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A lot of people will still use npm, so they'll be the canaries in the coal mine :) More seriously, automated scanners seem to do a good job already of finding

A lot of people will still use npm, so they'll be the canaries in the coal mine :) More seriously, automated scanners seem to do a good job already of finding malicious packages. It's a wonder that npm themselves haven't already deployed an automated countermeasure.

vasachi 1y ago
If only there was a high-ranking official at Microsoft, who could prioritize security[1]! /s [1] https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/05/03/prioritizing-security-above-all-else/ https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/05/03/prioritizing-sec...
deleted 1y ago
[deleted]
mcintyre1994 1y ago
In the case of the chalk/debug etc hack, the first detection seemed to come from a CI build failure it caused: https://jdstaerk.substack.com/p/we-just-found-malicious-code-in-the https://jdstaerk.substack.com/p/we-just-found-malicious-code... > It started with a cryptic build failure in our CI/CD pipeline, which my colleague noticed > This seemingly minor error was the first sign of a sophisticated supply chain attack. We traced the failure to a small dependency, error-ex. Our package-lock.json specified the stable version 1.3.2 or newer, so it installed the latest version 1.3.3, which got published just a few minutes earlier.
- DougBTX 1y ago
  > Our package-lock.json specified the stable version 1.3.2 or newer Is that possible? I thought the lock files restricted to a specific version with an integrity check hash. Is it possible that it would install a newer version which doesn't match the hash in the lock file? Do they just mean package.json here?
  - streptomycin 1y ago
    If they were for some reason doing `npm install` rather than `npm ci`, then `npm install` does update packages in the lock file. Personally I always found that confusing, and yarn/pnpm don't behave that way. I think most people do `npm ci` in CI, unless they are using CI to specifically test if `npm install` still works, which I guess maybe would be a good idea if you use npm since it doesn't like obeying the lock file.
    - Rockslide 1y ago
      How does this get repeated over and over, when it's simply not true? At least not anymore. npm install will only update the lockfile if you make changes to your package.json. Otherwise, it will install the versions from the lockfile.
      - cluckindan 1y ago
        Are you 100% on that?
        Rockslide 1y ago
        Yes. As someone who's using npm install daily, and given the update cadence of npm packages, I would end up with dirty lock files very frequently if the parent statement were true. It just doesn't happen.
      - mirashii 1y ago
        > How does this get repeated over and over, when it's simply not true? Well, for one, the behavior is somewhat insane. `npm install` with no additional arguments does update the lockfile if your package.json and your lockfile are out of sync with one another for any reason, and so to get a guarantee that it doesn't change your lockfile, you must do additional configuration or guarantee by some external mechanism that you don't ever have an out of date package.json and lock. For this reason alone, the advice of "just don't use npm install, use npm ci instead" is still extremely valid, you'd really like this to fail fast if you get out of sync. `npm install additional-package` also updates your lock file. Other package managers distinguish these two operations, with the one to add a new dependency being called "add" instead of "install". The docs add to the confusion. https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-install#save https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-install#save suggests that writing to package-lock.json is the default and you need to change configuration to disable it. The notion that it won't change your lock file if you're already in sync between package.json and package-lock.json is not actually spelled out clearly anywhere on the page. > At least not anymore. You've partially answered your own question here.
kjok 1y ago
> automated scanners seem to do a good job already of finding malicious packages. That's not true. This latest incident was detected by an individual researcher, just like many similar attacks in the past. Time and again, it's been people who flagged these issues, later reported to security startups, not automated tools. Don't fall for the PR spin. If automated scanning were truly effective, we'd see deployments across all major package registries. The reality is, these systems still miss what vigilant humans catch.
- hobofan 1y ago
  > If automated scanning were truly effective, we'd see deployments across all major package registries. No we wouldn't. Most package registries are run by either bigcorps at a loss or by community maintainers (with bigcorps again sponsoring the infrastructure). And many of them barely go beyond the "CRUD" of package publishing due to lack of resources. The economic incentives of building up supply chain security tools into the package registries themselves are just not there.
  - kjok 1y ago
    You're right that registries are under-resourced. But, if automated malware scanning actually worked, we'd already see big tech partnering with package registries to run continuous, ecosystem-wide scanning and detection pipelines. However, that isn't happening. Instead, we see piecemeal efforts from Google with assurance artifacts (SLSA provenance, SBOMs, verifiable builds), Microsoft sponsoring OSS maintainers, Facebook donating to package registries. Google's initiatives stop short of claiming they can automatically detect malware. This distinction matters. Malware detection is, in the general case, an undecidable problem (think halting problem and Rice theorem). No amount of static or dynamic scanning can guarantee catching malicious logic in arbitrary code. At best, scanners detect known signatures, patterns, or anomalies. They can't prove absence of malicious behavior. So the reality is: if Google's assurance artifacts stop short of claiming automated malware detection is feasible, it's a stretch for anyone else to suggest registries could achieve it "if they just had more resources." The problem space itself is the blocker, not just lack of infra or resources.

vasachi 1y ago

If only there was a high-ranking official at Microsoft, who could prioritize security[1]! /s [1] https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/05/03/prioritizing-security-above-all-else/ https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/05/03/prioritizing-sec...

deleted 1y ago

[deleted]

mcintyre1994 1y ago

In the case of the chalk/debug etc hack, the first detection seemed to come from a CI build failure it caused: https://jdstaerk.substack.com/p/we-just-found-malicious-code-in-the https://jdstaerk.substack.com/p/we-just-found-malicious-code... > It started with a cryptic build failure in our CI/CD pipeline, which my colleague noticed > This seemingly minor error was the first sign of a sophisticated supply chain attack. We traced the failure to a small dependency, error-ex. Our package-lock.json specified the stable version 1.3.2 or newer, so it installed the latest version 1.3.3, which got published just a few minutes earlier.

DougBTX 1y ago
> Our package-lock.json specified the stable version 1.3.2 or newer Is that possible? I thought the lock files restricted to a specific version with an integrity check hash. Is it possible that it would install a newer version which doesn't match the hash in the lock file? Do they just mean package.json here?
- streptomycin 1y ago
  If they were for some reason doing `npm install` rather than `npm ci`, then `npm install` does update packages in the lock file. Personally I always found that confusing, and yarn/pnpm don't behave that way. I think most people do `npm ci` in CI, unless they are using CI to specifically test if `npm install` still works, which I guess maybe would be a good idea if you use npm since it doesn't like obeying the lock file.
  - Rockslide 1y ago
    How does this get repeated over and over, when it's simply not true? At least not anymore. npm install will only update the lockfile if you make changes to your package.json. Otherwise, it will install the versions from the lockfile.
    - cluckindan 1y ago
      Are you 100% on that?
      - Rockslide 1y ago
        Yes. As someone who's using npm install daily, and given the update cadence of npm packages, I would end up with dirty lock files very frequently if the parent statement were true. It just doesn't happen.
    - mirashii 1y ago
      > How does this get repeated over and over, when it's simply not true? Well, for one, the behavior is somewhat insane. `npm install` with no additional arguments does update the lockfile if your package.json and your lockfile are out of sync with one another for any reason, and so to get a guarantee that it doesn't change your lockfile, you must do additional configuration or guarantee by some external mechanism that you don't ever have an out of date package.json and lock. For this reason alone, the advice of "just don't use npm install, use npm ci instead" is still extremely valid, you'd really like this to fail fast if you get out of sync. `npm install additional-package` also updates your lock file. Other package managers distinguish these two operations, with the one to add a new dependency being called "add" instead of "install". The docs add to the confusion. https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-install#save https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-install#save suggests that writing to package-lock.json is the default and you need to change configuration to disable it. The notion that it won't change your lock file if you're already in sync between package.json and package-lock.json is not actually spelled out clearly anywhere on the page. > At least not anymore. You've partially answered your own question here.

kjok 1y ago

> automated scanners seem to do a good job already of finding malicious packages. That's not true. This latest incident was detected by an individual researcher, just like many similar attacks in the past. Time and again, it's been people who flagged these issues, later reported to security startups, not automated tools. Don't fall for the PR spin. If automated scanning were truly effective, we'd see deployments across all major package registries. The reality is, these systems still miss what vigilant humans catch.

hobofan 1y ago
> If automated scanning were truly effective, we'd see deployments across all major package registries. No we wouldn't. Most package registries are run by either bigcorps at a loss or by community maintainers (with bigcorps again sponsoring the infrastructure). And many of them barely go beyond the "CRUD" of package publishing due to lack of resources. The economic incentives of building up supply chain security tools into the package registries themselves are just not there.
- kjok 1y ago
  You're right that registries are under-resourced. But, if automated malware scanning actually worked, we'd already see big tech partnering with package registries to run continuous, ecosystem-wide scanning and detection pipelines. However, that isn't happening. Instead, we see piecemeal efforts from Google with assurance artifacts (SLSA provenance, SBOMs, verifiable builds), Microsoft sponsoring OSS maintainers, Facebook donating to package registries. Google's initiatives stop short of claiming they can automatically detect malware. This distinction matters. Malware detection is, in the general case, an undecidable problem (think halting problem and Rice theorem). No amount of static or dynamic scanning can guarantee catching malicious logic in arbitrary code. At best, scanners detect known signatures, patterns, or anomalies. They can't prove absence of malicious behavior. So the reality is: if Google's assurance artifacts stop short of claiming automated malware detection is feasible, it's a stretch for anyone else to suggest registries could achieve it "if they just had more resources." The problem space itself is the blocker, not just lack of infra or resources.