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>The off-card model just seems like a complete architectural mismatch for the eSIM use case, since there is no single trustworthy entity. SAT applets are not pr
by gruez 1y ago
>The off-card model just seems like a complete architectural mismatch for the eSIM use case, since there is no single trustworthy entity. SAT applets are not presented to the eUICC vendor for bytecode verification, so the entire security model breaks down if verification doesn't happen on-card.
I thought the whole esim provisioning process required a chain of trust all the way to GSMA? Maybe the applet isn't verified by the eUICC vendor, but it's not like you can run whatever code either.
- ACCount36 1y agoSeems like you actually could "run whatever code". Apparently, GSMA recalled their universal eSIM test profiles. Prior to recall, those could be installed on ANY eSIM, and those profiles had applet updates enabled. By installing a profile to eSIM and issuing your own update to it, you could run arbitrary applets.
- lxgr 1y agoIf the set of actors that can deploy bytecode to eUICCs includes all operators issuing eSIMs worldwide, arguably it might as well be everybody.
- ACCount36 1y agoNah, it's only "everybody" when I'm on the list. My major gripe with eSIM as a technology is that you can't just issue your own profiles to it.