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Every week at AWS we have an account protection meeting; it's got the teams who handle fraud and abuse detection, compromised accounts (e.g. when a customer has
by colmmacc 1y ago
Every week at AWS we have an account protection meeting; it's got the teams who handle fraud and abuse detection, compromised accounts (e.g. when a customer has a security issue on their side), non-payment, forgotten creds, as well as our support team. You'll find the most junior members of those teams, all the way up to VPs, in the same meeting diving into the nitty gritty. Every week.
Disabling a legitimate in-use account is one of our absolute nightmares, and I don't care if it was an account paying $3/month we would be having a review of that with our top level management (including our CEO - Matt Garman) no matter how we found out about it. For us, there is not some acceptable rate of this as a cost of doing business.
- lotsofpulp 1y agoIt might not be for you, but it is an acceptable cost of doing business for whoever is high enough up the chain that is setting the budget such that sufficient customer support is not available. And disabling an in use account was not the issue here. There not being a way to get the account re enabled is the issue.
- colmmacc 1y agoIn this case, I am high enough in that chain.
- CamperBob2 1y agoSo, the key is somehow finding a way to bring problems like this to the group's attention, it sounds like. HN lamentations are great when they work, but they don't exactly scale. At least one layer of human support needs to have the ability -- not just the ability, but the obligation! -- to escalate to your team when a customer service problem occurs that doesn't fit a pattern of known/active scams and they are unable to help the customer themselves. Sounds like that's not currently the case.
- colmmacc 1y agoWithout prejudging the COE; it won't surprise anyone to learn that there are bad actors out there who try "every trick in the book" to have accounts that they don't pay for, and lying to customer support is absolutely one of those tricks, as is trying to be creative with changing payment instruments. In these cases, it's also really important that customer support stick to a script and can't be abused as part of social engineering, hijacking, or fraud check bypass. "No we can't reset your account" is a very important protection too. I agree that there is an obligation to escalation, but I suspect the focus of the COE will be on how we could have detected this without human judgement. There's got to be a way.
- Timshel 1y agoI love the irony that an issue caused by a failing automation was solved due to human escalation but let's not try to improve the escalation process but add more automation ...
- colmmacc 1y agoWe do both; automation never forgets.
- CamperBob2 1y agoRight, obviously you can't give the level-1 schlubs the keys to the kingdom, but they need to be able to escalate. What you're doing now, trapping customers in a maze of no-reply dead ends, isn't OK. It's never a good long-term play to let bad actors drive your business model. (Well, all right, maybe PayPal has to do that, but you don't.) One obvious approach would be to charge for access to human support. I'll bet the OP would happily have paid $50 to talk to someone with both the ability and inclination to escalate the issue. In rare instances such as this one where the problem really is on your end, the $50 would be refunded.
- Timshel 1y ago> Disabling a legitimate in-use account is one of our absolute nightmares Might be your nightmare but at the same time there is no way for your customers to report it or your own support agents to escalate that something wrong might have happened and someone should look again ...