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It is very hard for me to believe that you would have spotted this flaw immediately had anyone pointed out to you that TLS supported compression. I'm not claim
by cperciva 14y ago
It is very hard for me to believe that you would have spotted this flaw immediately had anyone pointed out to you that TLS supported compression.
I'm not claiming that I'd have noticed this particular attack. I'm saying that having compression in a supposedly secure transport layer was an obviously bad idea even before it was clear how it could be exploited. I don't need to get into a car accident to know that driving at night with my car's headlights turned off is a bad idea.
There is well-regarded (though not by me) crypto advice recommending that people compress before encrypting, to destroy structure in the plaintext.
There's a huge difference between compressing data and compressing an authentication channel. This is why compression should not be included in the secure channel -- it should be left up to the higher-level code to decide if compression is (a) completely pointless or (b) will leak information dangerously.
- tptacek 14y agoThese are things that are obvious in hindsight. They may have been obvious to you before; or, as I'm claiming, they may just fit snugly into your (probably correct) philosophy about secure channel design. But compression in TLS is not a relic of the 1990s; it's something that looks to have gained its earliest adoption in SSL/TLS at about the same time as Elliptic Curve. My issue here isn't that you're wrong; it's that I think this is an extremely clever attack that says something profound about designing cryptosystems, and I wouldn't want to see Thai's and Juliano's (or Pornin's, if he's "wrong" about the prediction) work minimized by a glib comment about TLS.
- cperciva 14y agocompression [...] looks to have gained its earliest adoption in SSL/TLS at about the same time as Elliptic Curve I guess by that point they had thrown in everything but the kitchen sink, and decided they might as well throw in the kitchen sink too. I wouldn't want to see Thai's and Juliano's (or Pornin's, if he's "wrong" about the prediction) work minimized by a glib comment about TLS. Oh, of course. I'm just irritated (as usual) by the fact that people continue to use SSL/TLS "because it's the standard" despite the fact that it's a phenomenally broken standard. There's places where you can't avoid it (HTTPS), but where it can be avoided...
- tptacek 14y agoYour perspective on HTTPS/TLS is that it has a history of vulnerabilities because it is poorly designed. My perspective on HTTPS/TLS is that it has a history of vulnerabilities because it is the most carefully studied cryptosystem in human history. I agree to disagree with you on this.
- cperciva 14y agoMy perspective is that we know how to design protocols which are provably secure. Your perspective is... I'm not quite sure, actually. Maybe you just don't believe in mathematical proofs? As you say, agree to disagree -- but I'm not going to stop pointing and laughing every time a new SSL/TLS vulnerability comes out. :-)
- tptacek 14y agoThat protocols without security proofs can survive in the real world, and protocols with security proofs still fall to implementation bugs, and that if you were going to bet on incidence of protocol design flaws vs. implementation flaws, the safe bet is on implementation flaws.
- luu 14y agoIf you've got a provably secure protocol, what's the problem with formally verifying the implementation of the protocol? I work in an area where bugs are very scary, so we use formal verification, and that's on top of having many more testers than developers. From the perspective of this naive outsider, I'd would have expected FV to be worth it for security sensitive protocols. Is it that the protocols are too complex to be verified, or is it just not considered to be worth the effort?
- tptacek 14y agoI'm not making an argument against formal methods. I'm saying that if you replaced TLS with a protocol with a design proof, you could easily end up less secure.