7 ms·

It makes more sense if you view it for what it is: Honest Satya's Certificate Authority. Microsoft showed they can semi-competently run a PKI. The end. Now ha

It makes more sense if you view it for what it is: Honest Satya's Certificate Authority. Microsoft showed they can semi-competently run a PKI. The end. Now had the Linux folks stepped up to the plate early on, instead of childishly acting like Secure Boot was the computing antichrist, the story might be different. But they didn't. We only have shim because some people at Red Hat had the common sense to play ball.

flomo 1y ago
Maybe this isn't a great take, but RedHat/LKF/etc could obviously run a 'semi-competent' PKI, and probably should be. But doing so would allow PC vendors to cleanly segment machines between Windows and Linux (+$$), so perhaps it made the best sense to lay-low and use MS infrastructure for this.
- danudey 1y ago
  Can easily imagine companies like Dell selling you a system with Ubuntu preinstalled but without Windows signing keys so you can't run Windows on an Ubuntu laptop (or vice-versa) with Secure Boot on an unmodified system. Not out of malice, necessarily, but at least incompetence. Likewise, having Microsoft signing the shim also means that any Linux installation with the signed shim can install on any system that supports Windows, whereas if RedHat had their own 100% comptent, rock-star PKI then a huge proportion of systems sold today would not be able to run Linux unmodified because the manufacturers wouldn't bother.
  - hulitu 1y ago
    > Likewise, having Microsoft signing the shim also means that any Linux installation with the signed shim can install on any system No. See certificate expiration.
- sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago
  This isn't really true. MS uses three separate CA's to sign Windows boot loaders, third party bootloaders (including Linux bootloaders) and UEFI Option ROMs. In theory, no manufacturer has to install all three as trusted. But it makes no business sense to do so - why have two separate hardware SKUs for the sole purpose of lock-in? Once word got out no one would buy from that manufacturer.
  - flomo 1y ago
    Sure they would, if it would make them a buck. Lenovo for example already has separate models for pro ThinkPads with 'certified' Linux support versus the consumer line. Dell too. PC vendors already have 9000 SKUs, what's a few more? Reminds me back in the day some vendors of Win 9x systems put something in the BIOS to prevent one from installing NT/2000. Gotta get the corporate model for that.
littlestymaar 1y ago
> Now had the Linux folks stepped up to the plate early on, instead of childishly acting This kind of victim blaming gets annoying very quick, as if the Linux ecosystem had any leverage at all on PC manufacturers…
- sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago
  > as if the Linux ecosystem had any leverage at all on PC manufacturers… Linux has 63% of the server marketshare, which is where Secure Boot and the whole chain-of-trust has utmost importance. Of course they have leverage. Do you think overall Secure Boot is more important in the context of securing your bank's servers, or some porno jack machine throwaway laptop?
robin_reala 1y ago
Reference: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959
ACCount36 1y ago
Secure Boot is the computing antichrist, and Linux folk were 100% right to rally against it. As well as a whole bunch of other "Trusted Computing" garbage.
- froh 1y ago
  mind to elaborate? I'd love to know if my machine has been compromised with early boot stage "meta-hypervisor" or not. the promise of secure boot and trusted computing is backdoor-free boot. what is in your eyes evil and garbage about that?
  - ACCount36 1y ago
    Who controls the fucking certs? "My computer was compromised with an early boot stage hypervisor backdoor" happens basically never. It's an attack vector that exists almost entirely in the minds of infosec fucktards. "My brand new device ships with vendor-selected boot certificates that can't be changed, can't be overridden, and control what software I can install onto my own device" happens with every other smartphone, gaming console, car, and even some PCs. "Trusted Computing" is, and always was, about making sure that the user doesn't actually own his device. This is the real, tangible attack vector - and the target of this attack is user freedom and choice.
    - flexagoon 1y ago
      > Who controls the fucking certs? Cert authorities, just like in case of SSL. Is SSL also an evil technology designed to take away freedom from the internet? > vendor-selected boot certificates that can't be changed That's a lie. Certain drivers are signed with a specific key, and they can only be used when this key is installed, which makes sense. The same thing happens with SSL - if you remove pre-installed CA certs from your device, HTTPS sites will stop working. However, nothing is stopping you from adding your own keys to the system and signing your own software with it. > happens with every other smartphone, gaming console, car, and even some PCs How often are you trying to install custom drivers on a smartphone, console or car? Why would you have secure boot issues on those? > the target of this attack is user freedom and choice. Which is exactly why users have the freedom and choice to just disable Secure Boot?
deknos 1y ago
orrr we just have official institutions which do this and enforce vendors to add certificates from other trusted parties. not only microsoft is able to do this. also microsoft already also had fallout regarding signing. and secure boot is still the antichrist, but we have to live with them.
- danudey 1y ago
  The problem here isn't that Microsoft is the one signing the shim, but that we can't trust systems manufacturers to update their systems, or even to have systems that can be correctly updated. A public signing institution (or at least, a not-for-profit one) would be a great idea, but it wouldn't solve the core issue that we're worried about.
WhyNotHugo 1y ago
Call me childish, but I don’t want to ask Microsoft to sign a certificate for me before I install software onto my own hardware. I don’t care if it’s required for every installation of if it’s once per hardware. I want to install software without asking a third party for permission. I want this to be doable entirely offline. Plus, keeping Microsoft’s CA installed greatest reduces any security which I’d get from SecureBoot.
- preisschild 1y ago
  > Plus, keeping Microsoft’s CA installed greatest reduces any security which I’d get from SecureBoot. Can't you just remove all CAs from the UEFI and import only your own anyways with most mainboard vendors?
  - xyse53 1y ago
    Yeah that's how my systems are set up. I also appreciate that each firmware let's me restore the original keys just in case without me having to manually back them up -- but they're not active for secure boot.
trelane 1y ago
If Linux users had "stepped up to the plate" and demanded their own separate PKI, nothing would be different, except that every system that shipped with Windows would be locked to Windows. Dual booting would not be a thing. I mean, your statement is self contradictory. Linux users demanded no signing etc. So, had the industry listened to Linux users, there would be no signing. We do not live in that universe. There are some vendors that don't have secureboot. They are e.g. System76. You can enable your own SecureBoot if you want[1], though some things may not work, like checking GPU firmware signatures, because they are signed by Microsoft only (there are other issues, depending on how deeply Microsoft is assumed in your system, see e.g "On some devices, removing either of these keys could disable all video output.") [1] https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Secure_Boot https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Secure_Boot
- sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago
  This makes no sense. Microsoft uses separate CAs (read: separate root certificates) to sign Windows vs Linux bootloaders. Both CAs have to be trusted. They could also, in theory, be revoked separately. There is no reason the "third party" CA couldn't be run by Red Hat. It's done by MS out of convenience.

flomo 1y ago

Maybe this isn't a great take, but RedHat/LKF/etc could obviously run a 'semi-competent' PKI, and probably should be. But doing so would allow PC vendors to cleanly segment machines between Windows and Linux (+$$), so perhaps it made the best sense to lay-low and use MS infrastructure for this.

danudey 1y ago
Can easily imagine companies like Dell selling you a system with Ubuntu preinstalled but without Windows signing keys so you can't run Windows on an Ubuntu laptop (or vice-versa) with Secure Boot on an unmodified system. Not out of malice, necessarily, but at least incompetence. Likewise, having Microsoft signing the shim also means that any Linux installation with the signed shim can install on any system that supports Windows, whereas if RedHat had their own 100% comptent, rock-star PKI then a huge proportion of systems sold today would not be able to run Linux unmodified because the manufacturers wouldn't bother.
- hulitu 1y ago
  > Likewise, having Microsoft signing the shim also means that any Linux installation with the signed shim can install on any system No. See certificate expiration.
sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago
This isn't really true. MS uses three separate CA's to sign Windows boot loaders, third party bootloaders (including Linux bootloaders) and UEFI Option ROMs. In theory, no manufacturer has to install all three as trusted. But it makes no business sense to do so - why have two separate hardware SKUs for the sole purpose of lock-in? Once word got out no one would buy from that manufacturer.
- flomo 1y ago
  Sure they would, if it would make them a buck. Lenovo for example already has separate models for pro ThinkPads with 'certified' Linux support versus the consumer line. Dell too. PC vendors already have 9000 SKUs, what's a few more? Reminds me back in the day some vendors of Win 9x systems put something in the BIOS to prevent one from installing NT/2000. Gotta get the corporate model for that.

littlestymaar 1y ago

> Now had the Linux folks stepped up to the plate early on, instead of childishly acting This kind of victim blaming gets annoying very quick, as if the Linux ecosystem had any leverage at all on PC manufacturers…

sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago
> as if the Linux ecosystem had any leverage at all on PC manufacturers… Linux has 63% of the server marketshare, which is where Secure Boot and the whole chain-of-trust has utmost importance. Of course they have leverage. Do you think overall Secure Boot is more important in the context of securing your bank's servers, or some porno jack machine throwaway laptop?

robin_reala 1y ago

Reference: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959

ACCount36 1y ago

Secure Boot is the computing antichrist, and Linux folk were 100% right to rally against it. As well as a whole bunch of other "Trusted Computing" garbage.

froh 1y ago
mind to elaborate? I'd love to know if my machine has been compromised with early boot stage "meta-hypervisor" or not. the promise of secure boot and trusted computing is backdoor-free boot. what is in your eyes evil and garbage about that?
- ACCount36 1y ago
  Who controls the fucking certs? "My computer was compromised with an early boot stage hypervisor backdoor" happens basically never. It's an attack vector that exists almost entirely in the minds of infosec fucktards. "My brand new device ships with vendor-selected boot certificates that can't be changed, can't be overridden, and control what software I can install onto my own device" happens with every other smartphone, gaming console, car, and even some PCs. "Trusted Computing" is, and always was, about making sure that the user doesn't actually own his device. This is the real, tangible attack vector - and the target of this attack is user freedom and choice.
  - flexagoon 1y ago
    > Who controls the fucking certs? Cert authorities, just like in case of SSL. Is SSL also an evil technology designed to take away freedom from the internet? > vendor-selected boot certificates that can't be changed That's a lie. Certain drivers are signed with a specific key, and they can only be used when this key is installed, which makes sense. The same thing happens with SSL - if you remove pre-installed CA certs from your device, HTTPS sites will stop working. However, nothing is stopping you from adding your own keys to the system and signing your own software with it. > happens with every other smartphone, gaming console, car, and even some PCs How often are you trying to install custom drivers on a smartphone, console or car? Why would you have secure boot issues on those? > the target of this attack is user freedom and choice. Which is exactly why users have the freedom and choice to just disable Secure Boot?

deknos 1y ago

orrr we just have official institutions which do this and enforce vendors to add certificates from other trusted parties. not only microsoft is able to do this. also microsoft already also had fallout regarding signing. and secure boot is still the antichrist, but we have to live with them.

danudey 1y ago
The problem here isn't that Microsoft is the one signing the shim, but that we can't trust systems manufacturers to update their systems, or even to have systems that can be correctly updated. A public signing institution (or at least, a not-for-profit one) would be a great idea, but it wouldn't solve the core issue that we're worried about.

WhyNotHugo 1y ago

Call me childish, but I don’t want to ask Microsoft to sign a certificate for me before I install software onto my own hardware. I don’t care if it’s required for every installation of if it’s once per hardware. I want to install software without asking a third party for permission. I want this to be doable entirely offline. Plus, keeping Microsoft’s CA installed greatest reduces any security which I’d get from SecureBoot.

preisschild 1y ago
> Plus, keeping Microsoft’s CA installed greatest reduces any security which I’d get from SecureBoot. Can't you just remove all CAs from the UEFI and import only your own anyways with most mainboard vendors?
- xyse53 1y ago
  Yeah that's how my systems are set up. I also appreciate that each firmware let's me restore the original keys just in case without me having to manually back them up -- but they're not active for secure boot.

trelane 1y ago

If Linux users had "stepped up to the plate" and demanded their own separate PKI, nothing would be different, except that every system that shipped with Windows would be locked to Windows. Dual booting would not be a thing. I mean, your statement is self contradictory. Linux users demanded no signing etc. So, had the industry listened to Linux users, there would be no signing. We do not live in that universe. There are some vendors that don't have secureboot. They are e.g. System76. You can enable your own SecureBoot if you want[1], though some things may not work, like checking GPU firmware signatures, because they are signed by Microsoft only (there are other issues, depending on how deeply Microsoft is assumed in your system, see e.g "On some devices, removing either of these keys could disable all video output.") [1] https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Secure_Boot https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Secure_Boot

sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago
This makes no sense. Microsoft uses separate CAs (read: separate root certificates) to sign Windows vs Linux bootloaders. Both CAs have to be trusted. They could also, in theory, be revoked separately. There is no reason the "third party" CA couldn't be run by Red Hat. It's done by MS out of convenience.