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Apple stores Chinese users' iCloud data and encryption keys to that data in China in a datacenter run by a state owned firm [1]. [1] https://www.reuters.com/ar

Apple stores Chinese users' iCloud data and encryption keys to that data in China in a datacenter run by a state owned firm [1]. [1] https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/apple-moves-to-store-icloud-keys-in-china-raising-human-rights-fears-idUSKCN1G805Z/ https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/apple-moves-to-st...

rs186 1y ago
Basically, there is no backdoor. The front door is wide open, the government just needs to ask. Or not even that -- just take whatever they need themselves.
- theturtletalks 1y ago
  Even in the US, even if Apple doesn’t have a backdoor, isn’t NSA linked up into the telecom companies already?
  - simondotau 1y ago
    What are the chances that the NSA has a useful zero-day on the TLS encryption standard?
    - mplewis9z 1y ago
      Probably not on the standard itself, but practically a guarantee they have attacks on the major implementations, especially OpenSSL.
    - mu53 1y ago
      What are the chances they just have everyone's private keys?
  - deepsun 1y ago
    If there's a properly implemented end-to-end encryption, then NSA cannot see anything, even having full access to telco-s.
    - Synaesthesia 1y ago
      But iCloud is not fully encrypted by default.
      - theturtletalks 1y ago
        Could you elaborate?
        aspenmayer 1y ago
        iCloud Advanced Data Protection (the feature that TFA is referring to) is required for E2EE, and it is not enabled by default. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud#Advanced_Data_Protection https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud#Advanced_Data_Protectio... > On December 7, 2022, Apple announced Advanced Data Protection for iCloud, an option to enable end-to-end encryption for almost all iCloud data including Backups, Notes, Photos, and more. The only data classes that are ineligible for Advanced Data Protection are Mail, Contacts, and Calendars, in order to preserve the ability to sync third-party clients with IMAP, CardDAV or CalDAV.
    - akimbostrawman 1y ago
      which you can verify because everthing is proprietary so it just there usual marketing play
    - cluckindan 1y ago
      But they can store the traffic and decrypt it later, if feasible.
      - dizlexic 1y ago
        ^ this and remember kids. Data processing does not require a warrant.
    - bigyabai 1y ago
      > if the target uses iCloud backup, the encryption keys should also be provided with content return https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21114562/jan-2021-fbi-infographic-re-lawful-access-to-secure-messaging-apps-data.pdf https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21114562/jan-2021-fbi...
  - nl 1y ago
    The whole point of encryption in transit is that it doesn't matter if the telecom companies aren't trusted: they still can't read the data.
    - heavyset_go 1y ago
      All the in-transit encryption in the world won't matter if they've pwned the decrypted client device. Every company from your device's manufacturer, OS vendor, telecom carrier, app distributors and 3rd party software providers can be compelled to help make that happen. And then there's always Cellebrite and friends.
      - jesseendahl 1y ago
        This is not just encryption in transit or simplistic client-side encryption. It is end-to-end encryption, where each device's key generation is handled by your phone's Secure Enclave. This article is a decent starting point in terms of what Advanced Data Protection is: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 If you want a deeper dive into the security engineering of iCloud Keychain, the second half of this Blackhat talk by Apple's head of Security Engineering & Architecture (SEAR) is really great: Synchronizing secrets: https://youtu.be/BLGFriOKz6U?si=cY94TYo28bRj4G7y&t=1357 https://youtu.be/BLGFriOKz6U?si=cY94TYo28bRj4G7y&t=1357
        heavyset_go 1y ago
        I'm aware of what E2EE is, all the encryption in the world does not matter if either end of the conversation is confiscated or pwned by adversaries.
        jesseendahl 1y ago
        >all the encryption in the world does not matter if either end of the conversation is confiscated or pwned by adversaries. Yes of course, but it's not so simple to bypass the hardware-enforced protections that exist both device side and server side. As far as I can tell, it seems effort was made to design/architect everything in such a way such that the protections can't be retroactively circumvented even under legal compulsion. Disclosure: I previously worked for Apple, but not on the design/implementation of any of this stuff and this is all my own opinions, not those of Apple.

rs186 1y ago

Basically, there is no backdoor. The front door is wide open, the government just needs to ask. Or not even that -- just take whatever they need themselves.

theturtletalks 1y ago
Even in the US, even if Apple doesn’t have a backdoor, isn’t NSA linked up into the telecom companies already?
- simondotau 1y ago
  What are the chances that the NSA has a useful zero-day on the TLS encryption standard?
  - mplewis9z 1y ago
    Probably not on the standard itself, but practically a guarantee they have attacks on the major implementations, especially OpenSSL.
  - mu53 1y ago
    What are the chances they just have everyone's private keys?
- deepsun 1y ago
  If there's a properly implemented end-to-end encryption, then NSA cannot see anything, even having full access to telco-s.
  - Synaesthesia 1y ago
    But iCloud is not fully encrypted by default.
    - theturtletalks 1y ago
      Could you elaborate?
      - aspenmayer 1y ago
        iCloud Advanced Data Protection (the feature that TFA is referring to) is required for E2EE, and it is not enabled by default. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud#Advanced_Data_Protection https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud#Advanced_Data_Protectio... > On December 7, 2022, Apple announced Advanced Data Protection for iCloud, an option to enable end-to-end encryption for almost all iCloud data including Backups, Notes, Photos, and more. The only data classes that are ineligible for Advanced Data Protection are Mail, Contacts, and Calendars, in order to preserve the ability to sync third-party clients with IMAP, CardDAV or CalDAV.
  - akimbostrawman 1y ago
    which you can verify because everthing is proprietary so it just there usual marketing play
  - cluckindan 1y ago
    But they can store the traffic and decrypt it later, if feasible.
    - dizlexic 1y ago
      ^ this and remember kids. Data processing does not require a warrant.
  - bigyabai 1y ago
    > if the target uses iCloud backup, the encryption keys should also be provided with content return https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21114562/jan-2021-fbi-infographic-re-lawful-access-to-secure-messaging-apps-data.pdf https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21114562/jan-2021-fbi...
- nl 1y ago
  The whole point of encryption in transit is that it doesn't matter if the telecom companies aren't trusted: they still can't read the data.
  - heavyset_go 1y ago
    All the in-transit encryption in the world won't matter if they've pwned the decrypted client device. Every company from your device's manufacturer, OS vendor, telecom carrier, app distributors and 3rd party software providers can be compelled to help make that happen. And then there's always Cellebrite and friends.
    - jesseendahl 1y ago
      This is not just encryption in transit or simplistic client-side encryption. It is end-to-end encryption, where each device's key generation is handled by your phone's Secure Enclave. This article is a decent starting point in terms of what Advanced Data Protection is: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 If you want a deeper dive into the security engineering of iCloud Keychain, the second half of this Blackhat talk by Apple's head of Security Engineering & Architecture (SEAR) is really great: Synchronizing secrets: https://youtu.be/BLGFriOKz6U?si=cY94TYo28bRj4G7y&t=1357 https://youtu.be/BLGFriOKz6U?si=cY94TYo28bRj4G7y&t=1357
      - heavyset_go 1y ago
        I'm aware of what E2EE is, all the encryption in the world does not matter if either end of the conversation is confiscated or pwned by adversaries.
        jesseendahl 1y ago
        >all the encryption in the world does not matter if either end of the conversation is confiscated or pwned by adversaries. Yes of course, but it's not so simple to bypass the hardware-enforced protections that exist both device side and server side. As far as I can tell, it seems effort was made to design/architect everything in such a way such that the protections can't be retroactively circumvented even under legal compulsion. Disclosure: I previously worked for Apple, but not on the design/implementation of any of this stuff and this is all my own opinions, not those of Apple.