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> "Unless you believe there’s something magical about consciousness" Well, yes, I do actually. See philosophical zombie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosop

> "Unless you believe there’s something magical about consciousness" Well, yes, I do actually. See philosophical zombie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie). Although I don't doubt that the physics of our universe could be simulated. By the way, there's actually something called the Bekenstein bound (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bekenstein_bound http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bekenstein_bound) which puts a finite information limit on a volume of spacetime. Incredibly enough, the information content is not proportional to the volume of the region, but to the volume's surface area. This is known as the holographic principle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holographic_principle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holographic_principle). I did a calculation the other day for fun with the Bekenstein bound. All of the information in 1 kg of water can be entirely described with roughly ~20,000 earth masses of 1 TB hard drives (assuming each hard drive weighs one pound). And if someone wants to see something extra freaky, calculate the maximal information content of a Planck volume ;)

Bakkot 14y ago
I'm sorry, you believe the physics of this universe could be simulated but still accept that the p-zombie argument is valid? So in p-zombie land, there's an Xcelerate making claims about being conscious for exactly the same reasons you are (ie physics), but only you are actually correct? Moreover, you're correct entirely by accident, because your reasons for making your claim to consciousness (ie physics) have nothing to do with the actual fact of your consciousness? I just can't take that seriously.
- s_baby 14y ago
  It's called the "hard problem" of consciousness. In theory, you can map causation from particle-wave interactions to experiential states but that doesn't provide an explanatory ontology. It's a matter of having a valid data type. No data type captures qualities.
  - Xcelerate 14y ago
    Are you using big words just for the sake of appearing knowledgable? "Causation from particle-wave interactions". What do you mean by this? If you're referring to determinism, that's already been ruled out by HUP (unless you support superdeterminism, although few scientists do; t'Hooft is a notable exception). Valid data type? When did the discussion switch to type systems? I'm sorry, you'll need to clarify what you are trying to convey.
    - s_baby 14y ago
      >Are you using big words just for the sake of appearing knowledgable? I'm sorry your highness. I didn't realize I'm speaking to an authority here. >Causation from particle-wave interactions". What do you mean by this? I mean saying firing of neural circuitry X correlates to experience of Y. Given the right tools you might be able to do that and create a valid mapping of causation. >Valid data type? When did the discussion switch to type systems? What you can't do is capture experience in formal language. We'd like to symbolically capture the experience of "seeing blue" for example but no data type maps onto qualities beyond nominal signifiers of our own personal experience.
  - Bakkot 14y ago
    Yup. But this certainly isn't unique to consciousness: In theory the axioms of Turing machines can prove that our best-candidate BusyBeaver(6) runs for around 10^36534 steps, but that doesn't provide an explanatory ontology. But you don't need to invoke magic for the theory to be true.
    - s_baby 14y ago
      Your point is taken but I don't think OP meant sentients is literally magic but that it is essentially a blackbox system to our constructs.
- Xcelerate 14y ago
  I'm sorry you feel that way. We just happen to disagree then. What constitutes science? You must be able to predict events from a theory and you must be able to reproduce them. But there's a third, implied tenet that most people forget about: anyone performing the experiment must come to a consensus on the results of the experiment. For me, "experience" is easy -- it's the most "real" thing in my reality. Vision, hearing, taste, smell? Those could all be faked some day with advanced enough neural manipulation. Let me attempt to clarify. Suppose you have a hypothetical person who sees an apple floating everywhere in front of him. He tells everyone that he sees this apple, but everyone else says "No, you're crazy. There is no apple there." So he takes a photograph of the apple. He prints it out and says "Look! Right here in this photograph is the apple!" Again, everyone says "I see no apple." He can consistently, predictably, see this apple. He decides to even paint exactly what he sees. And when he looks at his painting, he sees an apple, but everyone else sees empty sky. Is this person crazy? Well, if science is determined by consensus (which it is), then yes, the majority of people would say that he is crazy. But now instead of just this one guy with an apple, let's say that everyone sees a piece of fruit in front of them. But it's a different type of fruit for each person. And they all try to tell each other that there is clearly, obviously, unmistakably a fruit floating right there in front of them, but everyone thinks everyone else is crazy because they can't see other people's fruit -- only their own. So eventually, they decide to just forget about the fruit. Maybe it's not actually real if everyone else can't see it? (Would a person in a computer simulation see this fruit?) And so, despite everyone obviously having their own fruit hanging right in front of them, they have all decided to say that there is instead no such thing as floating fruit, since no one can come to a consensus about everyone else's fruit existing. So there you go. That's how I view consciousness. Although I should tweak that slightly -- "consciousness" perhaps isn't the right word. Consciousness can be manipulated with drugs and sedatives. What I am really referring to is the act of "experiencing" something.
  - saurik 14y ago
    (Did you make up the fruit metaphor, or was that one I should have heard before? I ask because I felt it was downright epic.)
- deleted 14y ago
  [deleted]
thaumaturgy 14y ago
The philosophical zombie as a thought-experiment is rapidly being faded away by advances in neuroscience. As scientists get better and better at studying the physical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain, the philosophical zombie will have to emulate those mechanisms of consciousness to such an extent that it will, by definition, be conscious. An easy example of this would be some recent work done in using MRI to map active brain regions to moral dilemmas. (A quick example: http://www.wbur.org/npr/6636701/the-science-behind-making-moral-decisions http://www.wbur.org/npr/6636701/the-science-behind-making-mo...)
- Xcelerate 14y ago
  See my reply to Bakkot. No amount of science can prove or disprove a p-zombie. Since it's unfalsifiable, it cannot possibly belong in the domain of science. (Again, I should note that I am referring more to "experience" than "consciousness").
  - thaumaturgy 14y ago
    I don't understand. You used the P-Zombie as a reference for believing that there's something "magical" about consciousness. The magic of consciousness is quickly giving way to the research of neuroscience. So, why are you injecting an unfalsifiable philosophy -- which, by the way, is indistinguishable from religion -- into a scientific discussion? To respond directly to your hypothetical apple, there are so many myriad ways of testing the existence or not-existence of a thing that hand-waving science away as agreement-by-consensus is premature (and wrong). Your hypothetical crazy dude could try immersing his apple in water and see if there is displacement; he could try burning it, measuring the light of the flame using a spectrometer, ask others to burn apples in the same way, and compare the output; he could attempt to infect it with insect larvae; he could attempt to power a small device with it; and so on. Science is not merely a matter of consensus, it is a matter of ever-rigorous testing. Or, to put it another way: the closest thing that scientists have found so far to a "consensus" reality is relativity, and they found a way to test and verify it. If scientists can come up with a way to test whether or not time itself actually speeds up or slows down according to frame of reference, don't you think they could come up with a way to test for the existence of a magic invisible apple? To get back to the article, I have to defer to Descartes: I think, therefore I am. And, I have thought about such things as MRI machines that verify the consciousness of the beings around me; their brains, the existence of their consciousnesses, is no longer a magical thing to me. I suppose it is possible that I am an element of some kind of incredible extra-dimensional simulation, but that's a very boring thing to imagine, because it doesn't in any way affect who I am or what I will do, or have done. And besides, I think that one day scientists will be able to test that, too. edit: here, I read the WP article you linked more thoroughly, so I'll just reference it back: I believe I would fall into the reductive physicalist camp, where p-zombies are impossible by definition. Furthermore, I think that the relatively recent work done in neuroscience -- work more recent than the idea of p-zombies, I would point out -- provides strong support for reductive physicalism.
ca98am79 14y ago
I've been reading/thinking about consciousness a lot lately and agree with the idea of philosophical zombies. I don't think that there is necessarily anything "magical" about consciousness - I just think that we are in the dark ages of understanding it. I think it's more like a fundamental property of the universe, or a property of matter, than something that can emerge from matter. Conscious experience emerging from matter seems more "magical" to me. I've been reading a lot of David Chalmers lately - he's awesome.

Bakkot 14y ago

I'm sorry, you believe the physics of this universe could be simulated but still accept that the p-zombie argument is valid? So in p-zombie land, there's an Xcelerate making claims about being conscious for exactly the same reasons you are (ie physics), but only you are actually correct? Moreover, you're correct entirely by accident, because your reasons for making your claim to consciousness (ie physics) have nothing to do with the actual fact of your consciousness? I just can't take that seriously.

s_baby 14y ago
It's called the "hard problem" of consciousness. In theory, you can map causation from particle-wave interactions to experiential states but that doesn't provide an explanatory ontology. It's a matter of having a valid data type. No data type captures qualities.
- Xcelerate 14y ago
  Are you using big words just for the sake of appearing knowledgable? "Causation from particle-wave interactions". What do you mean by this? If you're referring to determinism, that's already been ruled out by HUP (unless you support superdeterminism, although few scientists do; t'Hooft is a notable exception). Valid data type? When did the discussion switch to type systems? I'm sorry, you'll need to clarify what you are trying to convey.
  - s_baby 14y ago
    >Are you using big words just for the sake of appearing knowledgable? I'm sorry your highness. I didn't realize I'm speaking to an authority here. >Causation from particle-wave interactions". What do you mean by this? I mean saying firing of neural circuitry X correlates to experience of Y. Given the right tools you might be able to do that and create a valid mapping of causation. >Valid data type? When did the discussion switch to type systems? What you can't do is capture experience in formal language. We'd like to symbolically capture the experience of "seeing blue" for example but no data type maps onto qualities beyond nominal signifiers of our own personal experience.
- Bakkot 14y ago
  Yup. But this certainly isn't unique to consciousness: In theory the axioms of Turing machines can prove that our best-candidate BusyBeaver(6) runs for around 10^36534 steps, but that doesn't provide an explanatory ontology. But you don't need to invoke magic for the theory to be true.
  - s_baby 14y ago
    Your point is taken but I don't think OP meant sentients is literally magic but that it is essentially a blackbox system to our constructs.
Xcelerate 14y ago
I'm sorry you feel that way. We just happen to disagree then. What constitutes science? You must be able to predict events from a theory and you must be able to reproduce them. But there's a third, implied tenet that most people forget about: anyone performing the experiment must come to a consensus on the results of the experiment. For me, "experience" is easy -- it's the most "real" thing in my reality. Vision, hearing, taste, smell? Those could all be faked some day with advanced enough neural manipulation. Let me attempt to clarify. Suppose you have a hypothetical person who sees an apple floating everywhere in front of him. He tells everyone that he sees this apple, but everyone else says "No, you're crazy. There is no apple there." So he takes a photograph of the apple. He prints it out and says "Look! Right here in this photograph is the apple!" Again, everyone says "I see no apple." He can consistently, predictably, see this apple. He decides to even paint exactly what he sees. And when he looks at his painting, he sees an apple, but everyone else sees empty sky. Is this person crazy? Well, if science is determined by consensus (which it is), then yes, the majority of people would say that he is crazy. But now instead of just this one guy with an apple, let's say that everyone sees a piece of fruit in front of them. But it's a different type of fruit for each person. And they all try to tell each other that there is clearly, obviously, unmistakably a fruit floating right there in front of them, but everyone thinks everyone else is crazy because they can't see other people's fruit -- only their own. So eventually, they decide to just forget about the fruit. Maybe it's not actually real if everyone else can't see it? (Would a person in a computer simulation see this fruit?) And so, despite everyone obviously having their own fruit hanging right in front of them, they have all decided to say that there is instead no such thing as floating fruit, since no one can come to a consensus about everyone else's fruit existing. So there you go. That's how I view consciousness. Although I should tweak that slightly -- "consciousness" perhaps isn't the right word. Consciousness can be manipulated with drugs and sedatives. What I am really referring to is the act of "experiencing" something.
- saurik 14y ago
  (Did you make up the fruit metaphor, or was that one I should have heard before? I ask because I felt it was downright epic.)
deleted 14y ago
[deleted]

thaumaturgy 14y ago

The philosophical zombie as a thought-experiment is rapidly being faded away by advances in neuroscience. As scientists get better and better at studying the physical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain, the philosophical zombie will have to emulate those mechanisms of consciousness to such an extent that it will, by definition, be conscious. An easy example of this would be some recent work done in using MRI to map active brain regions to moral dilemmas. (A quick example: http://www.wbur.org/npr/6636701/the-science-behind-making-moral-decisions http://www.wbur.org/npr/6636701/the-science-behind-making-mo...)

Xcelerate 14y ago
See my reply to Bakkot. No amount of science can prove or disprove a p-zombie. Since it's unfalsifiable, it cannot possibly belong in the domain of science. (Again, I should note that I am referring more to "experience" than "consciousness").
- thaumaturgy 14y ago
  I don't understand. You used the P-Zombie as a reference for believing that there's something "magical" about consciousness. The magic of consciousness is quickly giving way to the research of neuroscience. So, why are you injecting an unfalsifiable philosophy -- which, by the way, is indistinguishable from religion -- into a scientific discussion? To respond directly to your hypothetical apple, there are so many myriad ways of testing the existence or not-existence of a thing that hand-waving science away as agreement-by-consensus is premature (and wrong). Your hypothetical crazy dude could try immersing his apple in water and see if there is displacement; he could try burning it, measuring the light of the flame using a spectrometer, ask others to burn apples in the same way, and compare the output; he could attempt to infect it with insect larvae; he could attempt to power a small device with it; and so on. Science is not merely a matter of consensus, it is a matter of ever-rigorous testing. Or, to put it another way: the closest thing that scientists have found so far to a "consensus" reality is relativity, and they found a way to test and verify it. If scientists can come up with a way to test whether or not time itself actually speeds up or slows down according to frame of reference, don't you think they could come up with a way to test for the existence of a magic invisible apple? To get back to the article, I have to defer to Descartes: I think, therefore I am. And, I have thought about such things as MRI machines that verify the consciousness of the beings around me; their brains, the existence of their consciousnesses, is no longer a magical thing to me. I suppose it is possible that I am an element of some kind of incredible extra-dimensional simulation, but that's a very boring thing to imagine, because it doesn't in any way affect who I am or what I will do, or have done. And besides, I think that one day scientists will be able to test that, too. edit: here, I read the WP article you linked more thoroughly, so I'll just reference it back: I believe I would fall into the reductive physicalist camp, where p-zombies are impossible by definition. Furthermore, I think that the relatively recent work done in neuroscience -- work more recent than the idea of p-zombies, I would point out -- provides strong support for reductive physicalism.

ca98am79 14y ago

I've been reading/thinking about consciousness a lot lately and agree with the idea of philosophical zombies. I don't think that there is necessarily anything "magical" about consciousness - I just think that we are in the dark ages of understanding it. I think it's more like a fundamental property of the universe, or a property of matter, than something that can emerge from matter. Conscious experience emerging from matter seems more "magical" to me. I've been reading a lot of David Chalmers lately - he's awesome.