4 ms·
> very obviously once Passkeys are everywhere it'll become "we're requiring attestation from approved device bootloaders/enclaves" This is far from very obviou
by growse 1y ago
> very obviously once Passkeys are everywhere it'll become "we're requiring attestation from approved device bootloaders/enclaves"
This is far from very obvious, especially given that Apple have gone out of their way to not provide attestation data for keychain passkeys. Any service requiring attestation for passkeys will effectively lock out every iPhone user - not going to happen.
- ori_b 1y agoIf there's no intention of doing this, it should be removed from the protocol. "I promise we'll never use this feature, so long as you implement it" isn't very convincing.
- growse 1y agoNot all people who want to replace passwords are running services available to the general public. There are a bunch of service provider contexts where credential storage attestation is a really useful (and sometimes legally required!) feature.
- ori_b 1y agoGreat, they can use standards that aren't targeted at running services for the general public. It seems like the requirements already diverged. Drop attestation from passkeys, and I become a promoter. Keep it, and I suggest people stay away. If it's not something anyone intends to use on public services, this should be uncontroversial. Dropping attestation simplifies implementation, and makes adoption easier as a result.
- growse 1y agoWhat makes you think that the Webauthn standards are "targeted at running services for the general public"? > It seems like the requirements already diverged. No, the requirements are _contextual_. This isn't a new idea.
- ori_b 1y agoThe fact that sites targeted at the general public are prompting me to use them. Should websites avoid using passkeys and webauthn? Would you like to tell them that they're doing it wrong?
- growse 1y agoI missed a word out from my question. Let me try again. What makes you think that the Webauthn standards are _only_ "targeted at running services for the general public"?
- ori_b 1y agoYeah, so if you want me to trust them, the harmful parts need to get removed from specs used in public contexts. I would love to use public key cryptography to authenticate with websites, but enabling remote attestation is unacceptable. And pinky swears that attestation won't be used aren't good enough. I've seen enough promises broken. It needs to be systematic, by spec. Passwords suck. It's depressing that otherwise good alternatives carry poisonous baggage. If you make something possible, it will be used.
- growse 1y ago> If you make something possible, it will be used. Sure, but that's not without tradeoffs. I come back to: > Any service requiring attestation for passkeys will effectively lock out every iPhone user - not going to happen.
- ori_b 1y agoAnd I come back to: if it would never work, why not drop support? "We pinky promise" is just not good enough.
- bryan_w 1y agoIs there a difference? It's a field in the response payload that nobody is filling out except the corps that need it. Would it make you feel better if they moved it to an appendix and called it an optional extension?