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I am amused that only one interpretation of the facts is considered, and not its bizarre consequences. At the end it is mentioned that the real numbers from 0
by btilly 14y ago
I am amused that only one interpretation of the facts is considered, and not its bizarre consequences.
At the end it is mentioned that the real numbers from 0 to 1 are not enumerable. Therefore there exist real numbers that are not in any particular enumerable set. Now consider the set of all potential finite definitions of a number using a finite set of symbols. This set turns out to be perfectly enumerable. Not all definitions in it will turn out to be well-formed, numbers have multiple definitions (for instance 5/10 is the same as 1/2) and many that are defined are not in the interval (0, 1). But this is no barrier. According to the classical view of mathematics, the set of definable numbers in (0, 1) is an enumerable set. Therefore almost all real numbers in that interval do not have any possible definition.
In what sense, I ask you, does a number with no possible definition actually exist?
Is there another way to look at this problem? It turns out that there is. If you take the constructivist view of things, things only exist if you can lay your hand on a concrete construction. "Constructions" that classical mathematics does not blink an eye at may not qualify. In particular this "enumeration" over possible definitions, and being able to sort through to figure out which definitions are valid, and which are equivalent, and which fall in the interval, is an example of something that is beyond the pale. Why? Well many of the possible definitions are computer programs. Figuring out which of them actually define numbers means doing things like solving the Halting problem. Which we can't actually do.
From the point of view of constructivism, "uncountable" does not mean "really big infinite set". It means "really convoluted set structure".
Yes, I know that constructivism lost. Nobody wants to consider these odd questions. But if somewhere in the middle of a proof you ask what it all means, you may find that classical mathematics doesn't necessarily make that much sense.
- gruseom 14y agoDo you mean: for each finite symbol set S, the set of all finite definitions using S is enumerable? That's clearly true. But then you're not really saying that there are numbers with no possible definition, just that there is no particular finite symbol set S that can define them all. Or do you mean: the set of all finite definitions in any finite symbol set is enumerable? That's not clear. Are there countably many such symbol sets?
- btilly 14y agoWhat I mean is this. Given a finite symbol set, the set of all finite definitions is enumerable. And the enumeration is simple. We enumerate all possible definitions of length 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. We order them first by length, and then by alphabetical order. We strike out all definitions that are not definitions, or define a number already defined. This leaves us with an enumeration of all numbers definable with that set of symbols. (Note, a constructivist will insist strenuously that this is not actually an enumeration.) Given that there are uncountably many real numbers, uncountably many of them are not in that enumerable set, and therefore almost all real numbers cannot be defined using that finite set of symbols. The possibility of uncountably many possible symbol sets with a similar plethora of possible associated definitions is irrelevant, because any potential symbol set that cannot ultimately be described in the finite alphabet that we use with the language English is irrelevant to us.
- phaedrus 14y agoAs a programmer I find constructivism is my default position if I think of math intuitively; perhaps that's why I butted heads so much with many of my math teachers. But, your argument actually makes me less sure of my agreement with it: it seems clear that at bottom constructivism must lead to the rejection of the concept of continuously variable quantities. It is the horns of a dilemma: if you reject Cantor you reject the existence of "analog" as even an admissible concept, on the other hand if you accept continuous variability then you must also accept the shocking conclusion that the overwhelming majority of the set you assert you believe exists (the reals) cannot even be described or calculated.
- btilly 14y agoBut constructivism does not give up continuity. All of the traditional definitions carry over. What you do have to give up, though, are discontinuous functions on continuous sets. They are not well defined for numbers that are the result of an infinite sequence converging near the border of the discontinuity. You can still give them a formal treatment, of course, but they aren't really functions. However if you're attached to your step functions, never fear. It would not be the first function-like thing that isn't a function. For another example consider the well-known derivative of the step function, the Dirac delta. Not actually a function in classical mathematics, though it is certainly useful.
- B-Con 14y ago> In what sense, I ask you, does a number with no possible definition actually exist? There is a difference between "describe" and "define". You are talking about what are mathematically called "indescribable numbers". They still have a definition, because we have sets that include them. > Nobody wants to consider these odd questions. But if somewhere in the middle of a proof you ask what it all means, you may find that classical mathematics doesn't necessarily make that much sense.Nobody wants to consider these odd questions. But if somewhere in the middle of a proof you ask what it all means, you may find that classical mathematics doesn't necessarily make that much sense. I don't think that describes the situation very well. It's just that they're not bothered by not being able to touch things. Most mathematicians have no problem working with things that they can't touch, it certainly doesn't have to inhibit their understanding of it. It isn't like mathematicians are uncomfortable with the question "but what does it mean if I can't touch it?", they simply reply with "why would I care about such a question?" (Of course, some people do care, but they are in the minority. The point is that the separation of opinion is mainly about whether the question makes sense to ask to begin with.)