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I agree with you on almost everything. Where we differ is on the nature of money. I think the recent wars emphasize that the real bottleneck in war is no longer
by somenameforme 1y ago
I agree with you on almost everything. Where we differ is on the nature of money. I think the recent wars emphasize that the real bottleneck in war is no longer $$$, but the things those dollars represent. So for instance a million $1000 drones is, on paper, only a billion dollars. The bottleneck isn't the cost, but the production. And you can't just spin up production making millions per year, because you also need the raw resources - and you end up with this entire complex supply chain, all on top of finite raw materials, and then the logistics to organize everything. And in the case of a war scenario, this all needs to be organized in a disruption proof system. It's extremely complex and difficult, even if you have an infinite money machine.
And I think you would actually agree with this by taking a simple thought experiment. Imagine we have 1 soldier with a million dollars of training. And we give an opposing force the choice of eliminating that soldier, or eliminating 1,000 $1000 drones. Everybody is going to pick the drones, and it won't be even remotely close. In fact drop it down by an order of magnitude, 100 drones, and it's still not even close - even though the on paper value of that soldier is an order of magnitude higher. 10 drones is probably where it starts to get close, though I think it'd still lean heavily towards the drones.
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I would add that when a war becomes a late stage war of attrition, the value of infantry goes up. I am speaking in more general terms in a war where manpower is nowhere near a critical issue. In any case by the time manpower does become a critical issue, a war is usually already lost, even if it might be able to drag on for many months yet.
- esseph 1y ago30% unit casualties causes the unit to be Combat Ineffective in the infantry role. (Number of infantry x .3) = $DesiredCasualties Let's say it takes 10 drones to kill a soldier, and each drone is $250/ea. That's $2,500, or the $KillCost $DesiredCasualties x $KillCost = Dollar value needed to move an infantry unit into combat ineffectiveness Looks like around 620,000 troops deployed by Russia so far. 620k x .3 = 186,000 186000 x $2500 = $465 million, bottom line price, in a crazy world where the starts align in many ways that aren't realistic, gives you a huge destruction in combat capability for less than $500mil. For those following along, this is extremely overly simplified, but I hope it conveys both the huge military advantages drones provide as well as the political (less dead bodies to deal with, less broken soldiers sent home for treatment and decades of care) and economic advantages lethal drones in combat can provide.
- somenameforme 1y agoAnd the enemy is using the exact same thing against you. Yet infantry will remain critical for claiming territory, clearing areas and more. As drones advance, war will probably become even bloodier. And drone operators that survive are already coming home completely broken men suffering from extreme PTSD. Then factor on top of this logistics. You need to transport men, keep them fed, equipped, and more. You need to move a massive amount of stuff constantly in war, yet drones are going to be buzzing everywhere. So I think we're seeing the future of war now - slow, grueling, bloody wars of attrition. And war where high prices tags are replaced by high costs in stuff, making it more apparent than ever that economies maximized through financial games and services are paper tigers when facing economies based on the production of tangible things.
- esseph 1y agoI don't think they are, actually (using the same TTPs), nor would it make sense to. Ukrainian drone doctrine is very different than Russian, and not just on paper, but how it is playing out. This is for two main reasons: proximity to logistics for the defenders vs attackers, and existing military structures including vehicles and troop organizational structures (MTOE) that drone systems support or are supported by. So I don't agree with your assessment there. It doesn't seem to match what's happening in the field with the type of drones used and the percentage of the classification of each type of drone system and purpose. These are quite different. I also don't think it will be more bloody, but less over time. Much of the fight is in the electronic warfare arena and in air dominance across the vertical airspace. A colleague agrees: https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/the-meaning-of-drone-enabled-infantry-striking-beyond-line-of-sight/ https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/the-meaning-of-drone-enabl... Infantry are expensive to train correctly, to outfit, and supply. I think the total number of frontline combat troops will continue to go down as a fraction of overall troops, while increasing supporting positions for drones, communications, electronic warfare, and general battlefield logistics. Agree with your last paragraph 100% !
- somenameforme 1y agoThat article reads like typical NATO stuff which sounds great in practice but makes assumptions that don't exist, and are unobtainable (like air superiority), if you're fighting an enemy more sophisticated than guys running around in sandals with AKs. Here [1] is a report from somebody who worked with drones in Ukraine, and why he's exceptionally disillusioned with them. I half wonder if what I linked to wasn't an indirect response to what you posted, as it was published only 3 days later, and is essentially that article's equal but opposite. [1] - https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck/ https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-he...