And who can push new code after the manufacturer's bankruptcy? I've worked in IoT and I'd say the biggest security problems are in this order: - Devices requir

And who can push new code after the manufacturer's bankruptcy? I've worked in IoT and I'd say the biggest security problems are in this order: - Devices requiring Internet access for functionality that could have been done locally - Hardware SDKs which are basically abandoned forks by manufacturers so IoT companies ship stone-age kernels and device drivers - The usual stuff: too much complexity, lack of tests, bad documentation, meaning old parts of the software get forgotten (but remain exploitable) Theoretical waxing about trusted computing and remote attestation does seem disingenuous when problems with non-certified firmware is probably not even in the top 10 in the real world. Notice how the article author mentions some scary attacks but conveniently omits how the attackers actually gained access?