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Regarding #3, I haven't kept up with this specific issue lately, but wasn't the issue with their use and creation of HEU, atleast for a while, that they wouldn'
by VoidWhisperer 1y ago
Regarding #3, I haven't kept up with this specific issue lately, but wasn't the issue with their use and creation of HEU, atleast for a while, that they wouldn't allow UN nuclear energy inspectors to monitor what was being created at the reactors? There are AP articles from 2023[1] saying that Iran had barred 1/3 of the most experienced inspectors the UN had there from monitoring it, and a news article from the UN itself from this year[2] says that Iran has been actively impeding their ability to monitor its nuclear program.
[1]: https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-un-inspectors-b82c92ea64f79c1e67dc2bd870cc7829 https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-un-inspectors-b82c92...
[2]: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164291 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164291
- mgiampapa 1y agoPresumably if you allow monitors for non-weapons uses, the accounting of where the material goes is relatively straightforward. Therefore monitoring could not be allowed, ipso facto, they are doing it for weapons.
- rocqua 1y agoAn other compatible explanation is that they wanted ambiguity about their weapon production. Besides, wasn't this whole thing triggered by a UN report showing they had made a lot more 50% enriched stuff than expected? I.e. the monitoring "worked"
- hnaccount_rng 1y agoBut ambiguity with respect to weapons production has to be taken as a confirmation of an intent to develop weapons of the opposite side. Which makes this equivalent to just having a nuke program. It doesn't even give you a bargaining chip because there is nothing you can do as a step back (since you didn't do anything in the first place)
- rocqua 1y agoThe step back is allowing inspections.