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Additional context: https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveillance-detected-at-anti-ice-protest/ https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell

Additional context: https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveillance-detected-at-anti-ice-protest/ https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveill... >At 8:58 a.m., just before the protest began, SAN began monitoring eight LTE bands present in the area and found no anomalous behavior. At 9:06 a.m., however, a burst of 57 IMSI-exposing commands was detected. >Other bursts, present on four of the LTE frequency bands, appeared roughly every 10 minutes over the next hour, causing Marlin to issue numerous real-time alerts. A post-scan analysis confirmed the detection of 574 IMSI-exposing messages. >It also flagged two “attach reject” messages, a type of cellular rejection sent when a cell phone tries to connect to a network. Attach rejects can occur for valid reasons, such as when a phone with an expired SIM card tries to connect to a network but such messages are rare on properly configured networks. IMSI catchers may use attach reject messages to block or downgrade connections and obtain an IMSI before it is encrypted. SAN observed the two suspicious messages at 9:55 a.m. and 10:04 a.m. at the height of the protest but did not encounter others before or after the demonstration ended. >SAN conducted a follow-up scan during the same time period, the following day, when no protesters were present. Unlike the day prior, Marlin did not issue real-time alerts.

perihelions 1y ago
I.e. the inference is that ICE is unconstitutionally tracking and assembling lists of protestors exercising their First Amendment rights. > "A post-scan analysis confirmed the detection of 574 IMSI-exposing messages." That's roughly 574 unique protestors, give or take. Full-on autocratic tyranny—this is also what Putin's oligarchs did to Ukranians at the Maidan Protests, in Kyiv in 2014. Used IMSI-catchers to assemble lists of everyone present, and intimidate them. https://slate.com/technology/2014/01/ukraine-texting-euromaidan-protesters-kiev-demonstrators-receive-threats.html https://slate.com/technology/2014/01/ukraine-texting-euromai... ("How Did Ukraine’s Government Text Threats to Kiev’s EuroMaidan Protesters?" (2014)).
- MiiMe19 1y ago
  [flagged]
  - perihelions 1y ago
    The article I'm replying to is the parent comment's "Exclusive: Evidence of cell phone surveillance detected at anti-ICE protest"; not the HN OP.
    - exe34 1y ago
      "Earlier this year, new media publication Straight Arrow News said it had analysed “mobile network anomalies” around a Washington state protest against ICE raids that were consistent with Stingray use."
- tiahura 1y ago
  How do you know there wasn’t a warrant?
  - perihelions 1y ago
    It'd be flatly unconstitutional to approve a dragnet warrant targeting a protest.
    - tiahura 1y ago
      In a recently-unsealed search warrant reviewed by Forbes, ICE used such a cell-site simulator in an attempt to track down an individual in Orem, Utah. Maybe you missed it when you read the article?
      - perihelions 1y ago
        The article[0] I'm replying to is about a political protest in Tukwila, Washington. [0] https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveillance-detected-at-anti-ice-protest/ https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveill...
        loeg 1y ago
        (It establishes that it is possible to obtain a warrant to use this device. One could have been obtained in Tukwila.)
    - dmix 1y ago
      They wouldn't necessarily be targeting the whole protest, the IMSI catcher would work broadly and from that the warrant would require them to narrow down to one and ignore rest. Unless I misunderstood the technical details the parent comment posted. This broad dragnet nature of Stingray collection has always been why it's been a major privacy issue. Like doing a wiretap by tapping the whole neighbourhood and filtering phone calls for a certain address.
    - cosmicgadget 1y ago
- xp84 1y ago
  [flagged]
  - boston_clone 1y ago
    Start at the Fourth Amendment. (I guess the First would be more appropriate place to start, but the Fourth is quite pertinent.) Also, > [...] if you disagree with me and think the government is fascist and thus can't be trusted not to throw you in prison just for saying things they don't like this is happening: https://www.msn.com/en-us/crime/general/tourist-refused-entry-into-us-and-jailed-over-bald-jd-vance-meme/ar-AA1HlCyz https://www.msn.com/en-us/crime/general/tourist-refused-entr... edited for phrasing / completeness
    - xp84 1y ago
      This seems like an apples/oranges comparison. The constitution is pretty silent afaik on whether random foreign nationals such as this tourist have any particular rights. Obviously summarily executing or imprisoning them would be a big no-no, but being asked lots of questions and thoroughly searched because they think you're a troublemaker is not uncommon. Being refused entry to a country that isn't yours and being home safe by the end of the day, is quite a few huge leaps away from being locked up in your own country for your speech. Do I think that incident sounds like a stupid move by CBP if that is the whole story[1]? Yeah. But I disagree that it's proof we're in a fascist dictatorship. [1] Is it also possible that the government agents didn't overhear him making some flippant comment that made him seem far more dangerous? For instance, "Yeah I can't believe I'm even coming here when that fascist Trump was elected. Wish that bullet hadn't missed." If he had said or done something to cause it to happen, you can bet he would have forgotten to mention it when he recounted his story to The Daily Star.
  - some_guy_nobel 1y ago
    Courts have repeatedly held that the government cannot chill lawful protest activity by imposing undue surveillance or intimidation. Sure, there is no explicit “right to anonymity,” but the Supreme Court has recognized in cases like NAACP v. Alabama (1958) that forced disclosure of membership lists can violate First Amendment rights, because it deters participation and chills association. Of course, the Fourth Amendment also has clauses against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but it's easy to see, from modern cases like Carpenter v. United States (2018) (which limited warrantless cellphone location tracking) why this could be perceived poorly. But the Constitution tries to ensure that risk doesn’t come from government retaliation against lawful expression. I would ask why you're so keen to allow it.
- meetpatelcurry 1y ago
  [dead]
noselasd 1y ago
Those Attach Rejects should have a cause value, possibly telling a bit more on the reject reason. I see those quite frequently, the bulk of them are phones trying to roam in a network they're not allowed to though, and some cause the cell is a bit overloaded, some cause the phone sends a wrong tracking area - not sure that's a phone bug or a common scenario where the phone retains an old tracking area, then it tries to connect to the same tracking area - then the phone discovers it's is now in a different tracking area, and after being rejected, it connects with the correct one.
- 542354234235 1y ago
  True but they happen because of individual phones. If you have bursts of those across dozens of devices, that indicates it is on the network side. Also, cell tower handoffs usually don't require Attach Rejects and are generally normal routine operations.
notherhack 1y ago
SAN doesn't say where the unusual tower traffic originated. Does the Marlin system attempt to geolocate and identify the suspicious transmitters? Could the regular mobile tower operators collect subscriber identities at will via their regular gear, with no stingray vans or warrants required, and save the information for later? That seems to be how it's done with the other subscriber location and communication contents that they collect.

perihelions 1y ago

I.e. the inference is that ICE is unconstitutionally tracking and assembling lists of protestors exercising their First Amendment rights. > "A post-scan analysis confirmed the detection of 574 IMSI-exposing messages." That's roughly 574 unique protestors, give or take. Full-on autocratic tyranny—this is also what Putin's oligarchs did to Ukranians at the Maidan Protests, in Kyiv in 2014. Used IMSI-catchers to assemble lists of everyone present, and intimidate them. https://slate.com/technology/2014/01/ukraine-texting-euromaidan-protesters-kiev-demonstrators-receive-threats.html https://slate.com/technology/2014/01/ukraine-texting-euromai... ("How Did Ukraine’s Government Text Threats to Kiev’s EuroMaidan Protesters?" (2014)).

MiiMe19 1y ago
[flagged]
- perihelions 1y ago
  The article I'm replying to is the parent comment's "Exclusive: Evidence of cell phone surveillance detected at anti-ICE protest"; not the HN OP.
  - exe34 1y ago
    "Earlier this year, new media publication Straight Arrow News said it had analysed “mobile network anomalies” around a Washington state protest against ICE raids that were consistent with Stingray use."
tiahura 1y ago
How do you know there wasn’t a warrant?
- perihelions 1y ago
  It'd be flatly unconstitutional to approve a dragnet warrant targeting a protest.
  - tiahura 1y ago
    In a recently-unsealed search warrant reviewed by Forbes, ICE used such a cell-site simulator in an attempt to track down an individual in Orem, Utah. Maybe you missed it when you read the article?
    - perihelions 1y ago
      The article[0] I'm replying to is about a political protest in Tukwila, Washington. [0] https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveillance-detected-at-anti-ice-protest/ https://san.com/cc/exclusive-evidence-of-cell-phone-surveill...
      - loeg 1y ago
        (It establishes that it is possible to obtain a warrant to use this device. One could have been obtained in Tukwila.)
  - dmix 1y ago
    They wouldn't necessarily be targeting the whole protest, the IMSI catcher would work broadly and from that the warrant would require them to narrow down to one and ignore rest. Unless I misunderstood the technical details the parent comment posted. This broad dragnet nature of Stingray collection has always been why it's been a major privacy issue. Like doing a wiretap by tapping the whole neighbourhood and filtering phone calls for a certain address.
  - cosmicgadget 1y ago
xp84 1y ago
[flagged]
- boston_clone 1y ago
  Start at the Fourth Amendment. (I guess the First would be more appropriate place to start, but the Fourth is quite pertinent.) Also, > [...] if you disagree with me and think the government is fascist and thus can't be trusted not to throw you in prison just for saying things they don't like this is happening: https://www.msn.com/en-us/crime/general/tourist-refused-entry-into-us-and-jailed-over-bald-jd-vance-meme/ar-AA1HlCyz https://www.msn.com/en-us/crime/general/tourist-refused-entr... edited for phrasing / completeness
  - xp84 1y ago
    This seems like an apples/oranges comparison. The constitution is pretty silent afaik on whether random foreign nationals such as this tourist have any particular rights. Obviously summarily executing or imprisoning them would be a big no-no, but being asked lots of questions and thoroughly searched because they think you're a troublemaker is not uncommon. Being refused entry to a country that isn't yours and being home safe by the end of the day, is quite a few huge leaps away from being locked up in your own country for your speech. Do I think that incident sounds like a stupid move by CBP if that is the whole story[1]? Yeah. But I disagree that it's proof we're in a fascist dictatorship. [1] Is it also possible that the government agents didn't overhear him making some flippant comment that made him seem far more dangerous? For instance, "Yeah I can't believe I'm even coming here when that fascist Trump was elected. Wish that bullet hadn't missed." If he had said or done something to cause it to happen, you can bet he would have forgotten to mention it when he recounted his story to The Daily Star.
- some_guy_nobel 1y ago
  Courts have repeatedly held that the government cannot chill lawful protest activity by imposing undue surveillance or intimidation. Sure, there is no explicit “right to anonymity,” but the Supreme Court has recognized in cases like NAACP v. Alabama (1958) that forced disclosure of membership lists can violate First Amendment rights, because it deters participation and chills association. Of course, the Fourth Amendment also has clauses against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but it's easy to see, from modern cases like Carpenter v. United States (2018) (which limited warrantless cellphone location tracking) why this could be perceived poorly. But the Constitution tries to ensure that risk doesn’t come from government retaliation against lawful expression. I would ask why you're so keen to allow it.
meetpatelcurry 1y ago
[dead]

noselasd 1y ago

Those Attach Rejects should have a cause value, possibly telling a bit more on the reject reason. I see those quite frequently, the bulk of them are phones trying to roam in a network they're not allowed to though, and some cause the cell is a bit overloaded, some cause the phone sends a wrong tracking area - not sure that's a phone bug or a common scenario where the phone retains an old tracking area, then it tries to connect to the same tracking area - then the phone discovers it's is now in a different tracking area, and after being rejected, it connects with the correct one.

542354234235 1y ago
True but they happen because of individual phones. If you have bursts of those across dozens of devices, that indicates it is on the network side. Also, cell tower handoffs usually don't require Attach Rejects and are generally normal routine operations.

notherhack 1y ago

SAN doesn't say where the unusual tower traffic originated. Does the Marlin system attempt to geolocate and identify the suspicious transmitters? Could the regular mobile tower operators collect subscriber identities at will via their regular gear, with no stingray vans or warrants required, and save the information for later? That seems to be how it's done with the other subscriber location and communication contents that they collect.