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This is the type of argument that immediately folds in on itself. If they didn’t care about civilian losses, why do people believe the civilian losses in these

by slg 1y ago

This is the type of argument that immediately folds in on itself. If they didn’t care about civilian losses, why do people believe the civilian losses in these bombings were necessary? Why is it assumed that the US needed to kill civilians and ended up killing just the right amount of civilians to force surrender?

throw0101d 1y ago
> If they didn’t care about civilian losses, why do people believe the civilian losses in these bombings were necessary? Why is it assumed that the US needed to kill civilians and ended up killing just the right amount of civilians to force surrender? The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant. The fire bombings killed as much, if not more, people. The Japanese leadership didn't care about numbers: after the first bomb dropped the War Cabinet ignored it thinking it was a bluff on the US part, and they didn't have any more bombs. It was only after the second bomb that they started re-considering. Even then, after two bombings, the War Cabinet was still deadlocked at 3-3. The Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate. The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon. From Hirohito's statement: > Furthermore, the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel bomb, causing immense and indiscriminate destruction, the extent of which is beyond all estimation. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization. * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast#Content https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast#C... I would recommend reading the book, which goes over the Japanese government deliberations using internal Japanese minutes/documents and interviews of those involved: * https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hiroshima https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hir... * https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-days-hiroshima-story-japans-last-chance-avert-armageddon https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-...
- slg 1y ago
  You are not engaging with the heart of the question. If "The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant", why do you think it was necessary that they were killed? If "The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon", why could the goal of forcing surrender not be accomplished by demonstrating that new weapon in a way that wouldn't kill hundreds of thousands? Why are options like dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay, further off the coast, or in less populated areas not treated as serious alternatives? Why did the bombs have to be dropped on cities?
  - throw0101d 1y ago
    > Why are options like dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay, further off the coast, or in less populated areas not treated as serious alternatives? Why did the bombs have to be dropped on cities? To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds. What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target. Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that: > It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war. Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line. And even after the Emperor and Cabinet had made the decision there were still people willing to fight on and overthrow the government: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident
    - slg 1y ago
      >To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds. >What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target. Is knocking down buildings the only way people can perceive the power of a bomb? Would a huge mushroom cloud over Tokyo Bay not be shocking? Could that "psychological effect of a new type of weapon" you mentioned in the previous post have been intensified if the Japanese War Cabinet saw that mushroom cloud with their own eyes? >Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that... That is an argument against "an advertised demonstration". It is not an argument for killing a hundred thousand civilians. Why wouldn't "the shock of surprise" apply to a demonstration that happened without notice? Why are you presenting this as a binary choice between "an advertised demonstration" and dropping the bomb on a city? >Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line. You keep on repeating this as if the decision being close means that any deviation from the history would have caused them to reach a different conclusion. You have no way of knowing that. I don't know why you seem to believe that the only path to surrender was the exact events that transpired.

by slg 1y ago

throw0101d 1y ago

> If they didn’t care about civilian losses, why do people believe the civilian losses in these bombings were necessary? Why is it assumed that the US needed to kill civilians and ended up killing just the right amount of civilians to force surrender? The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant. The fire bombings killed as much, if not more, people. The Japanese leadership didn't care about numbers: after the first bomb dropped the War Cabinet ignored it thinking it was a bluff on the US part, and they didn't have any more bombs. It was only after the second bomb that they started re-considering. Even then, after two bombings, the War Cabinet was still deadlocked at 3-3. The Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate. The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon. From Hirohito's statement: > Furthermore, the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel bomb, causing immense and indiscriminate destruction, the extent of which is beyond all estimation. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization. * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast#Content https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast#C... I would recommend reading the book, which goes over the Japanese government deliberations using internal Japanese minutes/documents and interviews of those involved: * https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hiroshima https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hir... * https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-days-hiroshima-story-japans-last-chance-avert-armageddon https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-...

slg 1y ago
You are not engaging with the heart of the question. If "The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant", why do you think it was necessary that they were killed? If "The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon", why could the goal of forcing surrender not be accomplished by demonstrating that new weapon in a way that wouldn't kill hundreds of thousands? Why are options like dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay, further off the coast, or in less populated areas not treated as serious alternatives? Why did the bombs have to be dropped on cities?
- throw0101d 1y ago
  > Why are options like dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay, further off the coast, or in less populated areas not treated as serious alternatives? Why did the bombs have to be dropped on cities? To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds. What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target. Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that: > It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war. Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line. And even after the Emperor and Cabinet had made the decision there were still people willing to fight on and overthrow the government: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident
  - slg 1y ago
    >To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds. >What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target. Is knocking down buildings the only way people can perceive the power of a bomb? Would a huge mushroom cloud over Tokyo Bay not be shocking? Could that "psychological effect of a new type of weapon" you mentioned in the previous post have been intensified if the Japanese War Cabinet saw that mushroom cloud with their own eyes? >Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that... That is an argument against "an advertised demonstration". It is not an argument for killing a hundred thousand civilians. Why wouldn't "the shock of surprise" apply to a demonstration that happened without notice? Why are you presenting this as a binary choice between "an advertised demonstration" and dropping the bomb on a city? >Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line. You keep on repeating this as if the decision being close means that any deviation from the history would have caused them to reach a different conclusion. You have no way of knowing that. I don't know why you seem to believe that the only path to surrender was the exact events that transpired.