3 ms·
> (1) It doesn't work reliably, because middleboxes don't pass DNSSEC/TLSA records reliably, so there has to be a downgrade path, so it's strippable. They need
by Tepix 1y ago
> (1) It doesn't work reliably, because middleboxes don't pass DNSSEC/TLSA records reliably, so there has to be a downgrade path, so it's strippable.
They need to be fixed but yes it is a real problem from what i've heard.
> (2) It's much slower than the TLS WebPKI.
Caching should make it fast enough. Do you have real-world numbers?
> (3) There's no transparency log and never will be, both because it hasn't been designed and because Google and Mozilla basically had to mug the WebPKI CA's in a dark alley to make CT happen.
That is an excellent point. Do you have a solution?
> (4) It requires you to set up DNSSEC, which is so error prone that some of the largest engineering teams in the world have managed to take their sites (and also countries) offline.
I really don't like DNSSEC myself – i'd rather have seen DNSCurve https://dnscurve.org/ https://dnscurve.org/ succeed – but at a certain point, i think we just have to go with it.
- tptacek 1y agoIt's not going to be fixed. You have to design protocols for the Internet we actually have, not the one you want. I don't have a solution for any of these problems; the conclusion I come to is, DNSSEC is a dead letter. That's happened with lots of protocols in the past, and it is going to happen with this one too.