> I believe your idea of consciousness is that it is an emergent phenomenon that arises from simpler processes, much like how biology arises from the simple law

> I believe your idea of consciousness is that it is an emergent phenomenon that arises from simpler processes, much like how biology arises from the simple laws of QM. Is this correct? I wouldn't call that a definition. Here's a working one: my consciousness is the part of me which thinks and feels, which enjoys music and mountains and friends and so forth. Computers as of now can take input, but can't experience input the way I do; the gap is what I call consciousness. (To this definition your above description does apply.) > "Do you think that this means your consciousness has nothing to do with your claim to be conscious?" Yes, that is exactly what I think. Although replace "consciousness" with "the act of experiencing existence" and that is a much closer semantic match to what I am attempting to convey. This is the bit I'm having trouble with. For me, I experience things, and then state that I experience things. The relationship is direct and causal. From what I understand you experience things and then state that you experience things, and these facts are completely unrelated? I'm pretty sure Occam had something to say about that.