever has a CSRF when analyzing what vulnerabilities are important to prevent for my potential Zig project? You’re right that overall danger and incidence of vulnerabilities matter - but they matter for the actual use-case you want to use the language for. The Linux kernel for example has exploitable TOCTOU vulnerabilities at a much higher rate than most software - why would they care that TOCTOU vulnerabilities are rare in software overall when deciding what complexity to accept to reduce them?
- pron 1y ago
  To your first point, you're sort-of right, but it's still not so simple. The value of vulnerabilities in V8 or in CPython is affected by their likelihood compared to other vulnerabilities to users using that same product (i.e. in JS or Python code). If I want to know how much I should pay for a screw in some machine, the answer isn't "whatever it costs to minimise the chance of the screw failing regardless of other components". Once the chance of a fault in the screw is significantly lower than the chance of the machine failing for other reasons, there's no much point in getting a more resilient screw, as it would have little to no effect on the resilience of the machine. The rate of vulnerabilities obviously can't be zero, but it also doesn't need to be. It needs to be low enough for the existing coping processes to work well, and those processes need to be applied anyway. So really the question is always about cost: what's the cheapest way for me to get to a desired vulnerability rate? Which brings me to why I may prefer a low-level language that doesn't prevent UAF: because the language that does present UAF has a cost that is not worth it for me, either because UAF vulnerabilities are not a major risk for my application or because I have cheaper ways to prevent them (without necessarily eliminating the possibility of UAF itself), such as with one of the modern pointer-tagging techniques.
  - johncolanduoni 1y ago