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I have to take issue with this. I think it's an important and useful rhetorical tool that, while sometimes can be used in a petty way to score points, can eleva
by InclinedPlane 14y ago
I have to take issue with this. I think it's an important and useful rhetorical tool that, while sometimes can be used in a petty way to score points, can elevate the debate. If half of your counter-argument is "compiler warnings" for your competitor's argument, I think that's valuable.
I, for one, would wildly prefer a world where every debater was a nit-picking SOB when it comes to logical fallacies and the average debate "compiled cleanly without warnings". It would be like heaven compared to where we are today.
- _delirium 14y agoIf we're talking about the formal fallacies, I agree, but my experience with people name-dropping compiler errors for informal fallacies is that they're often not very useful or accurate diagnoses. Ad hominem is one that is often useful, mostly as a sort of meta-rule about debate etiquette. But things like "slippery slope" are used to characterize a wide range of arguments of which only a subset are strictly fallacious. And some informal fallacies are only fallacies in the specific context of purported logical proofs, but not necessarily in other kinds of arguments. For example, it's true that an "appeal to authority" in an argument means it's not a valid logical argument that proves its conclusions from its premises. But people sometimes raise that objection in contexts where the authority is being invoked as an epistemic authority that raises the likelihood of its conclusion being true (because we have reason to believe that the authority's judgments have non-zero epistemic value), not as part of a logical proof. For example, while it's true that "the consensus of physicists is that X" doesn't prove anything about X, if I'm not a physicist and have a background belief that the consensus of physicists is generally a good guide on what is likely to be true about physics, it's a good inference that I should at least provisionally believe X.