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> It is important. This is unfortunate rhetoric that is harming the safety of the internet. DNSSEC was built for exactly one use case: we have to put root/TLD
by mike_d 1y ago
> It is important. This is unfortunate rhetoric that is harming the safety of the internet.
DNSSEC was built for exactly one use case: we have to put root/TLD authoritative servers in non-Western countries. It is simply a method for attesting that a mirror of a DNS server is serving what the zone author intended.
What people actually want and need is transport security. DNSCrypt solved this problem, but people were bamboozled by DNSSEC. Later people realized what they wanted was transport security and DoH and friends came into fashion.
- iscoelho 1y agoDNSSEC is about authentication & integrity. DNSCRYPT/DOH is about privacy. They solve completely different problems and have nothing to do with one another. There is also no reason we can't have both.
- tptacek 1y agoIf you have secure channels from recursers all the way back to authority servers (you don't, but you could) then in fact DoH-like protocols do address most of the problems --- which I contend are pretty marginal, but whatever --- that DNSSEC solves.
- iscoelho 1y agoYessir, that isn't possible yet but it would absolutely be a solution! I'd love to see it.
- tptacek 1y agoWhat's more, it's a software-only infrastructure upgrade: it wouldn't, in the simplest base case, require zone owners to reconfigure their zones, the way DNSSEC does. It doesn't require policy decisionmaking. DNS infrastructure operators could just enable it, and it would work --- unlike DNSSEC. (Actually getting it to work reliably without downgrade attacks would be more work, but notably, that's work DNSSEC would have had to do too --- precisely the work that caused DANE-stapling to founder in tls-wg.)
- cyberax 1y agoI'd love to see DoH/DoT that uses a stapled DNSSEC-authenticated reply containing the DANE entry. There's still a chicken-and-egg problem with getting a valid TLS certificate for the DNS server, and limiting DNSSEC just for that role might be a valid approach. Just forget that it exists for all other entry types.
- tptacek 1y agoStapling is dead: nobody could agree on a threat model, and they ultimately ended up at an HPKP-style cached "this endpoint must staple DANE" model that TLS people rejected (reasonably). But if you have DoH chaining all the way from the recurser to the authority, it's tricky to say what stapled DANE signatures are even buying you. The first consumers of that system would be the CAs themselves.
- cyberax 1y agoThat's why I want to use it only for DoH/DoT queries. Which will be used by the CAs to issue the WebPKI certs. This way, it can be used to guarantee the integrity of the resolution path without first getting a certificate from a CA.
- tptacek 1y agoI'm just saying, at that point, you're using a custom TLS protocol, because the real TLS protocol doesn't have a DANE-stapling extension.