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If they had already developed them, then we wouldn’t be having this discussion because nobody is going to war with a nuclear armed state. The question is only,
by lwansbrough 1y ago
If they had already developed them, then we wouldn’t be having this discussion because nobody is going to war with a nuclear armed state.
The question is only, did they have the means to, and was there an indication they were? The answer is yes. They were enriching uranium at levels that go beyond anything non-nefarious. Their lead nuclear scientists were going to be meeting with their ballistic missile scientists (according to the dossier.)
On would it be worth it: nuclear proliferation is probably the most dangerous existential threat that humanity faces that is completely preventable. Iran is the most destabilizing country in the region and the cascade of nuclear proliferation that would occur if they succeeded would be a nightmare. That is easily worth $3T.
- euW3EeBe 1y ago> Iran is the most destabilizing country in the region You misspelled Israel, and a reminder that Israel is the only nation in the region with multiple nuclear warheads. https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/06/israel-iran-war-regional-stability-military-adventurism-proxies?lang=en https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/06/israel-iran-w...
- runako 1y agoIf I’m a head of state in a contested region, I would read your post as an urgent appeal to make acquisition of nuclear capability as the top priority of the state. Nonproliferation via war is not a viable approach. This reminds me to read more on the game theory aspect of nuclear states. But I do find it fascinating that no nuclear-armed states have ever been in a shooting war. Interesting to speculate whether the Middle East could have seen less bloodshed over the decades if all the players had been armed since near the beginning of the nuclear age.
- lwansbrough 1y agoOne often under-appreciated aspect of proliferation is accidental detonation. It is not safer for more states to have nukes simply because it introduces more variables that are hard or impossible to control. And accidents/mistakes/miscommunications account for most (all?) of our closest calls with nukes.
- runako 1y agoI agree with you about accidental detonation and nonproliferation in general. But it is also clear that enforcement of nonproliferation without similarly muscular enforcement of sovereignty in general creates a huge incentive for proliferation. If we truly want nonproliferation, it simply follows that powerful nations must stop actions like the Russian conquest in Ukraine and whatever Israel is doing in Iran. Every government at base has an incentive to do everything possible keep bombs from falling on its cities, and a demonstrated nuclear capability is the only proven way to do that in a regime where nuclear powers are allowed to act with impunity.
- lwansbrough 1y agoI think one thing Iran could do would be to stop funding terrorism in the middle east and perhaps also not threaten the complete destruction of Israel while simultaneously pursuing nuclear weapons. That seems to have sent the wrong message by the looks of it.
- runako 1y agoConflating things with nonproliferation detracts from the effort to prevent that singular threat. Now we are weighing the global, persistent threat of more nuclear weapons against regional terrorism and proving unable to decide which is more important. This, in a case where by nature of the problem, “both” is not an acceptable answer. Maybe we are detracting from some regional terrorism at the margins while increasing incentives for nuclear proliferation. I don’t think that’s a smart trade off, but that’s where we are headed.