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compression [...] looks to have gained its earliest adoption in SSL/TLS at about the same time as Elliptic Curve I guess by that point they had thrown in every
by cperciva 14y ago
compression [...] looks to have gained its earliest adoption in SSL/TLS at about the same time as Elliptic Curve
I guess by that point they had thrown in everything but the kitchen sink, and decided they might as well throw in the kitchen sink too.
I wouldn't want to see Thai's and Juliano's (or Pornin's, if he's "wrong" about the prediction) work minimized by a glib comment about TLS.
Oh, of course. I'm just irritated (as usual) by the fact that people continue to use SSL/TLS "because it's the standard" despite the fact that it's a phenomenally broken standard. There's places where you can't avoid it (HTTPS), but where it can be avoided...
- tptacek 14y agoYour perspective on HTTPS/TLS is that it has a history of vulnerabilities because it is poorly designed. My perspective on HTTPS/TLS is that it has a history of vulnerabilities because it is the most carefully studied cryptosystem in human history. I agree to disagree with you on this.
- cperciva 14y agoMy perspective is that we know how to design protocols which are provably secure. Your perspective is... I'm not quite sure, actually. Maybe you just don't believe in mathematical proofs? As you say, agree to disagree -- but I'm not going to stop pointing and laughing every time a new SSL/TLS vulnerability comes out. :-)
- tptacek 14y agoThat protocols without security proofs can survive in the real world, and protocols with security proofs still fall to implementation bugs, and that if you were going to bet on incidence of protocol design flaws vs. implementation flaws, the safe bet is on implementation flaws.
- luu 14y agoIf you've got a provably secure protocol, what's the problem with formally verifying the implementation of the protocol? I work in an area where bugs are very scary, so we use formal verification, and that's on top of having many more testers than developers. From the perspective of this naive outsider, I'd would have expected FV to be worth it for security sensitive protocols. Is it that the protocols are too complex to be verified, or is it just not considered to be worth the effort?
- tptacek 14y agoI'm not making an argument against formal methods. I'm saying that if you replaced TLS with a protocol with a design proof, you could easily end up less secure.
- peterwwillis 14y agoThe level of civility in this thread is great, but I would pay money to see a DEF CON panel debate between you two where you each had to take a shot every 8 minutes. We could get Mikko Hypponen to moderate and pour shots!
- sausagefeet 14y agoHave there been any proposed contenders to TLS/SSL?
- Daniel_Newby 14y agoSSH and IPv6 come to mind.
- sausagefeet 14y agoFor HTTP traffic?
- geofft 14y agoVulnerabilities don't arise by study, they arise because of vulnerabilities. We have plenty of well-studied crypto that is fine, ranging from SHA to Kerberos. Colin is right that we know how to prove that cryptographic systems have certain security properties. The academic literature is filled with laments about TLS and proofs of fixed versions of it.
- tptacek 14y agoSHA? The Secure Hash Algorithm? The Secure Hash Algorithm with the length extension property? The Secure Hash Algorithm with the length extension property that was specifically forbidden from the SHA-3 contestants because it creates implementation vulnerabilities in the real world? That SHA? Also, how does one compare a cryptographic hash function core to an entire cryptographic protocol to produce a statement about the fallibility of crypto design?