> Minimal interest in what workable improvements (from the US Nat'l Security Establishment's PoV) would look like. An obvious improvement would be to not prohi

> Minimal interest in what workable improvements (from the US Nat'l Security Establishment's PoV) would look like. An obvious improvement would be to not prohibit people with a security clearance from looking at documents that are already publicly available. If the concern is that the documents could be forgeries, train them to have a suitable skepticism about the authenticity of leaks rather than prohibiting them from reading it. What if they are already skeptical and want to view the documents for some other reason? What if the government has already conceded that they're authentic, or it's something that can be easily verified given the information, so the authenticity isn't in question? What if they're in a position to prove that it isn't authentic, which could be highly useful information to the government, but nobody ever finds out if they avoid reading it because of a senseless prohibition?