4 ms·

Can you elaborate on why this is a risk factor? What do you mean by saying we're giving him root? If a person is paranoid of being chased i would expect them to

by gtsop 1y ago

Can you elaborate on why this is a risk factor? What do you mean by saying we're giving him root? If a person is paranoid of being chased i would expect them to put even more effort into the security of the OS he develops, not to add backdoors. But please expand your own reasoning.

onli 1y ago
Well, he can do everything to your phone, software and data by pushing software updates. When there was a dispute in the former project copperhead he deleted the cryptographic keys, blocking software updates. Paranoia could result in just making the system more secure, but why not add a backdoor to find the spies in your userbases that communicate with the black suited men that secretly run our government? After all it is easy, they all play a specific game where they communicate via secret messages in chat. You just don't know what will happen is what I'm saying. The "he has root" is also a reference to ubuntus shuttleworth.
- gf000 1y ago
  > when there was a dispute in the former project copperhead You mean who tried to hijack the project in a very questionable direction, harming their users, he rather lighted the project on fire then let the users' security be compromised? If anything, that is the greatest compliment you could give him. Also, this is fud that he can push any kind of code, like you can easily check any part of the pipeline.
  - bernoufakis 1y ago
    > You mean who tried to hijack the project in a very questionable direction, harming their users, he rather lighted the project on fire then let the users' security be compromised? > If anything, that is the greatest compliment you could give him. On one hand, sure it can be a compliment. On the other hand, it only increases the perception that he is could enact significant harm if he ever comes after you. > Also, this is fud that he can push any kind of code, like you can easily check any part of the pipeline. Who is "you" ? Neither Rossmann, neither me (software dev albeit not in cybersecurity), and even less so the average GOS user, and I would venture to guess that neither you can audit GOS code with enough confidence to declare that the risk of an exploit or backdoor being introduced is zero. Open-source is not a guarantee that code or software is secure (for e.g. CVE in xz utils and many such cases). Edit: some clarifications.
    - other8026 1y ago
      > On the other hand, it only increases the perception that he is could enact significant harm if he ever comes after you. But that would be incorrect. It's not possible for anyone from the GrapheneOS project to target a GrapheneOS user that way. Look into how updates and the update servers work. > neither you can audit GOS code with enough confidence to declare that the risk of an exploit or backdoor being introduced is zero. The updater app is pretty easy to read through. I think a software developer would be able to understand it. The update servers' setups are also very easy to understand. It doesn't take a software developer genius to figure these things out.
      - bernoufakis 1y ago
        > But that would be incorrect. It's not possible for anyone from the GrapheneOS project to target a GrapheneOS user that way. Look into how updates and the update servers work. My point is that from Rossmann's perspective, being target of the lead GOS software dev hostile behavior as per his "Why I deleted Graphene OS" induces Rossmann's --> perception <-- that the GOS could go after him if he really wanted to. First, everyone is busy and has their life, suggesting that his spend hours going through code and documentation he is not familiar with to make sure he is not target is moot. Most people don't read TOS, and same goes for Licences and docs of OSS. Between doing that and stop using it as it's main device OS, the easier choice is the latter. As a software dev myself, your expectation of layman being able to navigate something like a code review, or even an investigating an exploit is hardly reasonable. So it is not "incorrect". I am not even saying Rossmann could be targeted. I cannot even make this claim as I have not gone through the docs nor understand the build and update pipeline, which is kind of my point: I can't be bothered neither for GOS, nor for the most of the FOSS software I use. The majority of OSS user rely on the vague concept that motivated and honest people audit the code, but hardly anyone is going deep dive into how an arbitrary piece of software works. The main issue is the attitude of that GOS developer, whether they like it or not, taints the confidence in the project. it does not matter if Rossmann can or cannot be targeted technically. The issue here is not technical but a reputation issue. > The updater app is pretty easy to read through. I think a software developer would be able to understand it. The update servers' setups are also very easy to understand. It doesn't take a software developer genius to figure these things out. Even then, it could be argued that the rules in place could be changed to introduce malicious exploit if the lead dev(s) were motivated enough. Especially given GOS relatively top-down structure, relying essentially on a benevolent dictator. Even if I made the effort, then ascertain there was no vector attack, now I have to stay on alert every commit / release version and spend as much time looking for a targeted exploit ? etc... Update server setup might be clean, but an admin could SSH or gain access in some way or another and do rogue changes, were they determined enough. The probability is not zero. Again, the problem is eroding the trust of the specific user (Rossmann in this case).
- other8026 1y ago
  Wow. Reading and responding to your comments in this thread, I can see you are very motivated to trash GrapheneOS and its founder. > Well, he can do everything to your phone, software and data by pushing software updates. Other developers are doing the bulk of development work these days, so this is nonsense. > Paranoia could result in just making the system more secure, but why not add a backdoor to find the spies in your userbases that communicate with the black suited men that secretly run our government? Again with the baseless claims that he's crazy. Your argument here is that "he is crazy, so maybe this happens too." It's nonsense. There are no backdoors, and if there ever were any backdoors, they would be found. GrapheneOS isn't some small project that nobody knows about. It's famous for being very secure, even famous people have said publicly that they use it or others should use it. Cellebrite cannot even hack into it. Backdoors wouldn't go unnoticed. This is also nonsense.
  - onli 1y ago
    [flagged]
- gf000 1y ago
  This is on a level of "5G causes autism" understanding of the topic. Maybe learn how reproducible builds and cryptographic signatures work.
  - Andromxda 1y ago
    > This is on a level of "5G causes autism" understanding of the topic That sums it up perfectly
bernoufakis 1y ago
To put it simply, the (at the time) lead developer of GOS and Rossmann had some disagreements. At the time, Rossmann was mainly using GOS, but due to what he perceived as hostile behavior from GOS toward him through their communication, he opted to stop using GOS (at least on his main device, as he claims). His rationale was that the behavior of said lead developer was not "rational" and "scary", and since the developer has not only edit access to GOS code but also update publishing infrastructure, Rossmann's data or himself could be targeted through malicious code pushed via an update, for example. While GOS is opensource and malicious code or exploits could be detected by the community, he himself did not have confidence to audit the source code to make sure it was safe, hence his decision to stop using. By risk factor, I think the grandparent suggests that something similar could happen to someone else using GOS, the risk factor being essentially at the mercy of GOS developer, would they wish to harm said user.
- gtsop 1y ago
  So rossmann literally feared of a patch that was like this getting into graphene if (user is rossmann) { // do bad things } makes me think who is paranoid here.
  - bernoufakis 1y ago
    Your example is a strawman, as a determined enough actor, especially a security expert(s) like GOS developers could pull it off and get such patch / exploit. The probability is not zero. It will probably not be obvious to spot, would be spread over multiple files of code that don't necessarily relate to each other at first glance, as many documented CVE illustrated (one that comes to mind given HN context is the XZ utils backdoor from last year for e.g.) Rossmann himself has no confidence to audit the code, so why take the risk ? Good enough reason to be "paranoid", or at least feel uneasy about it if you ask me.
    - gtsop 1y ago
      Is it really a strawman? At some point, the code would need to identify rossmann. Please elaborate on the techniques required to do it and how it could be obfuscated. GOS doesn't use an account, so the code would have to perform very targeted heuristics in order to verify this is Luis' phone. It would have to compare his sim number against a known one, or dig into application data to find his logins and compare them against known emails. So the only way to not write `if (user is rossmann)` would be to send various diagnostics over the wire, to a service that contains these identifiers and perform the comparison onlinr, meaning he would introduce an imense security whole into everyone's phone, and everyone would see there is a home calling. So it's either a patch of if user == rossmann, or a home calling patch.

by gtsop 1y ago

onli 1y ago

Well, he can do everything to your phone, software and data by pushing software updates. When there was a dispute in the former project copperhead he deleted the cryptographic keys, blocking software updates. Paranoia could result in just making the system more secure, but why not add a backdoor to find the spies in your userbases that communicate with the black suited men that secretly run our government? After all it is easy, they all play a specific game where they communicate via secret messages in chat. You just don't know what will happen is what I'm saying. The "he has root" is also a reference to ubuntus shuttleworth.

gf000 1y ago
> when there was a dispute in the former project copperhead You mean who tried to hijack the project in a very questionable direction, harming their users, he rather lighted the project on fire then let the users' security be compromised? If anything, that is the greatest compliment you could give him. Also, this is fud that he can push any kind of code, like you can easily check any part of the pipeline.
- bernoufakis 1y ago
  > You mean who tried to hijack the project in a very questionable direction, harming their users, he rather lighted the project on fire then let the users' security be compromised? > If anything, that is the greatest compliment you could give him. On one hand, sure it can be a compliment. On the other hand, it only increases the perception that he is could enact significant harm if he ever comes after you. > Also, this is fud that he can push any kind of code, like you can easily check any part of the pipeline. Who is "you" ? Neither Rossmann, neither me (software dev albeit not in cybersecurity), and even less so the average GOS user, and I would venture to guess that neither you can audit GOS code with enough confidence to declare that the risk of an exploit or backdoor being introduced is zero. Open-source is not a guarantee that code or software is secure (for e.g. CVE in xz utils and many such cases). Edit: some clarifications.
  - other8026 1y ago
    > On the other hand, it only increases the perception that he is could enact significant harm if he ever comes after you. But that would be incorrect. It's not possible for anyone from the GrapheneOS project to target a GrapheneOS user that way. Look into how updates and the update servers work. > neither you can audit GOS code with enough confidence to declare that the risk of an exploit or backdoor being introduced is zero. The updater app is pretty easy to read through. I think a software developer would be able to understand it. The update servers' setups are also very easy to understand. It doesn't take a software developer genius to figure these things out.
    - bernoufakis 1y ago
      > But that would be incorrect. It's not possible for anyone from the GrapheneOS project to target a GrapheneOS user that way. Look into how updates and the update servers work. My point is that from Rossmann's perspective, being target of the lead GOS software dev hostile behavior as per his "Why I deleted Graphene OS" induces Rossmann's --> perception <-- that the GOS could go after him if he really wanted to. First, everyone is busy and has their life, suggesting that his spend hours going through code and documentation he is not familiar with to make sure he is not target is moot. Most people don't read TOS, and same goes for Licences and docs of OSS. Between doing that and stop using it as it's main device OS, the easier choice is the latter. As a software dev myself, your expectation of layman being able to navigate something like a code review, or even an investigating an exploit is hardly reasonable. So it is not "incorrect". I am not even saying Rossmann could be targeted. I cannot even make this claim as I have not gone through the docs nor understand the build and update pipeline, which is kind of my point: I can't be bothered neither for GOS, nor for the most of the FOSS software I use. The majority of OSS user rely on the vague concept that motivated and honest people audit the code, but hardly anyone is going deep dive into how an arbitrary piece of software works. The main issue is the attitude of that GOS developer, whether they like it or not, taints the confidence in the project. it does not matter if Rossmann can or cannot be targeted technically. The issue here is not technical but a reputation issue. > The updater app is pretty easy to read through. I think a software developer would be able to understand it. The update servers' setups are also very easy to understand. It doesn't take a software developer genius to figure these things out. Even then, it could be argued that the rules in place could be changed to introduce malicious exploit if the lead dev(s) were motivated enough. Especially given GOS relatively top-down structure, relying essentially on a benevolent dictator. Even if I made the effort, then ascertain there was no vector attack, now I have to stay on alert every commit / release version and spend as much time looking for a targeted exploit ? etc... Update server setup might be clean, but an admin could SSH or gain access in some way or another and do rogue changes, were they determined enough. The probability is not zero. Again, the problem is eroding the trust of the specific user (Rossmann in this case).
other8026 1y ago
Wow. Reading and responding to your comments in this thread, I can see you are very motivated to trash GrapheneOS and its founder. > Well, he can do everything to your phone, software and data by pushing software updates. Other developers are doing the bulk of development work these days, so this is nonsense. > Paranoia could result in just making the system more secure, but why not add a backdoor to find the spies in your userbases that communicate with the black suited men that secretly run our government? Again with the baseless claims that he's crazy. Your argument here is that "he is crazy, so maybe this happens too." It's nonsense. There are no backdoors, and if there ever were any backdoors, they would be found. GrapheneOS isn't some small project that nobody knows about. It's famous for being very secure, even famous people have said publicly that they use it or others should use it. Cellebrite cannot even hack into it. Backdoors wouldn't go unnoticed. This is also nonsense.
- onli 1y ago
  [flagged]
gf000 1y ago
This is on a level of "5G causes autism" understanding of the topic. Maybe learn how reproducible builds and cryptographic signatures work.
- Andromxda 1y ago
  > This is on a level of "5G causes autism" understanding of the topic That sums it up perfectly

bernoufakis 1y ago

To put it simply, the (at the time) lead developer of GOS and Rossmann had some disagreements. At the time, Rossmann was mainly using GOS, but due to what he perceived as hostile behavior from GOS toward him through their communication, he opted to stop using GOS (at least on his main device, as he claims). His rationale was that the behavior of said lead developer was not "rational" and "scary", and since the developer has not only edit access to GOS code but also update publishing infrastructure, Rossmann's data or himself could be targeted through malicious code pushed via an update, for example. While GOS is opensource and malicious code or exploits could be detected by the community, he himself did not have confidence to audit the source code to make sure it was safe, hence his decision to stop using. By risk factor, I think the grandparent suggests that something similar could happen to someone else using GOS, the risk factor being essentially at the mercy of GOS developer, would they wish to harm said user.

gtsop 1y ago
So rossmann literally feared of a patch that was like this getting into graphene if (user is rossmann) { // do bad things } makes me think who is paranoid here.
- bernoufakis 1y ago
  Your example is a strawman, as a determined enough actor, especially a security expert(s) like GOS developers could pull it off and get such patch / exploit. The probability is not zero. It will probably not be obvious to spot, would be spread over multiple files of code that don't necessarily relate to each other at first glance, as many documented CVE illustrated (one that comes to mind given HN context is the XZ utils backdoor from last year for e.g.) Rossmann himself has no confidence to audit the code, so why take the risk ? Good enough reason to be "paranoid", or at least feel uneasy about it if you ask me.
  - gtsop 1y ago
    Is it really a strawman? At some point, the code would need to identify rossmann. Please elaborate on the techniques required to do it and how it could be obfuscated. GOS doesn't use an account, so the code would have to perform very targeted heuristics in order to verify this is Luis' phone. It would have to compare his sim number against a known one, or dig into application data to find his logins and compare them against known emails. So the only way to not write `if (user is rossmann)` would be to send various diagnostics over the wire, to a service that contains these identifiers and perform the comparison onlinr, meaning he would introduce an imense security whole into everyone's phone, and everyone would see there is a home calling. So it's either a patch of if user == rossmann, or a home calling patch.