4 ms·
>slow escalation That's probably how it plays out if it plays out (also imo unlikely). But also mere existence of capabilities like PRC PGS will force parties
by maxglute 1y ago
>slow escalation
That's probably how it plays out if it plays out (also imo unlikely). But also mere existence of capabilities like PRC PGS will force parties to recalibrate response matrix. It would also be true to say ANY US strike on PRC mainland via any delivery platform, boats/planes/subs at scale will invite immediate retaliatory MAD response... after all essentially every US delivery platform is dual capable, i.e. can be nuclear tipped -> warhead ambiguity problem. How would PRC know otherwise? Except rational actors (maybe lol expectations) from both sides knows adversary capable of conventional homeland strikes will have to adjust response accordingly. This means in world where PRC can strike CONUS at scale, US likely has to settle for launch on confirmation, just like PRC has to deal with US striking mainland at scale. That's why assured second strike via triad exists (really SSGN for US, rocketforce TELs in tunnels for PRC). But until shooting actually starts, GD doesn't need to be trusted, it just needs to exist to placate domestic audience or confuse adversaries.
- jjk166 1y agoI don't think the US striking the PRC mainland, at least outside of an immediate conflict zone like the shores of the Taiwan straight, is plausible either. It's exactly the same arithmetic. Why would the US or China reduce their readiness to respond to an attack because their adversary has become more capable? The whole point of a nuclear deterrence is to deter attack. If anything, making it clear that a large scale missile attack will be interpreted as a nuclear first strike is more beneficial when there are a bunch of missiles the adversary is seriously considering launching at you. It is in both countries best interests to keep any potential conflict limited with clearly delineated theaters of war.