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Does controlling exit nodes necessarily help with deanonimizing? You would need control of the internal nodes for classic de-anonymization, or monitoring of bot

Does controlling exit nodes necessarily help with deanonimizing? You would need control of the internal nodes for classic de-anonymization, or monitoring of both the exit nodes and the originating network for timing attacks. Also, exit nodes aren’t involved in hidden services. That 7-8000 figure you quoted: is that just exit nodes, or all nodes? My understanding was there aren’t a ton of exit nodes because anyone operating an exit node is liable to get harassed by people impacted by any malicious traffic originating from Tor. But that isn’t really an issue for internal nodes, and so there are more of them

thewebguyd 1y ago
Controlling an exit node alone doesn't help, but controlling both entry and exit nodes does. The tor project has network stats on their website: https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html Looks like about 8,000 relays, inclusive of entry and exit nodes. Looks like about 2,500 exit nodes, and ~5,000 guard nodes. With that few I'd say it's reasonable to assume that a large number of both entry and exit are controlled by government agencies, at least enough to reliable to conduct timing attacks against a specific target they are interested in.
gausswho 1y ago
Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node.
- thewebguyd 1y ago
  > Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node. It's a little ambiguous. Section 230 (which continues to be under attack) provides some legal immunity, along with the DMCA is a safe harbor against copyright infringement claims for the Tor relay operator. Running a middle relay is generally fine and safe. But, running an exit relay is risky. Even if you can't be held legally liable for the traffic coming from the exit, you could still get raided, and it has happened before where exit node operators have been raided after the traffic coming out of it was attributed to the node owner. That being said, it's legal to run an exit node (for now). The problem is more so dealing with the inevitable law enforcement subpoenas or seizures, and having the money and resources to prove you are innocent.

thewebguyd 1y ago

Controlling an exit node alone doesn't help, but controlling both entry and exit nodes does. The tor project has network stats on their website: https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html Looks like about 8,000 relays, inclusive of entry and exit nodes. Looks like about 2,500 exit nodes, and ~5,000 guard nodes. With that few I'd say it's reasonable to assume that a large number of both entry and exit are controlled by government agencies, at least enough to reliable to conduct timing attacks against a specific target they are interested in.

gausswho 1y ago

Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node.

thewebguyd 1y ago
> Am also interested in the current understanding of culpability in the US for operating an exit node. It's a little ambiguous. Section 230 (which continues to be under attack) provides some legal immunity, along with the DMCA is a safe harbor against copyright infringement claims for the Tor relay operator. Running a middle relay is generally fine and safe. But, running an exit relay is risky. Even if you can't be held legally liable for the traffic coming from the exit, you could still get raided, and it has happened before where exit node operators have been raided after the traffic coming out of it was attributed to the node owner. That being said, it's legal to run an exit node (for now). The problem is more so dealing with the inevitable law enforcement subpoenas or seizures, and having the money and resources to prove you are innocent.