3 ms·
> Anyone at PwC will instantly know if this is true or not. My guess is that the specifics will check out (why else include them?) and give credibility to the c
by gwern 14y ago
> Anyone at PwC will instantly know if this is true or not. My guess is that the specifics will check out (why else include them?) and give credibility to the claim.
These specifics are either public information or not. If they are public information, they can be checked by a member of the public and confirmed to be wrong or right; but if they are public information, they could have been obtained by such security breaches or by accessing the same public information used to check them. So if they are public information, they do not prove anything.
If they are private information, then perhaps only PwC/PwC-employees can verify; presumably some of them will. But, if there was no security breach then PwC will deny that there was a security breach, and if there was a security breach, PwC will - like most companies - deny that there was a security breach because there is no possible advantage for them to confirm it. So regardless of whether this private information is accurate, the only party in a position to verify the information is also in a position with powerful incentives to claim that it is false.
What is necessary is some sort of trap-door or one-way data: information which is private, but can still somehow be publicly checkable. None of these details seem to be such trap-doors.
I figure these details are either public (building plan listing the existence of suite 260; location of PWC offices and having 3 floors all are trivial bits of info) or are made up for the purpose of seeming plausible.