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> Didn't need to deal with Spectre and Meltdown issues? If we made out-of-order work in ways where much more could be in flight and the compilers / assemblers w
by zozbot234 1y ago
> Didn't need to deal with Spectre and Meltdown issues? If we made out-of-order work in ways where much more could be in flight and the compilers / assemblers would know how to avoid stalls based on dependencies, or how to schedule dependencies? What if we took expensive operations, like semaphores / locks, and built solutions in to the chip?
I'm pretty sure that these goals will conflict with one another at some point. For example, the way one solves Spectre/Meltdown issues in a principled way is by changing the hardware and system architecture to have some notion of "privacy-sensitive" data that shouldn't be speculated on. But this will unavoidably limit the scope of OOO and the amount of instructions that can be "in-flight" at any given time.
For that matter, with modern chips, semaphores/locks are already implemented with hardware builtin operations, so you can't do that much better. Transactional memory is an interesting possibility but requires changes on the software side to work properly.
- AtlasBarfed 1y agoIf you have a very large CPU count, then I think you can dedicate a CPU to only process a given designated privacy/security focused execution thread. Especially for a specially designed syscall, perhaps That kind of takes the specter meltdown thing out of the way to some degree I would think, although privilege elevation can happen in the darndest places. But maybe I'm being too optimistic
- hnaccount_rng 1y agoIsn't the problem the "labelling" of "privacy-sensitive" in the first place?