Feels a bit stretchy that... Trump strongly believes the second point but is [even] less convinced of the importance of the other three points than previous US

Feels a bit stretchy that... Trump strongly believes the second point but is [even] less convinced of the importance of the other three points than previous US administrations (they're actively sabotaging a lot of the state organs that could orchestrate the production of US national wealth, and seem to regard national corporate champions as entities to demand protection money from more than entities to actually protect) China does believe in the role of the state and industrial policy and corporate champions but I don't think they actually believe the trade balance is a measure of strength, and they've been pursuing broadly similar policies for decades. The EU might be slightly more interested in linking defence to industrial policy than it used to be and a lot less trusting of the US as a trade partner, but its state aid sits under the same Single Market restrictions it always has and it certainly isn't making the mistake of trying to maximise its trade surpluses. And most of the rest of the world is trying to industrialise via Chinese imports and wondering why the US is being weird.