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It's called the "hard problem" of consciousness. In theory, you can map causation from particle-wave interactions to experiential states but that doesn't provi
by s_baby 14y ago
It's called the "hard problem" of consciousness. In theory, you can map causation from particle-wave interactions to experiential states but that doesn't provide an explanatory ontology. It's a matter of having a valid data type. No data type captures qualities.
- Xcelerate 14y agoAre you using big words just for the sake of appearing knowledgable? "Causation from particle-wave interactions". What do you mean by this? If you're referring to determinism, that's already been ruled out by HUP (unless you support superdeterminism, although few scientists do; t'Hooft is a notable exception). Valid data type? When did the discussion switch to type systems? I'm sorry, you'll need to clarify what you are trying to convey.
- s_baby 14y ago>Are you using big words just for the sake of appearing knowledgable? I'm sorry your highness. I didn't realize I'm speaking to an authority here. >Causation from particle-wave interactions". What do you mean by this? I mean saying firing of neural circuitry X correlates to experience of Y. Given the right tools you might be able to do that and create a valid mapping of causation. >Valid data type? When did the discussion switch to type systems? What you can't do is capture experience in formal language. We'd like to symbolically capture the experience of "seeing blue" for example but no data type maps onto qualities beyond nominal signifiers of our own personal experience.
- Bakkot 14y agoYup. But this certainly isn't unique to consciousness: In theory the axioms of Turing machines can prove that our best-candidate BusyBeaver(6) runs for around 10^36534 steps, but that doesn't provide an explanatory ontology. But you don't need to invoke magic for the theory to be true.
- s_baby 14y agoYour point is taken but I don't think OP meant sentients is literally magic but that it is essentially a blackbox system to our constructs.