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Millions of Cars Exposed to Remote Hacking via PerfektBlue Attack
- flerchin 1y ago[flagged]
- chaps 1y ago"In order to conduct an attack, the hacker needs to be in range and able to pair their laptop with the targeted infotainment system over Bluetooth. In some cases pairing is possible without any user interaction, while in others pairing requires user confirmation, or it may not be possible at all." I agree that it's not world shatteringly bad, but... you're being a bit disingenuous. :)
- CoastalCoder 1y agoDoes the attacker actually need to be nearby? Or does there just need to be some communications link between the car's Bluetooth transceiver and the attacker? I'd think that installing a BT <--> cell network bridge would easily solve that hurdle.
- dylan604 1y agoAre there BT antennas for long range? Like, can I make a Yagi style antenna out of a Pringles can and some all thread like we used to do for WiFi?
- bradyd 1y agoBluetooth uses the same 2.4GHz as WiFi
- smackeyacky 1y agoNo but there are bluetooth gateways that allow local bluetooth LE connections on one side and wifi / cell on the other. Cassia makes some great ones. I can see somebody setting up a Cassia in a car park and performing all sorts of bluetooth LE shenanigans remotely.
- cogman10 1y agoWhat BT <--> cell bridge? The cell -> phone -> bluetooth audio bridge? I don't think there's an exploit there, but even assuming there was, it'd require an attacker to know the phone number of the person they are attacking and for the car to be on at the same time when they execute the attack.
- lostmsu 1y agoThey mean to attach a device to the victim car that does Car BT <-> Device <-> 5G <-> Hacker
- cogman10 1y agoSeems like you still need a device either exploited or created physically located near your target/s. Maybe a car worm virus? Exploit one car and if it has a cell connection piggyback? Feels a little like the 90s ILUVYOU emails :)
- bdavbdav 1y agoBT to cell bridge? Just a phone stuck somewhere would work.
- qualeed 1y agoWhy leave out the first 2/3rds of the sentence, which are the more severe ramifications of the exploit? >From there the attacker can track the vehicle’s location, record audio from inside the car, and obtain the victim’s phonebook data. Combined with: >"In some cases pairing is possible without any user interaction" You end up with a stalker's dream.
- 4ndrewl 1y agoBut also you're potentially able to backdoor in if future vulnerabilities are found. One foot in the door so to speak.
- flerchin 1y agoIt's a local attack via bluetooth, location tracking is not very interesting. Recording audio likewise not all that exciting for much the same reason. The phonebook though, that's exfiltrating PII. >In some cases pairing is possible without any user interaction. Baloney. No implementations in the wild do this, or they would have loudly trumpeted it.
- qualeed 1y agoI can turn any security finding into a "yawn" by either ignoring and/or disbelieving most of it, too.
- minusLik 1y agoIs there an exploit? I've always wanted to explore the inner workings of my car's computer system, but I don't know how.
- noman-land 1y agoLook up OBD-II.
- Ccecil 1y agoI recently read "The car hacker's handbook". It seemed to explain the basics very well and pointed me to all the necessary software and hardware to get started. It is an interesting topic for sure.
- minusLik 1y agoThat book looks very promising. Thanks a bunch!
- asdff 1y agoSeems like early 2000s cars were the last of the good cars. You had full airbags by that point but cars were mostly still just basic fuel injected internal combustions engines with sensible transmission choices that had seen probably decades of iteration at that point. If you wanted some crazy infotainment its not hard to roll your own with the standard sized stereo slots in those cars. No telemetry. No "driver aids" behaving nondeterministically. Mechanical linkages vs by wire. Just a car. Starts with a key. Exactly what is says on the tin and nothing more or less.
- MisterTea 1y agoI miss them too. Re. the radio: Now its a big useless screen that shows me useless data while still hiding all the useful data that I can get over OBD-II. And whats worse, that screen is tied to your fucking cars computer and configures your car so you cant remove it, no matter how much the software sucks. I hate my 2022 CR-V's garbage infotainment screen. Its a shit UI, shit audio quality, and the Bluetooth is bugged to all hell. I already have a computer with me in my car called a phone that does everything but better. And that's not saying much.
- spacecadet 1y agoI own a bunch of impractical cars, but my daily driver is a 2005 Honda. I always explain to people exactly this. It's the last good year before everything became too digitized and wireless. It's got physical controls, a real horn, a cable driven throttle and at 350,000 miles with so little maintenance and no sign of stopping. I also own a 05 55 AMG, also all mechanical, but oh so impracticable :D
- LightBug1 1y agoThink you're onto something. I'm still rolling a 2005 Toyota. Incredibly functional, reliable, and I can add whatever I want and choose instead of having it forced down my throat by the current wave of nonsense ... Oh, and zero worries about it being hacked !
- avgDev 1y agoAh, I agree for the most part, however, safety has definitely moved forward. There is a lot more to safety than airbags and seatbelts.
- dmitrygr 1y agoBluetooth stacks are very complex due to the initially-vague 1.1 spec and the need for thousands of per-device quirks handlers. Even as specs were tightened, old device interop remains needed. If you implement a stack precisely as per spec, about half the devices out there won’t work with it (no exaggeration). This situation is not a recipe for good code. Now that BLE has audio (the last thing from classic that it lacked), we can begin phasing out BT classic and this mess. However, it will be a decade before anyone can safely drop bt classic interop. Basically: anywhere you have a Bluetooth stack that supports bt classic, feel free to ASSUME there are RCEs and DOSs lurking. You will not be wrong. Source: a full blown case of PTSD from having written and debugged a few BT stacks
- Gigachad 1y agoCould still contain it though. Bluetooth would only be needed for the non critical sound/calls/navigation stuff which should be it's own separate subsystem, on a read only OS with boot chain security so even if you did find an exploit in the bluetooth stack, it would only give you access to very unimportant things, and only until the car reboots. Of course I don't expect it's implemented anywhere near securely, but in theory it's very possible. Game console companies have this stuff pretty solved.
- bdavbdav 1y agoI’m half excited about this, and hoping I can exploit the infotainment on my Octavia 4
- sugarpimpdorsey 1y ago> The attacker may also be able The infosec community loves their weasel words don't they? The only other career path other than "meteorologist" where they get it wrong half the time with the burden of proof on the recipient, and everyone looks the other way. Show your work, or it's not possible.
- Sohcahtoa82 1y agoThis is the wrong attitude to have. There are cases where vulnerable code is found, but it may take weeks of tinkering to actually build an exploit that gets arbitrary RCE. An example could be a buffer overflow that only allows a few bytes to be written. At first, you're likely just causing segmentation faults. DEP and ASLR will make writing an exploit that gives RCE difficult. This is when an attacker "may" be able to do something, if there's an attacker determined enough to figure out a full exploit. The original researcher might not be interested in spending that time and just wants the vendor to fix it.
- sugarpimpdorsey 1y agoUnfortunately, you can only cry wolf so many times before no one will believe you anymore.
- sorenjan 1y agoI read recently about how some cars can be hacked and stolen through the CAN bus to the headlights. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/04/crooks-are-stealing-cars-using-previously-unknown-keyless-can-injection-attacks/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/04/crook...