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The problem you're up against in writing persuasively to me is that I have a bunch of reasons to dislike DNSSEC. The transparency and root-of-trust issues are t
by tptacek 1y ago
The problem you're up against in writing persuasively to me is that I have a bunch of reasons to dislike DNSSEC. The transparency and root-of-trust issues are the ones that, in my experience, are most legible to people who aren't deep into cryptography. But they're not my biggest issue.
I think the fundamental design of DNSSEC is wrong. Its role in Internet security is mostly as a vector to keep 1990s cryptography in common use. Offline signing was wrong. Signing and not encrypting was wrong. The model we ended up with for authenticated denial is wrong. The trust model is wrong. Top-down deployment, rather than bottom-up with incremental value: wrong. It's really hard to look at DNSSEC as a design and find anything right with it.
I don't blame the DNSSEC authors for this; they were working with constraints and assumptions that got rewritten in the 2000s. I do blame the DNSSEC non-authors who refuse to accept the idea that the IETF could have gotten something wrong and are still trying to push this contraption on people.
Finally, as I keep saying: we're never going to get "DNS transparency". Governments run the roots of the DNS hierarchy. Governments don't run CAs, and even then, a single browser had to amass so much market power that they could dictate terms to the CAs (and, in the process, kill some of the largest CAs) in order to make CT happen. That simply cannot happen with the DNS.
The dumbest thing about all of this is that the only purpose DNSSEC still serves is as an extra layer of authentication for domain-based WebPKI challenges. Nobody needs to change their zones to get better security than that! We can just run a protocol between the CAs and the registrars (it exists!).
- saurik 1y ago> Governments don't run CAs, and even then, a single browser had to amass so much market power that they could dictate terms to the CAs (and, in the process, kill some of the largest CAs) in order to make CT happen. If we accept this thesis, it means that the only reason we are able to have a secure internet is because we also have a monopoly on browser technology; and like, we don't want there to be a monopoly on browser technology, right? That means the current situation is unstable at best until we finally manage to regulate that monopoly out of existence... or, and maybe you feel this is the worst case scenario, attempt to turn it into a public good. > Governments run the roots of the DNS hierarchy. That this is true has some devastating consequences that I feel as if I've never seen you discuss, as TLS has not, does not, (seemingly) will not, and potentially even cannot fix the problem that a government is in a position to subvert the DNS hierarchy: it is just a fundamental property of deciding to build the web on top of a federated namespace managed by governments. We need to fix this at the web-protocol level by ditching the current TLD authority for something that isn't governmental (and is more distributed, not federated). I mean, let's look at surveillance that doesn't even require a certificate: 1) governments are in a position to redirect traffic to websites within their namespace by forging the DNS records anywhere under their TLD; 2) IP doesn't provide any protection against someone forwarding the encrypted packets; and 3) TLS only encrypts the content, but doesn't have any mechanism to encrypt the metadata of the communication channel (timing and length)... ...this is already devastating, as not only does it let you target small regions of people and determine if they are accessing a website, it also (and this is the thing that I find not enough people really internalize correctly) let's you know exactly what those users are accessing with high certainty, as you can see the approximate size of the responses to their requests. This technique has been successfully implemented in the past to figure out not merely which page of a site you are visiting, but what region of Google Maps you are looking at (based on patterns of map tile sizes), what video on YouTube you are looking at (based on patterns of video chunk sizes), and (maybe the most incredible) what your search query is (based on patterns of type-ahead suggestion lists: every keystroke causes a new request with a new JSON response of a different size; I think they did it for PornHub). > Finally, as I keep saying: we're never going to get "DNS transparency". I think you're throwing up your hands in defeat at something that we actually can fix in the browser stacks: simply add a new TLD that stores all of its second-level records on a blockchain. We already have some of these... they aren't designed well, as they don't have people who actually know much about the needs of internet protocols involved (the level of "defeat snatched from the jaws of victory" in this space is simply insane), but if people like us constantly point in the correct direction, we can pull this off. Or like, hell: maybe you find distributed blockchain tech distatesful... what if the EFF partnered with Google to manage a new TLD? Hell: Google already manages a TLD in a similar conceptual space (the one where Chrome requires HTTPS on all connections)! And then, what if they decided that DNS transparency was important enough to implement a scheme similar to the CA transparency lists for it? It would take some effort to come up with the correct design for this, but it isn't as if CA transparency was easy to pull off or is in any way perfect even today: it is a shaky system that only sometimes helps, but you care anyway! That isn't going to happen if you just write off DNS transparency as so impossible that it isn't even worth discussing. If you, instead, consistently said DNS transparency is really important, even though it is hard, maybe people at Google, EFF, Apple, Mozilla, or who all else might be relevant for this might suddenly get inspired to work on it... and, sure: to do it as a new TLD doesn't fix the problem immediately, but new websites are launched all the time, new TLDs already are successfully booted (even by Google), developers seemingly like to jump on fad TLDs, and if you start somewhere, maybe the pressure will slowly cause some of the existing TLDs to do something similar. Sure, DNSSEC might be a non-starter... but like, replacing DNSSEC is equivalent to fixing it, if you are willing to take a long-enough term approach to your advocacy efforts.
- tptacek 1y agoIronically, I think you've managed to meet my cynicism about DNS security with something even more reductive. I think it's more true than not that a browser monopoly reformed the WebPKI. That doesn't mean I think a browser monopoly is a good thing, only that it did one good thing, and losing that good thing would be, uh, bad. You're accusing me of "throwing my hands up". But you're also writing a comment that suggests maybe it's not a big deal if TLS certificates can get spoofed by state adversaries; how could it be worse than how things are now? I mean: in a sense, I get it, because I don't think any of this is the high order bit of Internet security, which has a lot more to do with xnu and Android kernel security decisions than with all this protocol ceremony. As I keep saying, the fact that DNSSEC is essentially a key escrow system run by world governments is just one of my objections, and not the one I personally care most about. What I care most about is spending hundreds of millions of dollars in a forklift upgrade of a core Internet protocol, all to take several steps backwards in Internet security.