4 ms·

The US already has this via the UK, who've been tapping the undersea cables of EU members for 20+ years. Literally everything transmitted via Ireland - home of

The US already has this via the UK, who've been tapping the undersea cables of EU members for 20+ years. Literally everything transmitted via Ireland - home of the DPC function for most of the US MNCs in the EU, the only US customs clearance on European Soil, and Datacentre hub for Amzn/Goog/Appl etc... https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/uk-spy-base-gchq-tapped-irish-internet-cables-1.2019492 https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/uk-spy-base-g...

wkat4242 1y ago
That's data in transit, they wouldn't be able to view end to end encrypted content with that. Chatcontrol specifically aims to break that.
- piltdownman 1y ago
  I mean you're not wrong re: DiT vs DaR, I was more just pointing out the Room 641A equivalence on an extra-territorial level https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A In terms of e2e chat encryption, binary blobs and 'managed' mobile platforms render it somewhat of a moot point to me. Bad actors can either be 0day'd or Social Engineered for those with advanced OpSec. To date though, the most successful network was Encrochat - an OTR-based messaging app which routed conversations through a central server based in France, which was eventually compromised by French police with a malware allowed them to read messages before they were sent and record lock screen passwords https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EncroChat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EncroChat Europol got a taste for the heady power of it - The chief of the Dutch National Police Force, Jannine van den Berg , compared the malware to "sitting at the table where criminals were chatting among themselves". Now the reality is that the equivalent of the Clipper Chip 'key escrow' is now implementable at a Firmware/Mandatory Push Update level, and probably as part of a 'secure' walled garden app-store API in future. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip

wkat4242 1y ago

That's data in transit, they wouldn't be able to view end to end encrypted content with that. Chatcontrol specifically aims to break that.

piltdownman 1y ago
I mean you're not wrong re: DiT vs DaR, I was more just pointing out the Room 641A equivalence on an extra-territorial level https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A In terms of e2e chat encryption, binary blobs and 'managed' mobile platforms render it somewhat of a moot point to me. Bad actors can either be 0day'd or Social Engineered for those with advanced OpSec. To date though, the most successful network was Encrochat - an OTR-based messaging app which routed conversations through a central server based in France, which was eventually compromised by French police with a malware allowed them to read messages before they were sent and record lock screen passwords https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EncroChat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EncroChat Europol got a taste for the heady power of it - The chief of the Dutch National Police Force, Jannine van den Berg , compared the malware to "sitting at the table where criminals were chatting among themselves". Now the reality is that the equivalent of the Clipper Chip 'key escrow' is now implementable at a Firmware/Mandatory Push Update level, and probably as part of a 'secure' walled garden app-store API in future. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip