5 ms·

Space-Based Missile Interceptors for Golden Dome Being Tested by Northrop

7 points by ironyman 1y ago

bigyabai 1y ago
Not a great idea. On paper it seems like a smart deterrent, but in practice it's a fallible defense that invites even more dangerous weaponry. The argument is that it's safer and easier to intercept a ballistic missile in it's ballistic phase than it is to defeat it in a boost or terminal phase. This is true, but it will result with adversaries skipping those steps altogether. Additionally, it likely wouldn't protect against long-range cruise missiles or similarly maneuverable glide vehicles. Best case scenario, nuclear weapons get sent up in satellites and "deorbited" in a scheduled attack that won't be recognizable until it's too late. Worst case scenario, a space-capable adversary (eg. Iran, China, Russia) kicks off a Kessler syndrome and flips the table back in their favor. It's no-win, even as peacetime deterrence. This is why nonproliferation and elimination was America's only feasible solution to the nuclear issue: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit
- mittensc 1y ago
  I would say the opposite. It's a great idea. It's one layer to missile defense. Cruise missiles can be destroyed via existing ground/sea defenses. Patriots have proven they can intercept anything non-ballistic and there are likely better capabilities not revealed yet. The US is also very far away for effective cruise missles. (and has a lot of allies nations in the way) Nuclear weapons sent as sattelites to be de-orbited sound novel, although they can be tracked easily and disabled covertly. (Russia has 'stolen' a US sattelite in the past without much repercussions) Kessler syndrome might be a net win if you are at the point of nuclear war, at which point, without ballistic missiles any country will not stand much against US conventional power. So... there aren't many drawbacks to the plan, the only thing I'm curious is if we don't already have that capability covertly via starlink... shouldn't be hard to take over those and guide them into ballistic missiles...
  - bigyabai 1y ago
    The US mainland isn't completely covered by air defenses, let alone Patriot systems. It's too large, and there are too many gaps that could be exploited. This is why long-range intercontinental cruise missiles cannot be written off completely. A well-designed cruise missile can be almost impossible to find on radar (due to sea/ground clutter) if it flies nap-of-the-earth. They're an extremely credible threat and there's a reason the US has long-range cruise missiles as part of the nuclear triad. It is not realistic to depend on special forces to disable nuclear satellites if (and when) they exist. As I highlighted in my previous link, one of the primary things stopping the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons to space was the idea that America wouldn't deploy space-based interceptors. Both China and Russia will jump at the chance to start hiding nukes in orbit. Our only options are to leave ICBMs as the status quo or negotiate for complete nuclear elimination. This is the downside that I am alluding to, besides the billions of dollars in taxpayer money this will burn starting a new nuclear arms race. You cannot use Starlink satellites to intercept ballistic missiles for multiple reasons. They do not have enough propellant, they don't move fast enough even to catch it in the boost phase, they orbit too low to intercept in the ballistic phase and they aren't designed to have high-impulse maneuvering motors. It would be a neat party trick, but there isn't an ice cube's chance in hell the DOD would privatize a life-or-death nuclear defense system like that. No, not even an administration this crazy.
    - mittensc 1y ago
      > The US mainland isn't completely covered by air defenses, let alone Patriot systems EU, japan, canada all have defenses of their own and collaborate. All other countries bordering russia/china do as well.. Then add in all the islands that US has bases on or of allied nations with detection capabilities. Once detected, the US navy and airforce can plan interceptions. Which way would a cruise missile go and how much fuel would it need to reach the US?... let's be real here. > It is not realistic to depend on special forces to disable nuclear satellites if (and when) they exist. Why special forces?, just laser their thrusters once in range during peacetime... who's going to do what? > one of the primary things stopping the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons to space was the idea that America wouldn't deploy space-based interceptors I would argue the idea was that the US would disable them as they got into space. Or that the US would do the same. Or that they innevitably fail sometimes and might leave portions of your homeland unhospitable. > Both China and Russia will jump at the chance to start hiding nukes in orbit. I disagree. > Our only options are to leave ICBMs as the status quo or negotiate for complete nuclear elimination That's a bit naive considering russia's behavior. > This is the downside that I am alluding to, besides the billions of dollars in taxpayer money this will burn starting a new nuclear arms race. Last arms race brought the USSR to collapse. Russia isn't looking too capable right now for another one, hence perfect timing to take advantage of their weakness. > You cannot use Starlink satellites to intercept ballistic missiles for multiple reasons Thanks, nice points to think about, you are likely correct right now. > It would be a neat party trick, Yes it would, so what would it take for them to work?, would early intelligence on possible launch times, missile locations, directions and all be enough to compute interceptors ahead of time during boost? would slight alterations and massive numbers covering the globe make up for that? Also, not privatize, just plain take over of spacex in case of emergency. DoD would use them as kinnetic interceptors. DoD could also force design changes on spacex in anticipation. So much to think about :) Edit: you missed nuke subs, so the MAD is still around unless the US has a way to kill them if they get too close to the us.
- jjk166 1y ago
  All defenses are fallible, that doesn't mean they aren't useful. Yes building a tall wall to protect against invaders won't stop those who build siege towers, but many invaders can't build siege towers, those who can must expend considerable time and resources to do so, and those who both can and do will still have a more difficult time against the defenders on the walls than against defenders with no walls. The reason ballistic missiles fly through space is because that is the fastest, easiest way to cross long distances. Every other option has significant drawbacks. Space based intercept won't address every potential vulnerability, but those vulnerabilities already exist, and are preferable to the current status quo. Kessler syndrome wouldn't do anything to stop midcourse-phase interceptors. They aren't in space long enough to be affected. Even if we pretend for a second it would be possible to put so much mass in orbit to stop interceptors, you've also essentially intercepted every nuke, doing the job of those interceptors for you.
  - bigyabai 1y ago
    Then we have to transition into looking at it as a system of tradeoffs. As long as America has a second-strike capability, ICBM attacks aren't really desirable even from rogue nations. AEGIS and AEGIS Ashore are both already deployed by America's armed forces. THAADs and Patriot systems protect our most vulnerable assets abroad and the naval forces can be redirected if a certain theater goes hot. We bought these systems at great expense and they function roughly as intended to save American lives. It isn't likely that a Golden Dome would stop rogue nations from attacking America with ICBMs, nor would it stop an all-out attack. It encourages new developments in space-based weaponry, ratchets up the fragile tension that enables satellite weaponry, and ultimately becomes a net-threat to Americans. Even if it was free, the sentiment that you project deploying such a system turns you into the abhorrent imperial power of space. You are naturally now the enemy of free spacefaring nations.
    - jjk166 1y ago
      Second strike capability deters full scale nuclear first strikes, but not necessarily limited strikes where the gamble is "they won't destroy the world just because we destroyed a city." It also does nothing against accidental launches, or strikes ordered because of miscommunication or irrationality. If we were confident we could deter all strikes, there would be no need for missile defense abroad either - our threat to retaliate would be sufficient. In any scenario where a carrier group is potentially getting nuked we're basically in a full scale nuclear war with a peer adversary. Those other ballistic missile defense systems do serve a purpose, but they are inadequate on their own. They currently exist because they were technically simpler, not because they are superior. The purpose of ballistic missile defense is not to deter a state from attacking with ICBMs, it is to intercept ICBMs. For small strikes such as the scenarios given above, it can defeat or mitigate them. For sufficiently large strikes, nukes will get through, but fewer will get through, and importantly the adversary doesn't know which will get through, so for a given arsenal size they need to either double up on targets or accept a significant fraction of targets not being destroyed, either of which means more stuff is left standing than if there wasn't such a missile defense system in place. Again, defense systems are not meant to be undefeatable, they are just to force your adversary into incurring the cost to potentially defeat them. There is a deterrent effect to any weapon system - if it's harder, riskier, and more expensive to defeat the adversary, all the less reason to try - but that's just an added bonus. The argument that this system encourages development of space based weapons falls on deaf ears. Space based weapons are already under active development by multiple nations, and will be implemented regardless because an adversary's satellite network is already a serious military asset to be attacked and defended. Given the choice between weaponized space and not being nuked versus probably still weaponization of space and being nuked, I know which option I'm choosing. I am even less compelled by the claim that a space based interceptor, whose sole purpose is to prevent nuclear armageddon and has no offensive capability whatsoever, somehow equates to space imperialism. The would be nuclear war mongers seem like the real enemy of free spacefaring nations. There is a very real question of opportunity cost. Developing and deploying such a system is resource intensive, could those resources be better spent elsewhere? Is there a better way to defend against these threats? Are there realistic alternatives that prevent nuclear war by other means? I think a compelling case could be made for either. Whatever that alternative is though needs to be better than "sit around and pray no one launches nukes."
maxglute 1y ago
PRC going to roll out their prompt global strike sooner than later. Conversation of CONUS vulnerability is slowly being acknowledged in wonk circles. A few more PRC FOB tests and the notion that PRC can conventionally strike CONUS (eventually at scale) is going to unavoidably manifest in mainstream American discourse. Likely spectacularly unhinged considering how Americans handled a balloon. Reality is even of GD is technically DOA and strategically destabilizing, it will serve as US MIC exceptionalism to calm Americans as long as it's not tested and Trump will be the guy credited with the president with the foresight to protect/"shield" CONUS. PRC being able to hit strategic energy nodes, data centres, carriers parked in dry docks, b21s in shelters, F35 manufacturing lines, finance infra... basically uproot CONUS serenity that underpins US power (both soft/hard) etc etc is going to be unavoidable, and the only rhetorical salve for that is Golden Dome wank as long as peace holds. There's also the very marginal chance that it will work. There's probably much better offensive capabilities US can hedge with using $$$$$ GD money, but ultimately not being hit is what allows constituents to sleep at night.
- bigyabai 1y ago
  Yes. However, the PRC knows that this is how world wars start. I suspect that nobody outside the uber-old Politburo members will be clamoring for preemptive strikes when China's soft-power is this strong already. There will come a day where American exceptionalism gets kicked in the face, but only once America overextends. China's blue-water navy is nowhere near as credible as their littoral forces, meaning that they're much better equipped to fight Taiwan than America. This is the fight they want, and they're overwhelmingly prepared to kill Americans until popular support collapses. It's a mistake to get sucked into the "China strong" outward presentation of the PRC - they're much more cunning (and constrained) than they make themselves out to be. They're willing to play poker at the international table until the knives come out, which is smarter than what many countries can say about their foreign policy.
  - maxglute 1y ago
    > preemptive strikes Prompt global strike less about preemption, but building up proportional responses on retaliation latter. US discussion around TW scenario factors in mainland strikes, with assumption that CONUS will be relatively spared. Once conversation includes hitting PRC mainland = PRC hitting CONUS, then escalation math becomes very different. Global strike and blue water are both we can touch your homeland capabilities, with global strike potentially able to make bluewater obsolete, i.e. global striking carrier hulls or logistic nodes that sustains bluewater prevents them from being forward deployed and being able to deliver fires at all. That's what makes US GD optics extra worthwhile, at this point US has sunk trillions and decades into carrier centred (and soon B21) expeditionary force structure, with no hint of pivot (i.e. IMO too much interbranch drama to build out equivalent of PLARocketForce). Sailors like their big boats, aviators like their fancy planes. No one wants to be the glorified uber driver for big icbm rockets. Marine MLRs closest, but they get to brag about driving off big boats in their big cars that shoot small missiles. At the end of the day, GD, going to be blanket wank material for US having bestest/most impenetrable missile defense can validate the other force structures that requires forward / preposition by at least pretending they're not as vulnerable as they are. It's how US gets to continue play the China weak card as long as china remains cautious / PLA remains untested. i.e. if PRC stays smart and appear weak relative to US.

7 points by ironyman 1y ago

Not a great idea. On paper it seems like a smart deterrent, but in practice it's a fallible defense that invites even more dangerous weaponry. The argument is that it's safer and easier to intercept a ballistic missile in it's ballistic phase than it is to defeat it in a boost or terminal phase. This is true, but it will result with adversaries skipping those steps altogether. Additionally, it likely wouldn't protect against long-range cruise missiles or similarly maneuverable glide vehicles. Best case scenario, nuclear weapons get sent up in satellites and "deorbited" in a scheduled attack that won't be recognizable until it's too late. Worst case scenario, a space-capable adversary (eg. Iran, China, Russia) kicks off a Kessler syndrome and flips the table back in their favor. It's no-win, even as peacetime deterrence. This is why nonproliferation and elimination was America's only feasible solution to the nuclear issue: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit

mittensc 1y ago
I would say the opposite. It's a great idea. It's one layer to missile defense. Cruise missiles can be destroyed via existing ground/sea defenses. Patriots have proven they can intercept anything non-ballistic and there are likely better capabilities not revealed yet. The US is also very far away for effective cruise missles. (and has a lot of allies nations in the way) Nuclear weapons sent as sattelites to be de-orbited sound novel, although they can be tracked easily and disabled covertly. (Russia has 'stolen' a US sattelite in the past without much repercussions) Kessler syndrome might be a net win if you are at the point of nuclear war, at which point, without ballistic missiles any country will not stand much against US conventional power. So... there aren't many drawbacks to the plan, the only thing I'm curious is if we don't already have that capability covertly via starlink... shouldn't be hard to take over those and guide them into ballistic missiles...
- bigyabai 1y ago
  The US mainland isn't completely covered by air defenses, let alone Patriot systems. It's too large, and there are too many gaps that could be exploited. This is why long-range intercontinental cruise missiles cannot be written off completely. A well-designed cruise missile can be almost impossible to find on radar (due to sea/ground clutter) if it flies nap-of-the-earth. They're an extremely credible threat and there's a reason the US has long-range cruise missiles as part of the nuclear triad. It is not realistic to depend on special forces to disable nuclear satellites if (and when) they exist. As I highlighted in my previous link, one of the primary things stopping the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons to space was the idea that America wouldn't deploy space-based interceptors. Both China and Russia will jump at the chance to start hiding nukes in orbit. Our only options are to leave ICBMs as the status quo or negotiate for complete nuclear elimination. This is the downside that I am alluding to, besides the billions of dollars in taxpayer money this will burn starting a new nuclear arms race. You cannot use Starlink satellites to intercept ballistic missiles for multiple reasons. They do not have enough propellant, they don't move fast enough even to catch it in the boost phase, they orbit too low to intercept in the ballistic phase and they aren't designed to have high-impulse maneuvering motors. It would be a neat party trick, but there isn't an ice cube's chance in hell the DOD would privatize a life-or-death nuclear defense system like that. No, not even an administration this crazy.
  - mittensc 1y ago
    > The US mainland isn't completely covered by air defenses, let alone Patriot systems EU, japan, canada all have defenses of their own and collaborate. All other countries bordering russia/china do as well.. Then add in all the islands that US has bases on or of allied nations with detection capabilities. Once detected, the US navy and airforce can plan interceptions. Which way would a cruise missile go and how much fuel would it need to reach the US?... let's be real here. > It is not realistic to depend on special forces to disable nuclear satellites if (and when) they exist. Why special forces?, just laser their thrusters once in range during peacetime... who's going to do what? > one of the primary things stopping the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons to space was the idea that America wouldn't deploy space-based interceptors I would argue the idea was that the US would disable them as they got into space. Or that the US would do the same. Or that they innevitably fail sometimes and might leave portions of your homeland unhospitable. > Both China and Russia will jump at the chance to start hiding nukes in orbit. I disagree. > Our only options are to leave ICBMs as the status quo or negotiate for complete nuclear elimination That's a bit naive considering russia's behavior. > This is the downside that I am alluding to, besides the billions of dollars in taxpayer money this will burn starting a new nuclear arms race. Last arms race brought the USSR to collapse. Russia isn't looking too capable right now for another one, hence perfect timing to take advantage of their weakness. > You cannot use Starlink satellites to intercept ballistic missiles for multiple reasons Thanks, nice points to think about, you are likely correct right now. > It would be a neat party trick, Yes it would, so what would it take for them to work?, would early intelligence on possible launch times, missile locations, directions and all be enough to compute interceptors ahead of time during boost? would slight alterations and massive numbers covering the globe make up for that? Also, not privatize, just plain take over of spacex in case of emergency. DoD would use them as kinnetic interceptors. DoD could also force design changes on spacex in anticipation. So much to think about :) Edit: you missed nuke subs, so the MAD is still around unless the US has a way to kill them if they get too close to the us.
jjk166 1y ago
All defenses are fallible, that doesn't mean they aren't useful. Yes building a tall wall to protect against invaders won't stop those who build siege towers, but many invaders can't build siege towers, those who can must expend considerable time and resources to do so, and those who both can and do will still have a more difficult time against the defenders on the walls than against defenders with no walls. The reason ballistic missiles fly through space is because that is the fastest, easiest way to cross long distances. Every other option has significant drawbacks. Space based intercept won't address every potential vulnerability, but those vulnerabilities already exist, and are preferable to the current status quo. Kessler syndrome wouldn't do anything to stop midcourse-phase interceptors. They aren't in space long enough to be affected. Even if we pretend for a second it would be possible to put so much mass in orbit to stop interceptors, you've also essentially intercepted every nuke, doing the job of those interceptors for you.
- bigyabai 1y ago
  Then we have to transition into looking at it as a system of tradeoffs. As long as America has a second-strike capability, ICBM attacks aren't really desirable even from rogue nations. AEGIS and AEGIS Ashore are both already deployed by America's armed forces. THAADs and Patriot systems protect our most vulnerable assets abroad and the naval forces can be redirected if a certain theater goes hot. We bought these systems at great expense and they function roughly as intended to save American lives. It isn't likely that a Golden Dome would stop rogue nations from attacking America with ICBMs, nor would it stop an all-out attack. It encourages new developments in space-based weaponry, ratchets up the fragile tension that enables satellite weaponry, and ultimately becomes a net-threat to Americans. Even if it was free, the sentiment that you project deploying such a system turns you into the abhorrent imperial power of space. You are naturally now the enemy of free spacefaring nations.
  - jjk166 1y ago
    Second strike capability deters full scale nuclear first strikes, but not necessarily limited strikes where the gamble is "they won't destroy the world just because we destroyed a city." It also does nothing against accidental launches, or strikes ordered because of miscommunication or irrationality. If we were confident we could deter all strikes, there would be no need for missile defense abroad either - our threat to retaliate would be sufficient. In any scenario where a carrier group is potentially getting nuked we're basically in a full scale nuclear war with a peer adversary. Those other ballistic missile defense systems do serve a purpose, but they are inadequate on their own. They currently exist because they were technically simpler, not because they are superior. The purpose of ballistic missile defense is not to deter a state from attacking with ICBMs, it is to intercept ICBMs. For small strikes such as the scenarios given above, it can defeat or mitigate them. For sufficiently large strikes, nukes will get through, but fewer will get through, and importantly the adversary doesn't know which will get through, so for a given arsenal size they need to either double up on targets or accept a significant fraction of targets not being destroyed, either of which means more stuff is left standing than if there wasn't such a missile defense system in place. Again, defense systems are not meant to be undefeatable, they are just to force your adversary into incurring the cost to potentially defeat them. There is a deterrent effect to any weapon system - if it's harder, riskier, and more expensive to defeat the adversary, all the less reason to try - but that's just an added bonus. The argument that this system encourages development of space based weapons falls on deaf ears. Space based weapons are already under active development by multiple nations, and will be implemented regardless because an adversary's satellite network is already a serious military asset to be attacked and defended. Given the choice between weaponized space and not being nuked versus probably still weaponization of space and being nuked, I know which option I'm choosing. I am even less compelled by the claim that a space based interceptor, whose sole purpose is to prevent nuclear armageddon and has no offensive capability whatsoever, somehow equates to space imperialism. The would be nuclear war mongers seem like the real enemy of free spacefaring nations. There is a very real question of opportunity cost. Developing and deploying such a system is resource intensive, could those resources be better spent elsewhere? Is there a better way to defend against these threats? Are there realistic alternatives that prevent nuclear war by other means? I think a compelling case could be made for either. Whatever that alternative is though needs to be better than "sit around and pray no one launches nukes."

maxglute 1y ago

PRC going to roll out their prompt global strike sooner than later. Conversation of CONUS vulnerability is slowly being acknowledged in wonk circles. A few more PRC FOB tests and the notion that PRC can conventionally strike CONUS (eventually at scale) is going to unavoidably manifest in mainstream American discourse. Likely spectacularly unhinged considering how Americans handled a balloon. Reality is even of GD is technically DOA and strategically destabilizing, it will serve as US MIC exceptionalism to calm Americans as long as it's not tested and Trump will be the guy credited with the president with the foresight to protect/"shield" CONUS. PRC being able to hit strategic energy nodes, data centres, carriers parked in dry docks, b21s in shelters, F35 manufacturing lines, finance infra... basically uproot CONUS serenity that underpins US power (both soft/hard) etc etc is going to be unavoidable, and the only rhetorical salve for that is Golden Dome wank as long as peace holds. There's also the very marginal chance that it will work. There's probably much better offensive capabilities US can hedge with using $$$$$ GD money, but ultimately not being hit is what allows constituents to sleep at night.

bigyabai 1y ago
Yes. However, the PRC knows that this is how world wars start. I suspect that nobody outside the uber-old Politburo members will be clamoring for preemptive strikes when China's soft-power is this strong already. There will come a day where American exceptionalism gets kicked in the face, but only once America overextends. China's blue-water navy is nowhere near as credible as their littoral forces, meaning that they're much better equipped to fight Taiwan than America. This is the fight they want, and they're overwhelmingly prepared to kill Americans until popular support collapses. It's a mistake to get sucked into the "China strong" outward presentation of the PRC - they're much more cunning (and constrained) than they make themselves out to be. They're willing to play poker at the international table until the knives come out, which is smarter than what many countries can say about their foreign policy.
- maxglute 1y ago
  > preemptive strikes Prompt global strike less about preemption, but building up proportional responses on retaliation latter. US discussion around TW scenario factors in mainland strikes, with assumption that CONUS will be relatively spared. Once conversation includes hitting PRC mainland = PRC hitting CONUS, then escalation math becomes very different. Global strike and blue water are both we can touch your homeland capabilities, with global strike potentially able to make bluewater obsolete, i.e. global striking carrier hulls or logistic nodes that sustains bluewater prevents them from being forward deployed and being able to deliver fires at all. That's what makes US GD optics extra worthwhile, at this point US has sunk trillions and decades into carrier centred (and soon B21) expeditionary force structure, with no hint of pivot (i.e. IMO too much interbranch drama to build out equivalent of PLARocketForce). Sailors like their big boats, aviators like their fancy planes. No one wants to be the glorified uber driver for big icbm rockets. Marine MLRs closest, but they get to brag about driving off big boats in their big cars that shoot small missiles. At the end of the day, GD, going to be blanket wank material for US having bestest/most impenetrable missile defense can validate the other force structures that requires forward / preposition by at least pretending they're not as vulnerable as they are. It's how US gets to continue play the China weak card as long as china remains cautious / PLA remains untested. i.e. if PRC stays smart and appear weak relative to US.