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I don't see you responding to the question. You're fixating on protections for DNS servers, because that is the only circumstance in which DNSSEC could matter f
by tptacek 1y ago
I don't see you responding to the question. You're fixating on protections for DNS servers, because that is the only circumstance in which DNSSEC could matter for these threat actors, not because they can't target the address space of the TLS servers themselves (they can), but because if you concede that they can do this, DNSSEC doesn't do anything anymore; attackers will just leave DNS records intact, and intercept the "authentic" server IPs.
So far your response to this has been "attackers can't do this to Cloudflare". I mean, stipulated? Good note? Now, can you draw the rest of the owl?
- iscoelho 1y agoI am focusing on DNS because this thread is about DNSSEC. The topic of doing it in to the TLS servers themselves is a tangent not relevant to this thread.
- tptacek 1y agoNo, I'm sorry, that's not the case. You're focusing on DNS servers as the target for BGP4 attacks because if you didn't, you wouldn't have a rebuttal for the very obvious question of "why wouldn't BGP4 attackers just use BGP4 to intercept legitimate ALPN challenges". The thread is right here for everyone to read.