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At multiple points on this thread you tell other people here that DNSSEC is the correct solution both for this dnsmasq security issue and for query ID predictio
by tptacek 1y ago
At multiple points on this thread you tell other people here that DNSSEC is the correct solution both for this dnsmasq security issue and for query ID prediction attacks generally. All of those are channel attacks that have nothing to do with the authenticity of DNS records.
I happen to think DNSSEC, writ large, is also engineering malpractice, but when I use that term just upthread, I was referring to your insistence that people deploy a top-down data authentication mechanism in order to resolve a trivial transaction spoofing attack, given the availability of multiple existing tools that decisively address those kinds of problems without any of the expense and coordination required for DNSSEC.
- dc396 1y agoI'm unclear there is a security issue with dnsmasq -- maybe leaving a transaction alive too long (but then again, what does "too long" mean these days?). However, I haven't looked into the "vulnerability" referenced to be sure (the "malformed name" aspect of the report doesn't fill me with confidence). I contend that creating signatures over the data at the sending side and then validating those signatures at the receiving end is superior protection to encrypting the channel over which the data is transmitted. Protecting the data is end-to-end. Protecting the channel is hop-by-hop. If you could ensure that the client speaks directly to the authoritative(s), the protection would be equivalent. But that's not how the DNS is operationally deployed (dnsmasq is a perfect example: forwarders really shouldn't exist). I would agree with you that operationally, DNSSEC deployment is lacking (i.e., water is wet) and the requirement for both the authoritative side and resolving side to simultaneously implement is a (very) heavy lift. However, even your Tranco stats show that there are pockets of non-trivial deployment (e.g., governments) and I believe the trend is increased deployment over the long term globally. Fortunately, it's not either/or. I personally prefer DoT/DoH to a trusted (i.e., that I run) resolver that DNSSEC validates. Unfortunately, as dnsmasq doesn't appear to implement forwarding to DoT/DoH resolvers, you're left with DNSSEC or not using dnsmasq (which is what I gather you're recommending).
- obvious_sock 1y agoYou're all over this thread and every other DNS thread, even the ones that don't have much to do with DNSSEC, constantly complaining about DNSSEC. Why? Last time you were arguing DNSSEC wouldn't solve BGP hijacks because whoever was hijacking the DNS server would just hijack the web server instead.
- aspenmayer 1y agoThey wrote this: https://web.archive.org/web/20250729043725/http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ https://web.archive.org/web/20250729043725/http://sockpuppet... They clearly seem to have strong feelings about the issue. I don’t, and I don’t know much about it either, so I will not comment further.
- tptacek 1y agoWhy are you archive-linking the post? It's the same place it's always been: https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ You'll notice, I didn't bring DNSSEC into this conversation. I agree: it didn't belong here; DNSSEC has nothing to do with this dnsmasq thing.
- aspenmayer 1y agoI archive linked it because you’re in this thread, and you operate that site. I’m removing any conflict of interest by posting it as an archive. I even used IA just to remove any hint of bias I suppose. I don’t want you doing timing attacks against me for posting it here now, or against those who may visit it later, nor do I want you to poison my DNS! I don’t even know enough about these exploits to know if it’s technically possible, but I know that you almost certainly do! I don’t think you would do this, but you’re in a position to do so. I did not mean it as a slight by doing so. I meant it as an acknowledgment of the sensitive nature of these issues, and part of my work as an amateur journalist and archivist. I say amateur because I do not do this work for personal benefit or gain, but because I like researching and learning myself, and I don’t believe in putting a light I also read by under a bushel. Here’s another archive: https://archive.is/UB7xN https://archive.is/UB7xN While searching for your post on archive.today or whatever their name is, I saw that it had also been archived without a trailing “/“ which redirects to the one with a trailing slash, so depending on how I parse what you said and how you originally posted it and how the redirect is implemented, I could see how that statement might be ambiguous but that kind of thing might be handled by your webserver software. I don’t think that it’s worth mentioning, but you did say it’s always been at that URL, which I don’t dispute. I’ve never known it to be at any other URL.