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This is an example of clickjacking protection, CSRF is cross site request forgery, f.ex. creating a POST form on a hostile site that targets a POST processing e
by whizzter 1y ago
This is an example of clickjacking protection, CSRF is cross site request forgery, f.ex. creating a POST form on a hostile site that targets a POST processing endpoint in on site with data that the user didn't want to supply but whose login cookie would authorize the request at the target.
Many frameworks inject an per-user "authentication" cookie in form's that is validated upon request, this way an attacker cannot trick the users browser to submit data since they don't have the correct cookie.
https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/CSRF https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attack...
- shakna 1y agoIf your problem is in authorisation, then it will be in your business logic, of what a user looks like, what the hierarchy is, and so on. It shouldn't live in your framework. And the standard ways of doing that, generating single use tokens, will work the way they usually do. As I said... I didn't use cookies. Which means none of what you listed applied in the first place. Logins were entirely ephemeral and died after a single session ended - as pains were taken to ensure anonymity.