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The dynamics of a House whose member's districts are small enough (30,000) to not require a lot of money to run a campaign (just knock on doors and put up signs

The dynamics of a House whose member's districts are small enough (30,000) to not require a lot of money to run a campaign (just knock on doors and put up signs) compared to the current situation that makes them spend almost all their time begging for money and avoiding being the target of other people's money? That is fairly straightforward. They can buck the President and the Party, because they don't need their money for their constituents to know them. >I don't think John Adams, Lincoln, or FDR held anything close to the view that "Congress tells me what to do, and I do it." I provided a comprehensive and convincing document arguing that such an understanding did in fact exist in the late 1700's and the 1800's, specifically in terms of the meaning of "Executive Power" in Article II. My loose phrasing should not be where an argument should be hung. Let me take a bit more time. The 18th-century evidence reviewed in this law article pretty clearly shows that "executive power" just meant the power to execute laws. This didn't appear to be in contention; from radical Whigs to hardcore royalists agreed on this basic definition. Some specific evidence: Blackstone's Commentaries, which Madison called "the book which is in every man's hand," flat-out defined executive power as "the right of enforcing the laws." That's it. Blackstone carefully listed over thirty different royal prerogatives—war powers, foreign affairs, pardons, AND executive power. Just one item on that long list, not some umbrella term for everything. Every single Founding-era dictionary backs this up. They all defined "executive" as having pwer to act or carry laws into execution. Not one included foreign affairs or war powers. When they specifically defined "executive power" as a legal term---it was always about implementing laws or putting plans into execution. Even Ryalists e.g Robert Filmer agreed with this narrow definition, dismissed mere executive power as beneath a true monarch (!!) calling it just "a power of putting laws in execution by judging and punishing offenders." The actual term for the Crown's broader powers was "the royal prerogative," not "executive power." Everyone understood that executive power was inherently subordinate to legislative power—it was an empty vessel that could only execute what the legislature authorized. So the argument goes that the modern Vesting Clause Thesis basically makes a linguistic mistake. Sure, people called the king "the executive" because he had the executive power, but that doesn't mean all his other powers were therefore "executive."

Amezarak 1y ago
> They can buck the President and the Party, because they don't need their money for their constituents to know them. They can’t do anything at all without convincing hundreds or thousands of other Representatives to agree with them. Coalition building is the only way to exercise legislative power (which requires majorities) and increasing the number of Representatives obviously makes that much more difficult on an individual level and strengthens party institutions by, well, institutionalizing them, as personal relationships obviously become totally insufficient. Constituent support is not the problem. There are lots of “problem” Congressmen several Presidents would have liked to get rid of, even in recent times. Unless your constituents really love the President more than they love you it has not often worked. The rest of your post is worth addressing but really misunderstands the way men like Adam’s and even Washington actually exercised and practiced the office. I think you’re focused to much on the different in legal phraseology. If you really care I may have time to write something up tomorrow.
- SubiculumCode 1y ago
  I view the practical difficulties of a large body making legislative progress as a different problem than getting representatives to be less vulnerable to outside influence from a need and fear of centralized sources of campaign money, which is the primary problem we now face. There is a clear line between politicians that have to be afraid of being primaries and the very few who do not, due to personalities or political skill. Those "problem" congressman are just nuisances because the larger body is under the thumb of the party's and president's money. As for the second, I think it is rather clear from history of the early presidency that the Presidency was not trusted nor viewed as being equal to Congress in terms of power. Moreover, the argument is about the meaning the the vestment clause's use of phrase "the executive power" as interpreted by the founders. The law article presents a strong case IMO that the vestment clause was much more restrictive, less expensive than it is viewed in the modern era, and that is less generally recognized
  - Amezarak 1y ago
    > which is the primary problem we now face I am actually really, really confused as to why you think that. That's not at all what the past several years have shown - we've seen over and again again individual Senators (who have more power, of course) and small blocks of Representatives hold things up over and over and over again. It's simply not practically possible to primary most Reps in their own districts because the primary problem isn't money, is that their constituents really do support them and not some nameless figure propped up by national campaign spending. For a party primary, the most important thing is far from getting some sort of national political support. That is not even remotely on the radar. It's garnering the support of the local party (people who actually live there and run the local outlet), local "elites" (politically involved business people, city and county pols, etc), and being someone known in your community - not through ads, but because you've lived there and done something. There are exceptions but this is definitely the rule. Of course, it's also the case that people often overstate the influence of money in the first place. It's votes that decide the election, not dollars. You can't buy your way into electing somebody that nobody wants to vote for. You can only try to persuade them and encourage them. > As for the second, I think it is rather clear from history of the early presidency that the Presidency was not trusted nor viewed as being equal to Congress in terms of power. On the contrary, it is quite clear from the Constitutional Convention that one of their greatest fears was making the executive in any way dependent on the legislative, and the first several Presidents took a very expansive view of Presidential power - the accusation that Adams wanted to be a king was not just wild slander. Of course it is difficult to compare modern times with the past, to some degree - the reach of government in the 1900s increased by orders of magnitude, and the APA in 46 created a sort of shadow Constitution, so the field where people could even imagine the President ordering anything changed.

Amezarak 1y ago

> They can buck the President and the Party, because they don't need their money for their constituents to know them. They can’t do anything at all without convincing hundreds or thousands of other Representatives to agree with them. Coalition building is the only way to exercise legislative power (which requires majorities) and increasing the number of Representatives obviously makes that much more difficult on an individual level and strengthens party institutions by, well, institutionalizing them, as personal relationships obviously become totally insufficient. Constituent support is not the problem. There are lots of “problem” Congressmen several Presidents would have liked to get rid of, even in recent times. Unless your constituents really love the President more than they love you it has not often worked. The rest of your post is worth addressing but really misunderstands the way men like Adam’s and even Washington actually exercised and practiced the office. I think you’re focused to much on the different in legal phraseology. If you really care I may have time to write something up tomorrow.

SubiculumCode 1y ago
I view the practical difficulties of a large body making legislative progress as a different problem than getting representatives to be less vulnerable to outside influence from a need and fear of centralized sources of campaign money, which is the primary problem we now face. There is a clear line between politicians that have to be afraid of being primaries and the very few who do not, due to personalities or political skill. Those "problem" congressman are just nuisances because the larger body is under the thumb of the party's and president's money. As for the second, I think it is rather clear from history of the early presidency that the Presidency was not trusted nor viewed as being equal to Congress in terms of power. Moreover, the argument is about the meaning the the vestment clause's use of phrase "the executive power" as interpreted by the founders. The law article presents a strong case IMO that the vestment clause was much more restrictive, less expensive than it is viewed in the modern era, and that is less generally recognized
- Amezarak 1y ago
  > which is the primary problem we now face I am actually really, really confused as to why you think that. That's not at all what the past several years have shown - we've seen over and again again individual Senators (who have more power, of course) and small blocks of Representatives hold things up over and over and over again. It's simply not practically possible to primary most Reps in their own districts because the primary problem isn't money, is that their constituents really do support them and not some nameless figure propped up by national campaign spending. For a party primary, the most important thing is far from getting some sort of national political support. That is not even remotely on the radar. It's garnering the support of the local party (people who actually live there and run the local outlet), local "elites" (politically involved business people, city and county pols, etc), and being someone known in your community - not through ads, but because you've lived there and done something. There are exceptions but this is definitely the rule. Of course, it's also the case that people often overstate the influence of money in the first place. It's votes that decide the election, not dollars. You can't buy your way into electing somebody that nobody wants to vote for. You can only try to persuade them and encourage them. > As for the second, I think it is rather clear from history of the early presidency that the Presidency was not trusted nor viewed as being equal to Congress in terms of power. On the contrary, it is quite clear from the Constitutional Convention that one of their greatest fears was making the executive in any way dependent on the legislative, and the first several Presidents took a very expansive view of Presidential power - the accusation that Adams wanted to be a king was not just wild slander. Of course it is difficult to compare modern times with the past, to some degree - the reach of government in the 1900s increased by orders of magnitude, and the APA in 46 created a sort of shadow Constitution, so the field where people could even imagine the President ordering anything changed.