5 ms·

Wait, so bots watch for new records added to this HTTPS cert public ledger, then immediately start attacking? To me that sounds like enabling HTTPS is actually

• yjftsjthsd-h 1y ago
  The server was already exposed. All this does is remove obscurity
  • afavour 1y ago
    Which is something that makes a notable difference. It’s telling the bots the OP listed are trying Vite endpoints, they’re targeting folks doing short term local web development. Removing obscurity and indicating relative likelihood of still being online is a big shift.
  • dijit 1y ago
    I wish this trend of “security through obscurity” should mean that all info should just be exposed would die, its silly and lacks basis in reality. Even within infosec, certain types of information disclosure are considered security problems. Leaking signed up user information or even inodes on the drives can lead to PCI-DSS failures. Why is broadcasting your records treated differently? Because people would find the information eventually if they scanned the whole internet? Even then they might not due to SNI; so this is actually giving critical information necessary for an attack to attackers.
    • augusto-moura 1y ago
      The issue is not that obscurity per se is bad, but relying _only_ on obscurity is absolute the same as not having any security measures at all. With the public ledger or not, you will still need to implement proper security measures. So it shouldn't matter if your address is public or not, in fact making it public raises the awareness for the problem. That's the argument.
      • Lammy 1y ago
        > relying _only_ on obscurity Until it gets obscure enough that we start calling it “public-key cryptography”. Guess the prime number I'm thinking of between 0 and 2↑4096 and win a fabulous prize!
        • tux3 1y ago
          If you replace "security by obscurity" with "Kerckhoffs's principle", yes, absolutely! The problem with using regular everyday obscurity is that it usually has a small state space and makes for terrible security, but people will treat it like it is cleverly hidden and safe from attackers If I guess the IPv4 you're thinking of between 0 and 2↑32, ready or not, you win a free port scan
        • gf000 1y ago
          As per another comment, we can scan a single port on every public IPv4 address in less than an hour. Trying every 256bit number gets into a "slightly" larger problem.
      • bb88 1y ago
        > So it shouldn't matter if your address is public or not, in fact making it public raises the awareness for the problem. That's the argument. Forget about the internet, we've had almost 100 years to prove we can secure identity theft. And the best thing we can do is to keep our SSN's secret -- security through obscurity. Keeping your SSN private reduces your personal attack surface. We've had 50 years to secure the internet, and yet, we still have zero day attacks. Nuclear submarines try their best to keep their locations a secret? Why? You cannot attack something you cannot see or hear.
        • gf000 1y ago
          Except we are more on a chess table where we can just trivially probe each cell, unlike the vast volume of the ocean.
          • dijit 1y ago
    • yjftsjthsd-h 1y ago
      Okay, but we're not talking about that here. This is very much the case of a service being exposed that shouldn't be and relying on obscurity to try and avoid actually getting compromised
      • dijit 1y ago
        ironically I would double down even harder then; If something was temporary then it’s likely that it wouldn’t have been found in a meaningful amount of time to be exploited. As an only line of defence it’s not good, but its also not good to hand-deliver your entire personal information to fraudsters and then claim that the systems should be more robust.
        • aspenmayer 1y ago
          If you have a target on your own back thanks to cert transparency logs, it's a bit like closing the barn door late for you to find fault in your own being in Texas when sharpshooters are about. If your only defense was obscurity, your ass is hanging out, and it's no one's fault but your own when you find fault with others for simply saying so. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_sharpshooter_fallacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_sharpshooter_fallacy
          • dijit 1y ago
            In my original comment I said (I thought) quite clearly that obscurity as your only defence is a terrible idea. But painting a target on your back is not exactly justified just because hiding yourself isn’t a good defence in of itself.
            • aspenmayer 1y ago
              Obscurity couldn't be anyone's last/best defense, unless it was their only defense, was my point. In any case, I think we agree.
  • homebrewer 1y ago
    IME, moving ssh off the standard port reduces bot scanning traffic by >99%. Not only it means less noise in the logs (and thus higher SNR), but also lowers the chance you're hit by spray-and-pray in case there's a zero day in sshd (or any other daemon really).
    • augusto-moura 1y ago
      True, but I hardly open any ssh to the wide world. I would only allow it inside a closed network anyways. HTTP on the other hand _needs_ to be exposed on 80 or 443 (not technically, but in practice)
    • lelanthran 1y ago
      > IME, moving ssh off the standard port reduces bot scanning traffic by >99%. Depends on the site I expect. My low value domains get NO ssh attempts on my random ports. The high value ones get a few each week.
    • godelski 1y ago
      You could also always add port knocking or something like that.
      • yjftsjthsd-h 1y ago
        If you're going to that level, just put it behind a VPN.
        • godelski 1y ago
          Tailscale is a VPN... The context of the conversation is that the address becomes publicly visible so you get hit with port scanners and script kiddies looking for vulns. Moving off standard ports does help but many of those are also going to look at ports like 2222 or 8022 and treat them as ssh. It's not hard to just send something like `nmap -sV -p- <ADDRESS>` (or better, use like rustscan.) and you'll discover those ports and the services. On the other hand, just install something like knocked and you don't have to do much. Knocking is not a difficult thing to set up.
• moontear 1y ago
  Yes. Yes, of course they do. Check for example https://crt.sh https://crt.sh with your domain name to see the glorious public history of everything the certificates tell about your domain.